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THE REGIME AND THE INTELLECTUALS
Priscilla Johnson

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SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT

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The Regime and the Intellectuals:
A Window on Party Politics

(Winter 1962–Summer 1963)

By Priscilla Johnson

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The Regime and the Intellectuals:

A Window on Party Politics

By Priscilla Johnson

EDITORS' NOTE: We present this detailed study of the recent campaign against artistic freedom and the liberal intellectuals in the USSR not only because of the fascinating character of the campaign itself, but also because the details shed a great deal of light on the nature of Soviet politics in general and on the interrelationship between internal party disputes and cultural politics in particular. In tracing the numerous ups and downs of the campaign starting with Khrushchev's tempestuous visit to the Manezh Gallery in Moscow on December 1, 1962, and ending with the plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee at the end of June of this year, Miss Johnson has, in our opinion, performed a singularly impressive service for all those interested in the inner workings of the Soviet political system. The strength of the "conservative" versus the "liberal" forces within the intellectual community; the ties that may be presumed to exist between these two groups and their counterparts in the highest echelons of the Communist Party; Khrushchev's position vis-à-vis these groups; the relationship between Soviet external and internal politics; the influence of public opinion within and outside the USSR; personal relations between various writers: such are the problems examined by Miss Johnson in this account of the latest attempt by the Communist Party to suppress and control the ever-burgeoning quest for artistic and political freedom in the USSR.

MORE THAN A YEAR AGO, while their conservative hetmen were off on a tour of the provinces, a group of writers in Moscow skillfully wielded the secret ballot to elect eight of their young and liberal members to the board of the Moscow writers' organization. Two leading conservatives were blackballed and three others failed even to be nominated for reelection. Stung by their defeat, the diehards retired to Rostov-on-Don, seat of the most reactionary writers' organization in the USSR, to lick their wounds and contemplate revenge.

"Such pain has accumulated in my soul," said Leonid Sobolev, head of the Russian Republic writers' organization, "that I cannot help speaking about it." The conservative writers, he promised, would have their revenge, and would have it "from a party position in literature." [1]

Less than a year later, in March 1963, it appeared that the conservatives had had their revenge. Yet precisely because they won it "from a party position in literature," they, like the liberals, seem doomed to perennial disappointment. For, as recent events have made increasingly plain, it is the policy of the Soviet Communist Party to use first the left, then the right, exploiting both, never giving up control, never wholly committing itself to either.

Surely, by last autumn, the liberals of both art and literature had racked up such a string of successes that they may well have suffered that Communist feeling of

Miss Johnson, now at work on a book about contemporary Soviet literature, had spent two years in the Soviet Union for the North American Newspaper Alliance, and revisited the country again last fall. Her articles have appeared in Harper's, Atlantic, The Reporter, *and other American journals.*

[1] See *Literatura i zhizn,* May 13-16-20, 1962. For a fuller account of this incident, see D. Burg, "The 'Cold War' on the Literary Front", Part III, *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1963, p. 57.

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"dizziness from success." In the field of art, there had been a few books and articles defending modern, even abstractionist, trends in painting, even occasional exhibits of modern painting and sculpture. On the literary front the liberal gains had been more spectacular and even more far-reaching. In 1962 the conservatives were foiled in at least two attempts to disband the liberal Moscow writers' organization. Later that year Yevgeni Yevtushenko and Vasili Aksionov, symbols of the spirit of youthful liberalization, were elected to the editorial board of the journal *Yunost.* At a plenary meeting of the board of the Moscow writers' organization at the end of September, the critic Alexander Borshchagovski delivered a stout speech in praise of the young.[2] The poetess Bella Akhmadulina sounded the note of hope that was now—partly with sincerity, partly from tactical dexterity—being proclaimed by young writers: "I think that the time has become happy for us, that it now runs in our favor. Not only can my comrades work, but they are given every encouragement in their endeavor."[3]

The cause of Akhmadulina's elation was not far to seek. It seemed indeed that an amnesty had now been declared for an entire generation of writers who only a few months before had been under fire as moral and political corrupters of youth. Under the terms of the amnesty, critics were free to write as they pleased about the literary merits of these writers. They were not, however, openly to question their political motives in print. The amnesty appeared to mean that the Communist Party now was placing itself squarely in the liberal camp.

And yet there were signs all summer and fall that, chastened as it might be, the conservative impulse in the arts was anything but dead. In July the party theoretical journal *Kommunist* published an unsigned article "'On the Attitude Toward the Literary Heritage of A. V. Lunacharsky." Naming no names, the article seemed aimed against those, such as Ilya Ehrenburg, who had cited the views of Lenin's Commissar of Enlightment to justify a lenient party policy in the arts. During the same month, July, the literary journal *Zvezda* printed a scurrilous, politically motivated attack on the alleged "leftism" of the 29-year-old poet Andrei Voznesenski. When the first, liberal volume of the *Short Literary Encyclopedia* appeared in midsummer with Alexei Surkov as editor-in-chief, it was greeted by praise, then criticism, and then, strangely, by silence. Finally, Poetry Day, celebrated usually on the first Sunday in October, was mysteriously postponed and held only on December 16.

[2] *Moskva,* No. 12, 1962.

[3] *Literaturnaia gazeta* (henceforth LG), Oct. 2, 1962.

THERE IS LITTLE doubt that these conflicting trends in literature, one liberal, the other conservative, only reflected a far more fundamental split in the political sphere—above all, the struggle by bureaucrats left over from the Stalin era to hang onto their power and positions. On October 21, with scarcely any warning, *Pravda* published a poem by Yevgeni Yevtushenko called "Stalin's Heirs." In the poem, Yevtushenko called upon the Communist Party "to double, to triple" the guard at Stalin's grave "lest Stalin rise again and, with Stalin, the past." The author of the poem, and those who decided to publish it, may have been aiming a blow not only at heirs of Stalin in general, but at one in particular. A passage in the poem reads: "Not for nothing do Stalin's heirs have their share of heart attacks." The most prominent member of the leadership known to have had a heart attack was Frol R. Kozlov.[4] On the day "Stalin's Heirs" appeared, the newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda* published still another poem by Yevtushenko, "Fears." This poem celebrated the end of terror. Neither poem had been published before, although they had been known to exist for some time.

Then, in November, the literary journal *Novyi mir* appeared, containing Alexander Solzhenitsyn's remarkable and powerfully understated story, "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." A moving description of life in a Soviet prison camp under Stalin, the story was bound to stir up a public sentiment that those responsible for the crimes of the Stalin era must now be brought to account. Its publication seemed to be a signal that destalinization was about to be carried deeper than ever before. It appeared to mean that all over the country the jobs, and perhaps even the lives, of those who had assisted the terror, were now in peril.[5]

Meanwhile, another threat to the Stalinists was rapidly coming to fruition. When the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party convened on November 19, it decreed an enormous overhaul of the entire economic and political apparatus of the country. This, too, seemed partly a design to flush out Stalin's heirs, hidebound and unproductive, from their jobs in the name of greater economic efficiency. Already an old

[4] In an interview with Wolfgang Leonhard, reported in *Die Zeit* (Hamburg), Feb. 8, 1963, Yevtushenko failed to deny, in response to a question, that the leader he had in mind was Kozlov. Kozlov's first heart attack took place in 1960.

[5] The editors evidently had permission to publish the story at latest by Sept. 21, the date *Novyi mir* (henceforth referred to as NM) was delivered to the printer, as the fine for withdrawing the 67-page manuscript after it had been set in type would have been virtually prohibitive. Knowing well in advance, then, that the story was to appear, Stalinist elements in the party had plenty of time to prepare a counter-action.

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debate, on the relative weight of economic versus ideological factors in a socialist society, had been reopened,[6] with Khrushchev on the side of those who believe that economic factors take precedence and that ideological factors are secondary.[7] His, then, was the moving spirit in the reorganization.

That his had been the leading role in reopening the anti-Stalin campaign in literature as well came to light at the Central Committee session. In a speech on November 23, Khrushchev revealed that it was he who had authorized publication of Yevtushenko's "Stalin's Heirs" and Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." Other members of the Soviet leadership, he revealed, had suggested cuts in the story, but he had overruled them on the ground that "no one had the right to alter the author's version."[8]

Khrushchev's speech was never made public. Only a few days after it was delivered, he himself appeared to set in motion a dramatically reversed policy toward the arts. The last week of November was, in fact, one of those enigmatic periods familiar to students of the Soviet scene, in which a trend that appears to be on the rise is, like a wave, actually at its crest, about to flow into swift and perilous descent.

Already, as the plenary session adjourned, it announced the creation of a special Ideological Commission of the Central Committee, to be headed by Leonid Ilichev. It was the purpose of the new commission to see to it that ideological activity be not relaxed but stepped up during the forthcoming period of attention to economic reforms.

An initiative had meanwhile been undertaken by Stalin's heirs in the hope of retrieving their position. While the Central Committee was meeting between November 19 and 23, it received a petition "from a large group of artists" complaining of growing "formalist trends in art" and asking the party to intervene. This was the first step in a long chain which was to see party conservatives destroy the recent liberal trend in art, then literature, in an attempt to halt the process of destalinization and upset the balance of power inside the party Presidium itself. They were aided, it is safe to assume, by the American out-facing of Khrushchev in Cuba in late October and by growing criticism of Khrushchev's policies from China. Let us look at the second link in the chain that led to action.

Art for the Party's Sake

On Monday evening, November 26, a semi-private exhibit of art that by Moscow standards was avant-garde, opened in the barn-like studio of a 38-year-old art teacher named Eli Beliutin. A handful of Western correspondents attended. So, too, did Soviet cultural officials and several hundred specially invited Muscovites. Hundreds more waited outside, hoping to get in. About 75 canvasses were shown, done by students of Beliutin in abstract or semi-abstract style. So, too, was work by the sculptor Ernst Neizvestny. The exhibit, closed to the public, lasted only a few hours. In retrospect, however, it is a perfect example of why it has been the strategy of Soviet liberals in recent years carefully to weigh each step forward, lest that particular step be the one to precipitate a reversal to past methods.

On Thursday evening, November 29, a second exhibit of modern art was to take place in the Yunost Hotel in Moscow. Hours before it was to open, the show was mysteriously postponed. Later, it was cancelled altogether. In the meantime, the work at the Beliutin studio was suddenly summoned to the huge Manezh gallery, where a retrospective exhibit, "Thirty Years of Moscow Art," of 2000 canvasses and sculptures in now fashionable variations of the official, socialist realist style, had been underway for nearly a month. The works from Beliutin's were not hung with the rest, but placed in three separate rooms. The Beliutin painters themselves had no idea why their work was summarily brought to the Manezh.[9] In the optimistic atmosphere of that time, some may have believed that their work was at last to be shown to the public. If that was their hope, it was destined to cruel disappointment.

On Saturday afternoon, December 1, Nikita Khrushchev, accompanied by four Presidium members and several members of the party Secretariat, paid a surprise visit to the Manezh. Khrushchev's reaction, with all its violence and crudity, has already been reported elsewhere.[10] What is significant in this context is that to

[6] See *Pravda,* Sept. 28, 1962, "New V. I. Lenin Document" and editorial; *Kommunist,* No. 14 (Sept.), 1962; speech by N. S. Khrushchev, *Pravda,* April 26, 1963; *Kommunist,* No. 7 (May), 1963, pp. 30-41.

[7] Speech by Alexei Adzhubei, *Pravda,* June 20, 1963.

[8] *New York Times,* Nov. 29, 1962.

[9] *New Statesman* (London), Dec. 28, 1962.

[10] See transcript of Khrushchev's remarks in *Encounter* (London), April 1963, pp. 102-103.

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certain high-ranking cultural officials, not to mention Neizvestny and the Beliutin painters who also were on hand, Khrushchev's negative reaction, let alone his violence, came as a total surprise. For hadn't Khrushchev authorized the release of a volume of liberal writing, *Tarusskie stranitsy,* in 1961, after his officials had confiscated it? And weren't his words of praise on opening the glassily modern Pioneer Palace only the summer before on record?[11] There was, then, a "myth" of Khrushchev's liberalism, and it seemed not altogether lacking in foundation.

As anyone who has trailed him on visits to Western exhibitions is aware, Khrushchev appears genuinely to detest modern painting and sculpture, as distinct from functional architecture. Thus, those who had instigated his visit to the Manezh and who stood by him, making disparaging remarks about the modernistic paintings, probably counted on an outburst of profanity and were prepared to use the visit for their own ends. In the post-Cuba atmosphere, with supporters of moderate policies in every sphere on the defensive, these conservatives were primed to carry the consequences very far indeed. They were lucky in their timing. The panic that seized them over "Ivan Denisovich" coincided neatly with an inner-party recoil after Cuba.

THUS, WITHIN HOURS after Khrushchev's explosion at the Manezh, the campaign for "ideological purity" in art was under way. The papers came out with editorials demanding, among other things, that all unions of artists, writers, composers, film and theater workers be merged into a single one so as to prevent nonconformity in the future; old-time bureaucrats came back into prominence, and some were elected to important positions. Yet the liberals took action as well. Undeterred by the thought that criminal charges of "factionalism" might later be raised against them, at least three groups of intellectuals now sent protest petitions to the Central Committee. A group of young abstract painters declared in a letter that they were seeking their way in "socialist art," and that without such searches there could be no progress.[12] A group of seventeen eminent artists and scientists, in a message addressed directly to Khrushchev, pleaded with him "to stop the swing in the representational arts to past methods which are alien to the whole spirit of our times."[13] The signatories of this letter included two Nobel Prize-winning scientists, Igor Tamm and Nikolai Semionov, as well as the writers Konstantin Simonov, Ilya Ehrenburg, Kornei Chukovski and Veniamin Kaverin, the sculptors Konenkov and Favorski, the composer Dimitry Shostakovich, the film maker Mikhail Romm, and others.[14] A similar letter, but one which appeared to go even farther, calling for "'peaceful coexistence' of all trends in art," was also dispatched. According to one source, this letter was later withdrawn.[15] According to others, one or more signatures were withdrawn.[16] The very fact, which later came to light, that Alexei Surkov, former head of the Writers' Union and persecutor of Boris Pasternak, was one of the original signatories of this letter, is a sign how deep the dry rot of liberal ideas had penetrated even those on whom the party had hitherto been able to rely as sturdy zealots of conformity.

Speeches and Discussions

At a meeting on December 17 between party leaders and 400 writers, artists and other intellectuals at the Pioneer Palace on Lenin Hills, the first phase of the new campaign came to a head. The gathering was addressed by Khrushchev in a speech that has not been published. The main address, however, said to have been ten hours long, was given by Ilichev. Art, he said, must be militant. It must inculcate "Communist Party spirit." The artist has no right to a view of human nature that is his own. He has no right to forgive weakness, or indulge in "abstract humanism." Yet the truly striking note in Ilichev's speech was its defensiveness. "It is considered inconvenient," he complained, "and unfashionable to defend correct party positions; one might get the reputation of being, so to say, a reactionary and a conservative." Unwittingly, he disclosed just how much pressure the regime was under to allow greater freedom of expression. There are people, he admitted, who are demanding an end to all censorship: "Exhibitions without juries, books without editors, the right of the artist to display without an intermediary what he wishes. 'Let us create as we ourselves wish,' these people say. 'Do not restrict us.'"

Again and again, so that it is almost a leitmotif, he lamented the influence of the West on Soviet art. In so doing, he showed just how vulnerable the party itself is to praise of its artistic exports abroad, and how skillfully the liberals have used their renown in the West to bolster their standing at home.

[11] See editorial in *Izvestia,* Dec. 4, 1962.
[12] Speech by Leonid Ilichev, *Pravda,* Dec. 22, 1963.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 28, 1962.
[15] Ilichev, speech cited above.
[16] Speech by Mikhail Sokolov, LG, April 2, 1963.

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Compared with such speeches in the past, however, Ilichev's tone, at least in the published text, was mild. Not only did he avoid aspersions on the motives of the modern-minded intellectual, but he specifically granted that "he might have shed blood in the war and be guided by very good intentions." Furthermore, some of the informal exchanges that took place at the meeting —of which the outside world learned subsequently—are as remarkable for what they reveal about Khrushchev's own feelings as for what they tell of the intellectuals' resistance to party interference in art. Thus Ilya Ehrenburg cited the cases of Picasso and Mayakovsky to show that modern artists need not, as the party insists, be political reactionaries.[17] The sculptor Ernst Neizvestny reportedly said to Khrushchev: "You may not like my work, but it has the warm support of such eminent Soviet scientists as Kapitsa and Landau." Khrushchev replied: "That's not why we admire Kapitsa and Landau."[18] Yevtushenko rose to Neizvestny's defense in a chivalrous exhibition of loyalty. "He came back from the war with 14 bullets in his body," he declared. "I hope he will live many more years and produce many more fine works of art." To which Khrushchev replied: "As they say, only the grave corrects a hunchback." It was Yevtushenko's turn to deliver an admonition: "I hope, Comrade Khrushchev, we have outlived the time when the grave was used as a measure of correction." Stunned at first, the audience burst into applause. Even Khrushchev joined in.[19] These displays of solidarity within the liberal camp, irrespective of medium, help explain why the campaign was so quick to spread from art into literature.

A stormy intervention by Khrushchev on anti-Semitism was occasioned by Shostakovich's choice of Yevtushenko's poem "Babi Yar" as the theme for the first movement of his new Thirteenth Symphony. There is no anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev declared. Nevertheless, it is better for Jews not to hold high posts in government, for this only stirs popular resentment. Khrushchev added that in his opinion the unrest in Poland and Hungary in 1956 had been caused by the large number of Jews in high places. Such an uneasy stir arose in the hall after these remarks that later Khrushchev went up to Ehrenburg and assured him that his words had not been directed at him personally. "You must understand," Khrushchev told him, "that as a professional politician I have to take things as I find them and warn against dangers."[20] In the aftermath of Khrushchev's statement, Yevtushenko agreed to add several new lines to "Babi Yar."[21]

On December 24 and 26, Ilichev held a meeting at Central Committee headquarters with 140 writers, artist and film workers. In his speech,[22] he used the technique of separating sheep from goats, hopeless sinners from those who may yet be redeemed, that was to become almost a hallmark of the campaign. He praised three speakers at the meeting for their "civic maturity": Neizvestny, Yevtushenko (evidently for agreeing to add new lines to "Babi Yar"), and Aksionov (for agreeing, after holding out for months, to make revisions in the screen of his story, "Ticket to the Stars"). On the other hand, he was highly critical of the painter N. Andronov (who continued his stubborn resistance and at no time recanted), as well as of the poet-guitarist Bulat Okudzhava, the young twelve-tone composer Andrei Volkonski, and the writer Yuri Nagibin (for an article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* praising Neizvestny). Nagibin's wife, Bella Akhmadulina, was not mentioned at all. Andrei Voznesenski, out of the country on a visit to Paris and Italy, was damned with faint praise. As for the poets Robert Rozhdestvenski, Yegor Isaiev, Rimma Kazakova and Vladimir Firsov, their voices, said the party leader, "resound more and more strongly." (Firsov and Isaiev belong to the conservative-national trend. They were to receive more and more of a buildup as the campaign went on.)

Even as Ilichev was meeting with artists and writers alike, a skirmish was clearly under way between moderates, who still hoped to limit the campaign to art, and extremists who wanted to carry it into literature, their target all along because of its role in destalinization. Thus, on December 25, the conservative critic Sergei Baruzdin had a front-page article in *Literaturnaia gazeta* urging the paper to stop taxing the Union of Artists and the Academy of Arts with liberalism and start criticizing the Union of Writers, "which is much closer to it." Here, warned Baruzdin, "there is something to think and argue about—something even to criticize." As though cued to Baruzdin's warning, the very next issue of the paper, that of December 27, revealed the replacement of V. A. Kosolapov as editor-in-chief by the more orthodox Alexander Chakovski.[23]

[17] *Le Monde,* Dec. 28, 1962.

[18] *Time* (New York), Jan. 11, 1963.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *The Observer* (London), Jan. 13, 1963.

[21] It has been reported that it was Shostakovich who first yielded to demands that new lines be added to the symphonic text of "Babi Yar" and that Yevtushenko complied only after the composer had done so.

[22] LG, Jan. 10, 1963.

[23] As of Jan. 22, 1963, six other editors were dropped; V. N. Bolkhovitinov (editor of *Science and Life*), Yuri Bondarev (author of "Quietude"), G. M. Korabelnikov, Boris Leontiev, Vladimir Soloukhin and Yevgeni Surkov.

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Yet, at the same time, signals of an opposite sort were going out—signals that could only mean that moderate forces were fighting to hold the line, with high support in the party. On December 28, for example, *Pravda* published Yuri Kazakov's "An Easy Life," the story of a ne'er-do-well in Siberia. The significance of the story's appearance at precisely this moment, and in *Pravda* at that, was striking. For it was well known in Moscow literary circles that Kazakov's tale, written in 1957, had been rejected by publisher after publisher because the morals of the hero were too lackadaisical for a literature that still claimed to abide by the uplifting canons of socialist realism. On New Year's Day, the head of the Writers' Union, Konstantin Fedin, made a public plea that literature be spared. "Extremism," Fedin argued, had been almost nonexistent in literature compared with the fine arts. If there were now to be a "campaign," or "extraordinary measures," writers would be unable "to make a new step forward." Besides, a campaign would only "drive the illness inside." [24] Two days later, *Pravda* ran an astonishingly outspoken letter by the venerable Kornei Chukovski, winner of the Lenin Prize for literature in 1962, praising young writers.

JANUARY, ON THE WHOLE, was a time of paradox, of patent indecision at the top. The press saved its fire for "formalism" in the fine arts. Writers were criticized less as writers than as patrons of modern art.[25] Yet, on January 17, an exhibit of 300 canvasses by the French painter Fernand Léger, an abstractionist who had the grace to be a Communist as well, opened at the Pushkin Museum, where it ran for three months before being shipped back to Paris. The young poets were giving as many public readings as ever, and the much-criticized Bulat Okudzhava was permitted to perform with his guitar before a crowd of 10,000 at the Sports Palace. Valentin Kataiev and the playwright Viktor Rozov left for the United States as planned, and Yevtushenko slipped off on a visit to West Germany and France. Before leaving, he fired a rather defiant poetic parting shot,[26] which seems to reflect inner turmoil over the lines he had been prevailed upon to add to "Babi Yar."

In the fine arts there were signs of stubborn resistance even from the public, to say nothing of the artists themselves. At a Komsomol meeting at Moscow University in late December, Yevgeni Katsman, an official of the Union of Artists, was booed when he tried to expound the new line to students. With art officials traveling all over the country on missions similar to Katsman's, some audiences were cool; others, outspokenly hostile. As far away as Irkutsk there were reports of violent debates, with students vehement in their defense of Western abstractionism and Russian avant-garde art of the 1920's. Even art officials showed signs of resistance—*e.g.*, members of the Lenin Prize Committee stayed away in a boycott when a painting by Vladimir Serov, "With Lenin," came up for discussion.

Firm as most writers proved to be in their opposition when the campaign later turned full force against them, it is the artists who were the most silent and stubborn of all. Having had less success than the writers, and having played less of a public role throughout the post-Stalin era, possibly they have not been so inhibited by a feeling of responsibility. Having had fewer hopes in recent years that by skillful maneuvering they could push the calendar of progress forward, they have been more willing simply to paint "for the drawer" and wait for times to change. Thus, they have had a rather special immunity to blackmail or temptation. The recantations were few and far between.

It was not, in fact, until six weeks after the party pilgrimage to the Manezh that so much as one of the young painters whom Khrushchev had criticized there could be persuaded to come forward in *Pravda* (January 14) with anything resembling a recantation. This statement, by Andrei Vaznetsov, was scarcely a thing of contrition. Vaznetsov praised three youthful colleagues whom Khrushchev had singled out for criticism. Matisse, Picasso and Léger he termed "great artists." He called the work of young painters a "natural reaction" against the "pomposity, varnishing and soullessness" of Stalinist art and declared that "new content does not always fit into old forms." That *Pravda* even printed such a statement is testimony to the difficulty the party was having—and continued to have—with the artists.

Attack from the Right

Toward the end of January, the campaign took a sharp break. From now on it was aimed first of all at the writers. The turn occurred on January 20, when

[24] LG, Jan. 1, 1963.

[25] A. Laktionov, in *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1963, criticized Ehrenburg and Nagibin as art patrons. A. Gerasimov, in *Trud*, Jan. 9, bitterly attacked Ehrenburg, Nagibin and Paustovski and added the unlikely charge that *Ogoniok*, edited by Anatoli Sofronov, and *Nedelia*, edited by Alexei Adzhubei, had fallen under "leftist" influence. For this act of excessive conservatism he was rebuked in *Izvestia* and, according to *Le Monde*, Jan. 31, obliged to present a written apology to *Ogoniok*.

[26] Ye. Yevtushenko, "My Ideology," *Izvestia*, Jan. 8, 1963.

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Izvestia printed a pointed, unsigned attack on the 52-year-old Viktor Nekrasov for his travel notes on Italy and America.[27] Calling his notably fair-minded observations on the West "extremely superficial and profoundly incorrect," *Izvestia* warned that his "fifty-fifty" approach in weighing the merits of the two sides in the cold war is "a very dangerous game."

The charge of pro-Westernism, already a main theme in the campaign, was raised again a few days later in a poem by Nikolai Gribachov in *Pravda,* entitled "No, Boys!"[28] This was a parody of a poem by Yevtushenko that had appeared some months earlier.[29] The fact that the party newspaper now chose to print so scurrilous a rejoinder was a signal that conservative fortunes were looking up. The formula applied in the poem is something like this: the West equals abstract art, and a liking for either equals treason:

> **Devil knows what they slap on their canvasses,**
> **Or what they shove into their verse. . . .**
> **They bring us their foreign editions**
> **Like passports to summits of glory. . . .**

The formula continues: Soviet "sons" are ungrateful to their "fathers," who braved war and revolution for their sake. Gribachov then linked up the three, "sons," "abstract art," and the "West," in the person of Yevtushenko. To the latter, he issued a warning that sounds almost like a prophecy of the mishap to come:

> **There's that terrible second abroad,**
> **When you've slipped—and you're already an orphan,**
> **Under the Red Banner no longer. . . .**
> **You're alone. . . .**
> **Condemned to the scorn of your fellows,**
> **Thus, many have vanished into obscurity,**
> **Without a trace, the light from their souls**
> **extinguished,**
> **And no lines, no echo of their songs,**
> **Not even their tears,**
> **have reached us.**

The deeply nationalistic spirit of Gribachov's poem was henceforth an important part of the campaign against the writers.

The opening stage of the literary drive reached its climax a few days after when Izvestia[30] mounted a blistering attack by Yermilov on Ilya Ehrenburg—primarily for the latter's assertion, in his memoirs published in *Novyi mir,* that he and other Soviet citizens had been perfectly well aware during the 1930's that millions of Stalin's victims were innocent, but that they had been compelled to live with "clenched teeth" and be silent.[31] Yermilov vehemently denied this. No one, he insisted, unless he enjoyed some special "advantage," was aware at the time that the arrests were largely a frameup. Those rare individuals who happened to know that a particular victim was innocent "fought, and fought not with silence." The point, of course, was that if a journalist like Ehrenburg knew, what about high-ranking officials, like Khrushchev, who even then held responsible posts in the party? Were they too cowardly to take steps against the slaughter? Or were they knowingly helping to carry it out?

Ehrenburg lost no time replying.[32] He took issue with Yermilov that people "fought" the arrests of the 1930's: "I was not present at a single meeting at which people took the floor to protest the arbitrary persecution of comrades whose innocence they never doubted. Not once did I read an article of protest."

Izvestia printed Ehrenburg's reply, but only with another attack by Yermilov and a note from the editors supporting the attack. Yermilov's second attack repeated his earlier insinuation: either Ehrenburg was lying, or he enjoyed "special insight" or an "advantage" during the 1930's. Such an "advantage" could mean only the protection of Stalin himself. At best, the exchange was an attempt to discredit a leading liberal of the older generation as a coward or liar. At worst, it can be seen as a hint that unless Ehrenburg swallowed his remarks, he might one day find himself on trial for complicity in the crimes of Stalin.[33]

IMMEDIATELY after the initial assault on Ehrenburg, *Izvestia* set out to chasten two other members of the older generation who had protected the talented but mettlesome young.[34] The victims were Alexander Tvardovski, editor of *Novyi mir,* and Boris Polevoi, editor of the journal *Yunost.* Mildly, *Izvestia* scolded Tvardovski for publishing Alexander Yashin's story "Vologda Wedding"—a shocking picture of poverty, brutality and superstition in a Russian village after 47 years of

[27] V. Nekrasov, "On Both Sides of the Ocean," NM, Nos. 11 and 12, 1962. See *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (New York), March 27 and April 3, 1963.

[28] *Pravda,* Jan. 27, 1963.

[29] Ye. Yevtushenko, "Let's Go, Boys!," NM, No. 7, 1962.

[30] Jan. 30, 1963.

[31] The key quotation used by Yermilov came from an installment of Ehrenburg's *People, Years, Life,* published in NM, No. 1, 1961, pp. 105-106. The installment that deals with the purges in greatest detail appears in NM, No. 5, 1962. The storm over Ehrenburg's memoirs was, to say the least, belated.

[32] *Izvestia,* Feb. 6, 1963.

[33] This interpretation is suggested also by Michel Tatu in *Le Monde,* Jan. 31, 1963, and by the Moscow correspondent of the *New Statesman,* March 15, 1963.

[34] *Izvestia,* Jan. 31, 1963.

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Soviet rule. Tvardovski did not reply for three and a half months. Then, in an interview with UPI correspondent Henry Shapiro, he called Yashin's story "excellent" and "full of poetry."[35] He added that the story "was, in my opinion, unjustly attacked in the press." These words were deleted from *Pravda's* account of the interview.[36]

In the other half of its double-barreled attack, *Izvestia* took Polevoi to task for "squeezing" into the January issue of *Yunost* "banal little verses about Italy" by the talented Andrei Voznesenski. Contrary to the expectations of many who had known him before the 1959-62 "thaw" melted all but the most ice-bound reflexes, Polevoi did not apologize. Instead, he denied that the verses were "banal," and suggested that *Izvestia* ought to have taken up its criticisms directly with Voznesenski and not with his editors alone.[37]

After mid-February, there was what one observer has called "a truce, with each camp resting on its positions." For a time, attacks by the extreme conservatives were halted (*e.g.*, a violent assault which Yermilov was said to have prepared against Viktor Nekrasov failed to appear in print[38]), and a number of liberal writers, such as Gladilin, Okudzhava, Ehrenburg, Shchipachov, Yashin, Nagibin, Yevtushenko, and Kazakov, and others appeared in print. Nor were the conservatives silent, going so far as to attack Solzhenitsyn, hitherto virtually above approach.

Briefly the situation in early March could be summarized as follows: The more talented writers and artists were asking a limited right to formal experiment and a right to think their own thoughts. Few

[35] *Pravda*, May 12, 1963.

[36] The words are taken from the UPI text distributed abroad —they constitute the only discrepancy between the UPI and *Pravda* versions.

[37] *Izvestia*, Feb. 14, 1963.

[38] *Le Monde*, March 9, 1963.

A Representative of the Right Wing

Among those writers who were active in the Stalin era there is hardly one who can boast of an "unblemished" record: At one time or another each of them had been impelled—either by fear of consequences, or by more direct and blatant pressure—to pay homage to the great Leader, to sing the praises of "socialist construction," or to damn the enemies of the Soviet Union. To cite indiscriminately from the past, therefore, is often as meaningless as it is unfair: indeed, it is a practice which lends itself to unscrupulous utilization in the Soviet Union itself —as witnessed by the recent attacks upon Ilya Ehrenburg, whose wartime praise of Stalin was cited by Ilichev in an obvious effort to discredit the elderly writer—and thus, simultaneously, to absolve some of the very real accomplices in Stalin's crimes.

This is not to say, of course, that the past record of any public figure in the USSR should be disregarded (see, for that matter, the essay on Ehrenburg in the current issue, p. 15). Quite obviously a man's past is a clue to the present, especially when there is a patent continuity in views and attitudes. The case of the writer Nikolai Gribachov is a case in point. Winner of two Stalin Prizes (1948 and 1949), a Lenin Prize (1960) and various other awards, Gribachov has been in the forefront of the struggle against any manifestations of intellectual liberalism, lending it his own special quality of strident vituperativeness.

No accident, that (as the Communists would say): For Gribachov's entire record is one of unrelieved loyalty to Stalinist values, in his literary as well as journalistic output. The tone and coloring of Gribachov's writings, present and past, indicate that his super-patriotism, anti-Westernism, and hatred of political and artistic open-mindedness are not merely postures adopted for the sake of expediency, but attitudes stemming from perfectly genuine convictions.

Here, for instance, is a passage from an article in which Gribachov welcomed the arrest of nine doctors in January 1953, accused of having murdered—on the orders of the American and British secret services and the Jewish organization "Joint"—a number of Soviet leaders, and of planning to destroy others:

There is weeping at the rivers of Babylon—the most important of which is the Hudson. The "Joint" has been plucked—that vulture dressed in the pigeon-feathers of charity and philanthropy. . .

The bourgeois newspapers are weeping inky tears. From Jerusalem to London creeps the perplexed muttering of the Zionist leaders. . . .

We are tender-hearted people, but in this case we say: let them weep, this will not move us to pity, nor them to reform. We will not sympathize, because we know the real value of their tears and causes, and they will not reform, because even the grave will not reform them*. . .

As the saying goes, you can't make a silk purse out of a sow's ear. . .

* *Krokodil*, Moscow, February 20, 1953.

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were in conscious disagreement with the ideal of communism as such. Insisting on its right to be the arbiter of the intellectual conscience, the party no longer was dealing, as in the "freezes" of 1954 and 1957, with only a handful of creative artists. At poetry readings and art exhibitions, the creative few had now come in contact with tens, maybe hundreds of thousands of intellectuals, many of them young, and sympathy for their work had spread. By the barrage of publicity—the heaviest since the Zhdanov purges of 1946-48—which it had given to the attack, the party had only spread the curiosity and sympathy farther. Thus, after Khrushchev's outburst at the Manezh, the exhibit itself was kept open and crowds flocked there in far larger numbers than before. Jokingly it was said that the Premier's attack on Neizvestny had brought the sculptor more valuable publicity than any exhibition.[39] As far as the public went, the party was dealing more with good-natured curiosity than with anything in the nature of a revolt. But it felt that its authority over the nation's mind and morale was challenged. To deal with the "challenge," extreme conservatives were demanding that the party use "administrative measures," or physical repression, against the liberal intellectuals.[40] Until March 7, there were reports of persistent disbelief in Moscow intellectual circles that the party would consider anything of the kind. But on the eve of the now famous March 7 meeting, darkly pessimistic rumors were heard. Voznesenski and Yevtushenko, it was said, were about to become victims of a major offensive.

The Peak of the Campaign

Thus, it was an apprehensive gathering of 600 writers, artists and other intellectuals who met in the Kremlin's Sverdlov Hall on March 7 to hear the party leaders speak once again. In Paris, Yevtushenko had received an urgent cable on February 28 summoning him home for the meeting. He left on March 4 on the last flight that could deliver him to Moscow on time. Any doubt as to the mood of the intellectuals is put to rest by the rows of somber faces pictured in *Pravda*, the rows of anxious hands scribbling the exact words of the speakers.

Ilichev was the first major speaker.[41] Acknowledging that the discussion touched off on December 1 was by now "a national debate," he conceded that the party's drive had been greeted by skepticism, silence and open protest. Some people, he admitted, were fearful that there would now be "creative stagnation" and "suppression of innovational searches in art." Some "have not merely misunderstood, but continue stubbornly to defend their mistaken views. Some even are trying to win others to their point of view, to surround artists who listen to healthy criticism with a wall of indifference and alienation and to ostracize them, accusing them of 'apostasy' and 'lack of principle.'" Using his "divide and conquer" technique, he announced that Yevtushenko, Neizvestny and Beliutin had "correctly evaluated their errors" (presumably on December 24-26). So, too, had Vaznetsov in his *Pravda* article. Several artists and art critics, on the other hand, were "belligerently taking an incorrect position."

The brunt of Ilichev's speech fell on Ehrenburg. Like Yermilov, he accused the elderly writer of enjoying special protection from Stalin. Hadn't Ehrenburg himself, he asked, quoting some of Ehrenburg's flights of prose, praised Stalin in 1951? As if anticipating that this weapon might one day be turned against himself, Ilichev added: "We all spoke and wrote thus at the time without being hypocritical. We believed and we wrote. And you, it turns out, did not believe, but wrote. These are different positions!"

Ehrenburg chose to make no reply to the vicious attack by Ilichev, nor, indeed, to any that followed. Immediately after the speech, he retired to his dacha outside Moscow. There he apparently remained in seclusion for several weeks. Before leaving the Kremlin hall, however, he pronounced an epitaph of his hopes to a member of the younger generation: "I shall never see the flowering of the Soviet arts," he said sadly. "But you will see it—in twenty years." Reflecting the dismay of Russians in the hall, one foreign observer concluded that it was difficult to tell whether this prophecy erred on the side of optimism or pessimism.[42]

Ilichev's assault on Ehrenburg was seconded by others, including Sholokhov, who is said to have declared as he took the floor: "I have wanted to criticize Ehrenburg for a long time."[43] Other speakers included Ernst Neizvestny, who, again (as on December 24-26) engaged in self-criticism, and the director Grigory Chukhrai, who reportedly delivered a courageous speech in favor of avant-garde filmmaking. Speakers the next day included Vsevolod Kochetov, Vasili Aksionov and the critic Elizar Maltsev. Voznesenski is said to have recited two poems and then opened his remarks: "I am not a member of the Communist Party, nor do I intend to become one. I, like my teacher Mayakov-

[39] *Ibid.*
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Pravda*, March 9, 1963.
[42] *Le Monde*, March 12, 1963.
[43] *Ibid.*, March 10-11, 1963.

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sky. . . ." Referring, apparently, to the poet's nonmembership in the party, Khrushchev broke in: "This is nothing to be proud of." Voznesenski was shouted down as he attempted to go on.[44]

THE MAIN SPEECH of the two-day meeting was that of Nikita Khrushchev.[45] This was the speech that at last brought home to Moscow intellectuals the full ferocity of the campaign that had been mounted against them. Its crux was the partial rehabilitation not merely of Stalin's tastes in art but of Stalin himself:

Did the leading cadres of the party know about the arrests of people at the time? Yes, they knew. But did they know that people were being arrested who were in no way guilty? No, they did not know. They believed Stalin and did not admit the thought that repression could be applied against honest people devoted to our cause.[46]

Almost at a single swoop Khrushchev revealed his vulnerability on the question of Stalin's crimes and contradicted his own claims of ignorance. Thanks to a lack of "yes-men," he boasted, major Stalinist purges were averted in Moscow and the Ukraine at precisely the moments when he had been head of the Moscow and Ukrainian party organizations, respectively. Dating the beginning of Stalin's errors as late as 1934 (only a few weeks before, party historians had been dating his errors back to the early years of the 20th century), Khrushchev made his rehabilitation:

At Stalin's funeral many people, including myself, had tears in their eyes. These were honest tears. Although we knew of some of Stalin's personal shortcomings, still we believed in him.

With these words, Stalin's heirs had gained what they were seeking: they had used what began as a party inquiry into "abstract" art as a lever to halt destalinization.

Khrushchev's references to Ehrenburg were particularly venomous. He compared the elderly Jewish author, the alleged beneficiary of Stalin's protection, not only with the writer Galina Serebriakova,[47] Stalin's victim, but also with Mikhail Sholokhov, who in 1933 wrote a letter to Stalin protesting "outrages" and "excesses" in the drive to collectivize peasants in the Don Valley. By explicitly citing archives of the secret police, Khrushchev no doubt hoped to intimidate his audience: he was reminding them that the same archives could be made to yield up material acutely embarrassing to any of them at any moment the party might choose. And he involved himself in a contradiction of the type that seems not to bother him at all: either the collectivization of 1933 was historically distant from the Great Purges of 1937-38 of which Ehrenburg had been speaking and the comparison with Sholokhov is irrelevant, or the two purges are to be treated as one and the same. In the latter case, how can Sholokhov have known of the "excesses" and Khrushchev, a high party official at the time, not have known?

Even as Khrushchev himself was quoting from the archives, he admonished Soviet writers against dipping too freely into their memories. The purges of the 1930's, he warned, are "a very dangerous theme." Revealing that publishing houses were being "flooded with manuscripts about the life of persons in exile, in prisons, in the camps," he added that such material can only "delight" enemies of the Soviet Union abroad.[48]

In a discussion of a film by M. Khutsiev, "Gate of Ilich," Khrushchev raised what is perhaps the most delicate issue in Soviet life today: that of "fathers and sons." Perhaps this theme is particularly close to the Soviet leader's heart because it, too, raises the question of responsibility during the 1930's. It is the contempt of younger men, many of whom lost their own fathers in the 1930's, for an entire generation of "fathers" who allowed the purges to happen. In one light, it is the special contempt of Soviet young men for old men and old ideas, for "fathers" who learned hidebound bureaucratic ways under Stalin and cannot now unlearn them. In another light, it is the eternal impatience of the young to take over. As he spoke of "Gate of Ilich," Khrushchev denied, as he always does, that a "fathers and sons" question exists. Yet the very vehemence with which he denied it is a measure of his personal

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[44] This account is pieced together from Italian Communist sources and LG, March 30, 1963, speech by V. Firsov.

[45] *Pravda,* March 10, 1963.

[46] For discrepancies between this version and Khrushchev's earlier remarks, see *Problems of Communism,* No. 2, 1963, p. 57.

[47] Widow of two of Stalin's purgees, Grigori Sokolnikov and L. P. Serebriakov, Serebriakova herself spent a decade in prison. In a speech at the Dec. 17 meeting that has not been published, she was reported to have accused Ehrenburg of crimes both penal and political during the Stalin era. In a sensational revelation, she added that Alexander Poskrebyshov, Stalin's personal secretary, who has been presumed dead, was alive and could confirm her charges. Her accusations having lent sinister political overtones to the anti-Ehrenburg campaign from the start, Khrushchev's raising her name helped keep these overtones alive.

[48] In spite of Khrushchev's warning, destalinization literature did not cease to appear: Solzhenitsyn's novel came out in early 1963 (in an edition of 100,000 copies), Kozhevnikov's *The Fleeting Day* in the second quarter (30,000 copies), and I. Stadniuk's *Men Are Not Angels* in the third quarter (115,000 copies).

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sensitivity to the idea that Soviet "fathers" no longer have anything to teach their "sons" and that, as he put it, "there's no use turning to them for advice."[49] Concerned as he is with the "sons," Khrushchev did not forget their "grandfathers," the handful of brave old men who have given the young both their protection and a spiritual tie with a world untouched by Stalinism: the West, 19th-century Russia, and the intensely experimental Soviet Russia of the 1920's. As we have seen, he had already dealt with Ehrenburg. He now went out of his way to criticize Valentin Kataiev (author of "Squaring the Circle") who, as editor of *Yunost,* had helped nearly all the young writers get their start. Kataiev, Khrushchev charged, had been "careless" in his statements in America in January. They flatter an unstable person abroad," said Khrushchev, "call him 'a symbol of a new era,' and he forgets whence he came, where he has come and why, and begins to talk nonsense." Finally, he complained that remarks which Konstantin Paustovski, among others, had made on a visit to France in December produced "an unpleasant impression" on him.

[49] Although Soviet officials insist that the "fathers and sons" question is a Western fabrication, articles on it, mainly by conservatives, appear constantly in the Soviet literary press. Thus, *Oktiabr,* No. 11, 1962, devoted 20 pages to a discussion of the topic. One of the contributors, significantly, was General of the Army A. A. Yepishev, head of the Central Political Department of the Soviet Armed Forces. For an unusual admission that the "fathers and sons" problem is a real one, see *Voprosy literatury,* No. 4, 1963, p. 10.

Another author whom Khrushchev selected for especially sharp reproof was Viktor Nekrasov. He chided the Stalin-Prize-winning novelist for remarks he had made while in France, for his travel notes in *Novyi mir,* and for his praise of the film "Gate of Ilich." For his openmindedness in matters of art and with respect to the West, Khrushchev made clear, Nekrasov was only one doghouse removed from Ehrenburg himself.

Toward no one was Khrushchev so equivocal as toward Yevtushenko. In one passage he accused Yevtushenko along with Ehrenburg of "a gross ideological error" in liking some contemporary art. Praising him for his speech of December 24-26, however, Khrushchev gave the poet a bit of fatherly advice: "To hold dear the trust of the masses and not to seek cheap sensation, not to bow to the ideas and tastes of the philistines." He made the poet's "Babi Yar" the occasion of the longest public statement he has ever given on Soviet anti-Semitism ("We do not have a Jewish question, and those who dream it up are singing a foreign tune.") At the end of his speech, he again applied carrot and stick in bewildering succession. He contrasted Yevtushenko with Voznesenski, Nekrasov, Paustovski and Kataiev, on the one hand, as having "conducted himself worthily" on his visit to West Germany and France. On the other hand, in an interview with *Les Lettres françaises* Yevtushenko "did not withstand the temptation to win the praise of the bourgeois public."

At the moment of Khrushchev's speech, Yevtushenko already was under attack in the press. The attacks did

From Nekrasov's Travel Notes: Awkward Moments of Truth

Somehow I got into a conversation with a young [Italian] film director. . . . When he learned that I had never seen a single film by Bergman or Michelangelo Antonioni, he could not believe his ears.

"You haven't seen Antonioni's pictures?"

"No."

"But why?"

I shrugged. "We just haven't bought any of them."

"You didn't buy any Antonionis? But he is now the most noted director. They are arguing about him all over the world. Not seeing his pictures is the same as not having seen, say, Fellini's 'La Dolce Vita.'"

"But I haven't seen 'La Dolce Vita.'"

He threw up his hands. "You didn't see it?"

"No."

"Well, you simply don't like movies, you're not interested in them. I can't believe that your people didn't buy 'La Dolce Vita.' After all, it's a very serious, intelligent, terrible and also revealing film. I don't believe it." . . .

I was put in a rather difficult position on a third occasion, when I was asked why we don't publish certain writers. . . .

"I can understand," said the person I was talking to—also a Communist, incidentally—"that you have your own views about the tasks of literature and your own publishing plans. I am quite willing to recognize that some writers are closer to you and others more distant, while some are completely alien. . . . But why are you so slow to do Faulkner? Why don't you print Kafka? Why are you so diligent in avoiding Albert Camus? . . . After all, these writers are extremely typical of their time, epoch, state of mind. One doesn't have to love them; one may criticize them, may finally repudiate them, but one must know them."

Was this person right? I think he was.

—From *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* New York, March 27, 1963, pp. 16-17.

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not say so, but it was known in Moscow that the poet had consented to serialization of his five-part autobiography in the French weekly *L'Express,* beginning on February 21. Whether the party would make an issue of the autobiography was a subject of speculation in the Soviet capital. As Khrushchev spoke, however, he must have been aware of the contents of at least two installments of the autobiography. Thus, Khrushchev's speech suggests that he hoped to preserve intact his most famous roving ambassador abroad, the young man who had come to symbolize the new and more liberal image of the USSR. Indeed, the speech even suggests a sort of "father and son" relationship between the two men, a relationship resting perhaps less on personal acquaintance than on Yevtushenko's friendship with Khrushchev's son-in-law, Alexei Adzhubei, whose old newspaper, *Komsomolskaia pravda,* had been one of the first to publish the poet.[50]

EVEN BEFORE THE meeting was over, it was clear that conservatives were still dissatisfied and wanted the drive to go farther. So impatient were they that one of their more moderate members, Alexander Chakovski, who only a few weeks earlier had been installed as editor of *Literaturnaia gazeta* to restore the conservative line, now warned against carrying the campaign too far.[51] Despite this warning, the newspapers were filled the next few days with numerous articles stridently welcoming the new and stricter party position on the arts. Yet from those who were under heaviest attack there was at first no sound of repentance. At a meeting of intellectuals in Leningrad, Nikolai Akimov, 61-year-old director of the Leningrad Comedy Theater, was criticized by the local party secretary Vasili Tolstikov for the "ambiguous ideological message" of several plays staged by Akimov, especially Yevgeni Shvarts' "The Dragon." (The play's message is that one tyrant is too often toppled only to be succeeded by another unless the struggle against tyranny itself goes on.) In response to Tolstikov's "just criticism," reported the newspaper *Leningradskaia pravda,* "Akimov's speech did not satisfy the audience." Nor did speeches by a painter, Leonid Tkachenko, who defended the artist's "right to unlimited forms" and by an unnamed woman curator of the European art section of the Hermitage Museum. She, according to the newspaper, described "formalist" art as "joyous creative work."[52]

Of the intellectuals whom Khrushchev personally had criticized, the first to speak out was Neizvestny.[53] His statement, too, was a masterpiece of ambiguity. It concludes: "Again I tell myself: I must work more, better, more ideologically, more expressively—only thus can I be useful to the country and the people." (No mention of the party.) The only other one was the 30-year-old poet Robert Rozhdestvenski. His brief statement was another miracle of ambiguity.[54] It opens: "It is interesting to be alive." Later: "I find it interesting to be alive." He closed with a defense of "quality" (a liberal byword) was well as "ideological purity" (the party slogan) in art.

So unsatisfactory was the response of young writers that on March 17 *Komsomolskaia pravda* (consistently, now, a mouthpiece of reaction) felt moved to float a proposal by the 20-year-old poet Igor Volgin that was also a threat: "It would be very useful for us to work for a while in local newspapers, journals and printing combines. The experience would enable us better to understand the 'poet's' place in the working system.'"

On March 17, *Pravda* contained two new indications that conservatives were on the warpath. The first was a crude, Stalin-style attack on Michel Tatu, Moscow correspondent of the French newspaper *Le Monde,* on whom more than on any other Western source readers outside the Soviet Union had had to rely for information on the cultural offensive. The attack, signed by Yuri Zhukov,[55] was an attempt to force Tatu's recall to Paris, evidently because detailed and accurate reporting of the drive in the West was not to the liking of the more intransigent Moscow officials.

On the same day, *Pravda* also announced that Stepan Shchipachov, a nonpolitical poet, who had distinguished himself as head of the Moscow organization by his tolerant attitude toward young writers of talent, had been removed two days earlier as chairman

[50] While in France last February, Yevtushenko asked the painter Mark Chagall to send a present to Khrushchev through him. Chagall gave Yevtushenko an autographed biography inscribed "To Nikita Sergeievich." See *Le Monde,* May 7, 1963.

[51] *Pravda,* March 11, 1963.

[52] All signs of dissent were censored out of accounts of the meeting in *Pravda,* March 15, *Sovietskaia kultura* and LG, March 16. A report in *Leningradskaia pravda* was, however, more revealing. See *Baltimore Sun,* March 19; *New York Times,* March 20; *Le Monde,* March 20; and *Time,* March 29.

[53] *Pravda,* March 15, 1963.

[54] *Ibid.,* March 18, 1963.

[55] Once Paris correspondent of *Pravda* and later Chairman of the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. In the latter capacity he told the Supreme Soviet in the fall of 1959, just before negotiating a new cultural exchange agreement with the United States, that such exchanges are a "Trojan Horse."

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of the Moscow organization of the Union of Writers "at his own request" and been replaced by Georgi Markov, author, ironically, of a new novel with the title *Father and Son.*

Main Target: The Young

Shchipachov's fall was a clue to a sudden shift in direction. With meetings of "art workers" now taking place all over the country, the name of Ilya Ehrenburg began, mysteriously, to vanish. Instead, Western-oriented young writers became prime targets of attack,[56] the most ominous of which took place at a meeting of the Moscow writers' aktiv. Its stated purpose was to discuss "serious defects in the ideological education of writers" while Shchipachov, Elizar Maltsev and Alexander Borshchagovski had been guiding spirits of the organization.[57] Pointedly, the ex-leaders were accused of lacking "courage to tell the truth straight out to certain people, for example, to Ye. Yevtushenko, for some of his statements in the press." The lone dissenting voice in this increasingly strident chorus was that of Yulian Seminov, the only young writer to speak at the meeting, was called for "creative work and not fruitless discussions on subjects having little to do with literature."

On March 26, a plenary meeting of the board of the USSR Writers' Union opened in Moscow, amid rumors at home and abroad that the moderate liberal Alexander Tvardovski was to be replaced as editor of *Novyi mir* by Yermilov and that the position of Konstantin Fedin as head of the Writers' Union might also be in jeopardy. In its reports of the meeting, significantly, *Literaturnaia gazeta* featured two photos each of Fedin and Tvardovski, giving the lie to the rumors and showing that both men had powerful moderate support. The meeting opened with a mild plea by Fedin in defense of individuality in art: "We are glad that the importance of artistic individuality has been upheld by Nikita Sergeievich, too." Fedin was followed to the floor by the aging poet Nikolai Tikhonov who, despite a tone of mild reproof toward the young writers, showed himself, like Fedin, to be a moderate: "Let us so act that we are not dragged from our main work as writers by all kinds of petty matters, by various internal squabbles, so that all our energy may be spent for the good of our socialist society, and not inciting passions, which are not stirred, really, by necessity."[58]

Other speeches at the meeting were less moderate. That of Alexander Prokofiev, Lenin Prize-winning poet in 1961 and outspoken opponent of Yevtushenko's travels abroad, set the jealous, embittered tone which many were to follow. Complaining that the liberal spirit had now invaded not merely Moscow, but Leningrad and Siberia as well, he asked why Yevtushenko, Voznesenski, and four or five other "neon innovators" were allowed "vast editions" of fifty and a hundred thousand copies, and why a first book of verse by the young Leningrad poet, Viktor Sosnora, got fourteen reviews "while books by those who take a Soviet position receive almost no attention."[59]

ENVY AND PLAINTIVENESS echo through the other speeches. Repeatedly, the speakers cited a questionnaire that had been sent out by *Voprosy literatury* the year before. In their replies, the speakers complained, too many young writers declared that it was Boris Pasternak who had influenced them most (not Mikhail Sholokhov), Hemingway, Salinger, Heinrich Böll, Erich Maria Remarque, and not home-grown Russian authors. One speaker attacked Soviet writers who "have insistently tried, under cover of cybernetics and modern mathematical methods, to resurrect Russian formalism of the 1920's."[60] Another, licking his chops in revenge, revealed that, "inflamed by a thirst for power," Yevtushenko and Voznesenski at one time sought election as officers of the poetry section of the Moscow writers' organization. They were "blackballed," said the speaker, because the voters were "grown up people and well understood that these comrades were not ripe for leadership."[61]

Yevtushenko, Voznesenski, and to a lesser extent Aksionov were, indeed, the writers whose names were sounded most often, and in scorn. Yevtushenko especially was subjected to vile attacks, of which the one by Boris Riurikov, a former editor of *Literaturnaia*

[56] So, too, did the critics who defended them. See, *e.g.*, remarks on Lev Anninski, Alla Marchenko and B. Runin by Yu. Barabash, LG, March 16.

[57] LG, March 19.

[58] *Pravda,* March 27.

[59] Prokofiev was quite right in his first charge: according to *Kazakhstanskaia pravda* of March 27, for instance, the young Kazakh poet Olzhas Suleimenov had been accused of "formalism" and of being a defender of Voznesenski. As for the "vast editions," however, Prokofiev was indulging in hyperbolics: even at the height of the liberal tide in 1962, most of the young liberals were appearing in editions of 5 to 30 thousand, far below demand, while the classic Sholokhov and reactionary Kochetov came out in editions as large as 500,000.

[60] Speech by I. Anisimov, LG, March 30, 1963; and *Voprosy literatury,* No. 4, 1963, p. 5.

[61] Speech by V. Fiodorov, LG, April 2, 1963.

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gazeta and sometime Central Committee apparatchik with responsibilities in literature, was notable for its unrelieved vehemence. In addition to castigating Yevtushenko, Riurikov, unlike any speaker so far, pinpointed the error for which Voznesenski and Aksionov were, in fact, under fire: an interview they had given the Polish weekly *Polityka* in which they touched on the twin issues of "fathers and sons" and of responsibility for the purges of the 1930's. Suggesting that it might be a matter of motives, Riurikov concluded that these young writers fail to take into account "what a sorry role they play—*whether they will it or not*" [italics added], in the cold war.[62]

The speeches reflected the enormous pressure which Yevtushenko and Voznesenski were now under—Aksionov was out of town—to make a clean breast of their sins and offer up their hearts to the party. Nor was public pressure by any means the whole story. More privately they were told that in future they would not be published at all unless they accepted the right of the party to direct their work.[63]

Another kind of threat was in the air as well. The atmosphere in Moscow by now was one of fear. There was a feeling that control had somehow been lost, that anything might happen, including a swing back to Stalinism. It is perfectly possible that Voznesenski and Yevtushenko were led to believe that their confessions were needed to forestall precisely such an eventuality.

It was not too great a surprise, therefore, when the slender, boyish figure of Andrei Voznesenski rose to the podium facing the assembled writers. What followed was concise, only 114 words, and one of the more remarkable statements in the annals of Russian recantations:

It has been said at this plenum that I must not forget the stern and severe words of Nikita Sergeievich. I shall never forget them. I shall not forget not only these severe words, but also the advice which Nikita Sergeievich gave me. He said: "Work." I do not justify myself now. I simply wish to say that for me the main thing now is to work, work, work. What my attitude is to my country, to communism, what I myself am, this work will show. (*Pravda*, March 29.)

To recant at all is, of course, to concede. But here at least was no extra word, no shade of capitulatory meaning that could be sliced off and exploited. If nuances are crucial for what they save or sacrifice of talent for the future, then Voznesenski's gift may have survived relatively intact. In the art of recantation, evidently, he had gone to school to Boris Pasternak, his teacher in life, as in poetry.

Yevtushenko's recantation is a measure of the ambivalence of the man. Alternately defiant and abject, it was published only in part, and hence misrepresented. How grossly, we do not know. According to some sources, the poet defended himself and even counterattacked. Characteristically, he vigorously defended his colleague Neizvestny. On the other hand, he took issue with Ehrenburg's "glib" phrase, "the Thaw," insisting that it was "Spring"—a breach of solidarity under fire even though Yevtushenko had made this criticism before. In those portions of the statement that appeared in the Soviet press,[64] Yevtushenko confined himself to the autobiography. He did not apologize for writing, or even for publishing it. He did not repudiate what he had actually written. On the contrary, he said that it contained much that is "serious and mature." But

[62] LG, March 30, 1963.

[63] *L'Express*, June 20, 1963, by K.-S. Karol.

[64] *Pravda*, March 29, and LG, March 30.

Evening on the Building Site

By Andrei Voznesenski

They nag me about "formalism."

Experts, what a distance
You are from life! Formalin:
You stink of it, and incense.

They've got their virgin lands, I know,
Where not one pearl of grain can grow. . . .

Art's deathly without a spark—
Human rather than divine—
For bulldozermen to mark
In the taiga's trackless zone;

It comes to them raw and salt
To straighten them up at once,
Unshaven like the sun, pelt
Peeling like bark from pines . . .

For some girl of the Chuvashi,
Brushing a blue tear away,
Brushing it—sweetly, sluttishly,
Brushing it—like a dragonfly,
To clap hands at rowdily. . . .

So to me they mean little,
The spearpoints of libel,
And the furious labels.

—Translated by Robert Conquest in Encounter (London), April 1963, p. 70.

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he added, "I see now that it has much that is superficial and immodest. My most serious mistake is that I forgot about the morals of the bourgeois press, and for this I was cruelly punished." He had been the victim, he claimed, of distortions and misleading headlines by the editors of *L'Express*. He concluded:

I have committed an irreparable mistake. I feel heavy guilt on my shoulders. . . . I have lived through and felt a lot in these days. It is a lesson to me for my whole life. I want to assure the writers' collective that I fully understand and realize my error, and will try to correct it by all my future work.

TO JUDGE BY reports of travellers, so unyielding was the mood of many Moscow young people that they greeted Yevtushenko's and even Voznesenski's statement with anger, disappointment, dismay. The idols were damaged although not, apparently, shattered. The conservative writers at the plenum were dissatisfied, too, albeit in a very different way. Having wrung even a slight admission of fault from the poets, they now were anxious to break them entirely: to destroy symbolically, if they could, the gap in moral stature as well as in talent between the older and younger generations, to make them more and more compliant tools of the party. As Yevtushenko himself might have guessed from one of his favorite authors, Kipling: "The bleating of the sheep irritates the tiger."

It was Yevtushenko's fateful combination of rebellion and repentence that seemed to draw him, above all others, irresistibly into the storm. His rebelliousness goaded his enemies on; his repentance led them to hope for more. And so *Pravda* remarked that Yevtushenko's statement "did not satisfy participants at the plenum. The tone of his speech shows that Yevtushenko did not recognize the roots of his mistakes, either in publishing the autobiography or in certain of his poems." Yuri Zhukov asked darkly why Yevtushenko had "shifted to a position of capitulation to our ideological enemies."[65] The Ukrainian author Leonid Novichenko called him "an intriguer, a frondeur, a dealer in his own glory." And Vladimir Firsov attacked Yevtushenko for "egocentrism," criticizing him for allowing his autobiography to appear in "one of the most reactionary" French newspapers. What Firsov and his listeners may not have known is that the Soviet government itself bought space in the same reactionary newspaper to publicize a speech by Khrushchev to the Supreme Soviet on Dec. 12, 1962!

Mikhail Sokolov, editor of the journal *Don,* also made a revealing speech. He launched an attack on Alexei Surkov as a signatory of a group letter to Khrushchev the previous December calling for "peaceful coexistence" of differing trends in art. In a speech to the Moscow writers aktiv that had not been published, evidently because it was not sufficiently self-critical, Surkov disclosed, according to Sokolov, that he withdrew his signature from the letter nine hours after signing it. Sokolov demanded that Surkov now make a fulsome apology. It is "inadmissible to propagandize the coexistence of ideologies for nine seconds, much less nine hours!," he exclaimed. Sokolov demanded also that Alexander Tvardovski engage in self-criticism for publishing Ehrenburg, Nekrasov, and two short stories by Solzhenitsyn.[66]

Even now the high point of conservative bitterness had not yet been reached. This came only with a meeting of the Board of the Writers' Union of the Russian Republic on April 2-3. It was here that the tide of reaction came closet to getting out of hand. Four speakers, including Ivan Kharabarov, once a disciple of Pasternak and a ringleader of the young liberals, demanded that Yevtushenko be thrown out of the Union of Writers itself. One speaker, in what was described as "an emotionally stirring speech," complained that the conservative writers had suffered a "feeling of defenselessness" during the period of liberal successes.[67] As Sergei Baruzdin explained:

At first we fought, and the literary events of 1956-1957 make it clear that we were capable of arguing and attacking; but then—especially in the past two or three years—we became either tired or afraid. What did we fear? Being voted down by secret ballot? Having labels like "dogmatist," "Stalinist," etc., pinned on us?[68]

Echoing complaints were sounded against the Bureau for Propaganda of Artistic Literature, that had supplied speakers to the poetry readings at which Yevtushenko, Voznesenski and others had built their fame and their following. Viktor Poltoratski sounded a chauvinistic call: "Who has even once attempted to arrange an evening of *really Russian* poetry [at the Polytechnical Museum or Moscow University?] Why not arrange an evening? . . . and listeners would see where *real Russian* Soviet poetry is going and what it calls for!"[69]

[65] Zhukov implied that Yevtushenko had sold republication rights to *L'Express*. According to K.-S. Karol in *L'Express* of April 11, all republication rights in the USSR and other Communist countries were reserved to Yevtushenko. As a result, *L'Express* had to refuse sale of the rights to the Czech magazine *Kulturni zivot*.

[66] LG, April 2.

[67] *Literaturnaia Rossia,* April 12.

[68] *Ibid.*, April 5.

[69] *Ibid.*, April 12.

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The warhawks, meanwhile, succeeded in collecting one more scalp, that of Vasili Aksionov, in *Pravda,* April 3. Like his friends Yevtushenko and Voznesenski, Aksionov apologized not for his work itself—his irreverent and jargon-laden stories "Ticket to the Stars" and "Oranges from Morocco" had been under heavy fire from the critics—but for an interview which he and Voznesenski gave to the Polish weekly *Polityka.* In the course of the interview (which had taken place in the fall of 1962) Voznesenski claimed Lorca, Eluard and Pasternak as his spiritual predecessors in poetry. He disavowed the present generation of literary "fathers" in the Soviet Union and proudly proclaimed that "heredity can sometimes skip a generation." Aksionov put the "fathers and sons" question in a frame more personal than poetic. Pointing out that his own father had been a victim of Stalin, he blamed his father's generation nonetheless: "How could they have allowed the year 1937 to happen?" [70]

In his apology the 30-year-old Aksionov followed the example set by Yevtushenko. He claimed that he had been misquoted. He pointed out, in oblique self-defense, that the interview had, after all, been granted to a Communist, not a capitalist, newspaper. He added that it had taken place under official auspices in Moscow, not abroad under the spell of bourgeois flattery. He promised, all the same, to "work" to correct his errors. Published in its entirety in *Pravda,* his statement seems to have gone farther than those of either Yevtushenko or Voznesenski.

L'affaire Yevtushenko

As mentioned before, no one was under heavier pressure to recant than Yevtushenko: "spontaneous" letters from readers ringing all the changes from the threat of force to the hope of redemption in an effort to wring a new, more self-abasing recantation from him; an editorial statement in *Yunost* (April 1963) insinuating that unless he improved on his March 29 statement he would be dropped as one of the editors of the journal; and finally a press conference given on April 19 by the head of the Komsomol, Sergei Pavlov, clearly threatening the young author with the suppression of a new book of poems unless he mended his ways ("Yevtushenko's boastful attitude has destroyed, or rather may destroy, him if he does not stop his shameful behavior")—all these developments indicated that the drive against Yevtushenko had now become the center and crux of the entire campaign.[71] The unfolding of this drive (which, as will be seen below, came to a halt shortly after Pavlov's press conference) is so enormously revealing as to the dynamic of the assault on the liberal intellectuals *in toto,* that it is worth making a digression to examine it in detail.

Let us first look at the circumstances in which the poet came to publish abroad his famous "Precocious Autobiography." [72] As we know, Yevtushenko arrived in Paris in mid-February from West Germany (where his statements, such as one bewailing that fact that Bonn had no diplomatic ties with the Communist countries had led to speculation in the local press that he was not so much an "angry young man" as a Soviet diplomat without portfolio) with his autobiography largely, if not wholly, written.[73] Almost immediately, he reached agreement for its serial publication in *L'Express.* The first installment appeared on February 21, little over a week after his arrival in France. The last installment appeared just a month later, on March 21.

Yet the decision to publish entailed enormous risk. Clearly, Yevtushenko knew it. After the Pasternak case in 1958, the Central Committee had issued a new ruling forbidding Soviet writers to publish abroad material, especially books, not already cleared for publication inside the Soviet Union. Yevtushenko had shown that he was keenly aware of this ruling. At poetry readings in Moscow, for example, he would often recite verses that had not yet been printed. Yet he had repeatedly refused copies of such poems to foreigners, presumably on the basis of the "Pasternak ruling." No doubt, by publishing the autobiography in a newspaper series before it appeared in book form, the poet, who had had single articles printed abroad before, hoped that his "Pasternak violation" would escape official wrath.

Ostensibly, the poet's reason for desiring publication was that he had been misquoted in many of his interviews abroad and wished now to be properly understood.[74] This was strange. For Yevtushenko had been besieged by counless offers to explain himself in separate articles, at little risk, in Western publications; and on a few occasions he had done so. More compelling considerations must have led him to publish the autobiography than the reason he gave.

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[70] *Polityka* (Warsaw), March 2, 1963.

[71] For an extraordinary gesture of solidarity, see "Lads with Turned-up Collars," *Yunost,* No. 3, a poem by Rozhdestvenski which seemed designed to hearten Yevtushenko.

[72] Now published in English under the same title by E. P. Dutton, New York.

[73] David Rousset, in *Le Figaro littéraire* (Paris), April 6.

[74] *L'Express,* April 4, articles by Francoise Giroud and by K.-S. Karol.

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AWARE OF THE violence which the cultural offensive back home might assume, was he moved to go down in flames with a moving *apologia pro sua vita* before being silenced? Or, carried away by megalomania, did he simply assume that a Yevtushenko could get away with anything? The evidence suggests that his motives may have lain in between. We must recall, first of all, that he had left home in mid-January, after being patted on the back by Ilichev for his "civic maturity." Even intellectuals inside Russia underestimated the drive against them until the meeting on March 7-8. Wolfgang Leonhard, who interviewed Yevtushenko in *Die Zeit,* and friends who talked with him in Paris felt that he was overly optimistic about the attack on writers and artists.

On the other hand, Yevtushenko is famous for a political intuition that sometimes outstrips his capacity for maneuver. He was under close surveillance from Soviet security agents while in Paris, and he made no secret of his suspicions. Euphoric, yet strangely determined, his behavior suggested that of a man tottering on the edge of self-induced doom. His wife, Galina, was fearful that publication of the autobiography had been a mistake and that they would not be allowed to leave the Soviet Union again. At a press conference before the autobiography appeared, moreover, Yevtushenko said prophetically of himself and Voznesenski (albeit in a discussion of formal experiment in poetry): "Who knows if we may not be, after all, a generation of the sacrificed? We would, then, be like cavaliers of Napoleon who hurled themselves into the river to make a bridge." [75]

Possibly, then, Yevtushenko's reasoning was somethink like this: Either the party drive in the arts was not serious, in which case his autobiography might help reverse it and give the liberal cause a boost, or the situation was already past saving, in which case he would surely be a victim and had nothing to lose by making a last statement of his credo. Possibly, too, he counted on high level protection from Khrushchev, or his son-

[75] *Le Monde,* Feb. 14.

Yevtushenko on Anti-Semitism and "Babi Yar"

. . . It must be said that anti-Semitism is not in the least natural to the Russian people, any more than to any other people. It is always grafted on. In Russia anti-Semitism was artificially stirred up under the Tsars. It was just as artificially stirred up at various times under Stalin. But to me, both as a Russian and as a man to whom Lenin's teaching is dearer than anything in the world, anti-Semitism has always been doubly repulsive. . . .

Next morning every copy of *Literary Gazette* [containing the poem "Babi Yar"] was sold out at every newsstand in a matter of minutes. But that afternoon I was getting batches of telegrams from strangers congratulating me. But the rejoicing was not universal. Two days later the journal *Literature and Life* published an answering poem by Alexei Markov in which I was described as a "pigmy who had forgotten the people he belonged to" and in another two days a long article in the same paper accused me of trying to wreck Lenin's international policy by stirring up hatred among national groups.

A more monstrous and grotesque charge it would be hard to imagine. But the author's chauvinism was ill-disguised and there was public indignation. I was showered with letters from all over the country. One morning I was visited by two young men about seven feet tall with badges inscribed "Master of Sports." They said they had been sent by the Komsomol organization of the Institute to act as my bodyguards.

"To guard me?" I asked in surprise. "Whom are you to guard me from?"

The young men looked embarrassed; they told me that while, of course, my poem had been very well received by the public, we had not achieved communism yet and there were still some bastards around. They faithfully kept at my heels for several days. . . .

I was not of course in any danger. Out of some twenty thousand letters written to me about "Babi Yar," only thirty or forty were abusive and they were all unsigned and in obviously disguised handwriting. In our country it is the bastards who are in danger. It was not I but Markov who had something to fear. He canceled his public appearances because the organizers of the meetings hinted that his face might be pushed in.

The Western press made a sensation of the attacks on "Babi Yar," claiming that they proved the existence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, and some of these papers dishonestly distorted the meaning of my poem to suit their own needs. But as far as I was concerned, the two attacks on me in *Literature and Life* were less significant than the reaction of the wide and varied public—workers, collective farmers, intellectuals, and students—who supported me at that difficult moment. When I gave a reading in Mayakovsky Square just before leaving for Cuba, ten thousand people came to give me a marvelous send-off, and the support of the people will always mean more to me than anything else.

—From A Precocious Autobiography, New York, Dutton & Co., 1963, p. 80 and pp. 120-22 respectively.

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in-law, Adzhubei. If these protectors couldn't save him, Yevtushenko may have reckoned, who could?

What, however, of the motives of Soviet officialdom? From the moment he set foot in Paris, Yevtushenko made no secret of his intention to publish the autobiography. Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist Party, knew of it. So, too, did the Soviet ambassador. Neither made any attempt to dissuade him. On the contrary, after two installments had appeared and before Yevtushenko's return to Moscow, Embassy officials and French Communists were heard to congratulate him on the "good work for the USSR" and to joke that Yevtushenko had been paid for his autobiography, while Khrushchev had had to pay to insert his December 12 speech in *L'Express!*[76] Yet little over two weeks later, when events had taken a dramatic turn in Moscow and Yevtushenko was rapidly becoming target No. 1, the original copy of his manuscript, sent back to him at 5 p.m. on March 19 by *L'Express* so that he could see the cuts and changes, was lifted in the mails, evidently by Soviet security police.[77] The same day Yuri Zhukov announced in Moscow that "it fell to me to 'go over' the tracks" of poets who had travelled abroad. Thus, when Yevtushenko rose to defend himself at the writers' plenum a few days later, it was with an incomplete text, translated from Russian to French and back to Russian, and knowing that the original was in the hands of the security police!

Was Yevtushenko, then, the victim of a giant provocation? Had Soviet officialdom lured him onto the end of a long limb, only awaiting the moment to lop it off? Some Soviet officials, no doubt, wished to do precisely that. Yet the chain of events that led to his becoming the scapegoat for his entire generation—inevitable as such an outcome may have been—seems to have been somewhat more haphazard.

LET US FIRST recall the meeting of March 7-8, at which Ehrenburg and Nekrasov were the main targets. From neither were recantations forthcoming. Nor, short of force, apparently, would they be. To sustain the attack without hope of recantation would be not only a defeat for the party, it could be a dangerous one as well, since the issue raised by Ehrenburg—that of responsibility during the 1930's—could be turned momentarily against several of the party leaders. A number of older Presidium members and many high-ranking officials, then, must have been only too glad to drop the political hotcake the Ehrenburg case had become. Thus, the attacks on Ehrenburg ceased almost immediately after Khrushchev's March 8 speech appeared in *Pravda.*

Khrushchev's and Ilichev's speeches, on the other hand, had unleashed the literary rightwingers. And they —the Sobolevs and Kochetovs and Sokolovs—were now howling for blood. To judge by the tone of Khrushchev's speech, he was unwilling, and perhaps not easily able, to put them back on the leash immediately. Another victim, then, had to be found.

To conservatives in literature, the whole group of young liberal writers must have seemed desirable victims because their burgeoning quality was a threat to all mediocrity. To watchdogs in the party, moreover, the young liberals must also have been logical targets since they had already acquired a sizable following among young people all over the country. Finally, their very success had focussed attention on the volatile issue of "fathers and sons." Spelled out in political terms, this issue reads: "Let us destalinize the Communist Party. Let us get rid of all those who were in responsible positions during the 1930's, and let others who are innocent take their places."

Surely, if the young were to be offered up as victims, then the sacrifice of Yevtushenko could serve as the symbolic sacrifice of all. His jaunty, matinee-idol manner, his privileges, his huge editions, by now had made him the target of innumerable private jealousies. Above all, his was the flaming neo-Leninist spirit, his the incandescent presence at poetry readings. His, then, was the blood the conservatives were after.

Party leaders right up to Khrushchev, however, must have had reservations. Abroad, Yevtushenko's downfall would bring jeers from the imperialists. "What about the new and liberal Russia of Khrushchev?" they would ask. Even more important, Yevtushenko, as he freely admits in his autobiography, has taken on the burden of compromise for his entire generation. Partly by virtue of his compromises, of the split between poet and politician in his personality, the party had been able to keep the entire youth movement under control. Some may have felt that, grown too big for his breeches, it was time for Yevtushenko to go. Others must have asked: Will the next idol be controlled so easily?

If indeed there were counsellors of restraint, timing was not on their side. By mid-March, the next to last installment of the autobiography must have become available in Moscow. In this chapter the poet shows the continuing strength of Stalinist elements within the party, the struggle the young liberals waged "to fight the mistakes of their fathers," and the persecution Yevtushenko himself suffered as a result. Nothing could have been more calculated to outrage "Stalin's heirs".

[76] K.-S. Karol, in *L'Express,* April 4.

[77] Françoise Giroud in *op. cit.*

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So the pressure to yield up the young poet became irrestible. On March 15 Stepan Shchipachov was ousted as chairman of the Moscow writers' organization partly on grounds that he had championed Yevtushenko's first journeys abroad.[78] On March 19 Zhukov announced that he was "going over" Yevtushenko's (and Voznesenski's) "tracks" abroad. A day or so later, the KGB intercepted Yevtushenko's manuscript. On March 22 and 24, *Izvestia* and *Pravda* printed satirical lampoons against the poet. Any doubts as to high-level strategy were ended by the speech in late March by Alexander Korneichuk, a friend of Khrushchev's in Kiev during the latter's long tenure as party secretary of the Ukraine. The tactic of the leadership, it appeared, was to identify itself with the attack in order to control it and keep it from being turned possibly against Khrushchev himself.

Volte-Face?

Indeed, it was in late March and early April that the storm showed real signs of getting out of hand. Shortly thereafter, however, the clamor against Yevtushenko and the other young writers subsided. We have only two clues as to the answer, one having to do with protests by Communist parties abroad, the other with stresses inside the Soviet leadership itself.

In late March or early April, at the height of the campaign against the young writers, all foreign Communist newspapermen stationed in Moscow had been summoned to a meeting. There, the editor of a leading Soviet literary journal showed them a "dossier of the accused." In language reminiscent of the purge era, the "dossier" spoke of an "opportunist fraction," from Yuri Kazakov ("this descendant of Ivan Bunin") to Yevtushenko, in the tradition of "that dubious political personality, Boris Pasternak." The dossier termed Yevtushenko's autobiography (shades of *Dr. Zhivago*!) a "blasphemy on the October Revolution."[79]

This effort to prepare foreign Communist opinion for further draconian action seems to have fallen flat. One elderly Communist at the meeting said it sounded like Zhdanovism to him. A Cuban rose to defend Yevtushenko, a national hero in his country.[80] The correspondent of the Italian Communist newspaper *L'Unità*, Pancaldi, wrote a critical dispatch. The French were silent. Nevertheless, the description of Yevtushenko's autobiography as a "blasphemy" must have been taken as an aspersion on the dialectical competence of Maurice Thorez, Louis Aragon, and other luminaries of the French Communist Party. Not only had they failed to detect the "blasphemy"; after sections had appeared in print, with the author still in Paris, they had held a reception in his honor! So, too, the Czechs, who had openly sought to publish it. The Poles evidently were offended because the *Polityka* interview of March 2 had been used to bully Voznesenski and Aksionov. Finally, on the eve of the elections to be held in his country on April 30, Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party, made a statement disavowing the drive. Nobody, he said, no matter how capable and shrewd he may be, should attempt "to tell an artist how to write a poem, how to create music, or how to paint."[81] All this at a time when the Soviet comrades, engaged in a quarrel with China, were wooing opinion in the European Communist parties! By early April, as we have seen, there seemed to be a danger that the wave of reaction inside the Soviet Union might be getting out of control. The adverse response of foreign Communist leaders may well have given a strong argument to moderates who wanted the campaign to go no further.

STILL ANOTHER SET of circumstances appears to have played a role. With Khrushchev in Gagra on vacation for nearly five weeks from about March 20 until April 20, his ceremonial duties were taken over by other senior members of the Presidium: Kozlov, Suslov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev and Kosygin. By the end of March, rumors began reaching the West of high-level disagreement inside the Soviet party, mainly centered on Khrushchev's designated successor, Frol Kozlov. It is not known what role, if any, Kozlov played in the cultural drive. We do know, however, that in his interview with *Die Zeit* of February 8, Yevtushenko pointedly failed, in response to a question, to deny that a passage in his poem "Stalin's Heirs" had been written with Kozlov in mind, an omission that could only have infuriated the leader ranked second in the Soviet hierarchy. Be that as it may, the last of a virulent series of attacks on Yevtushenko took place on April 7.[82] On April 11 Kozlov fell ill, victim of a new heart attack.

[78] Shchipachov may have been a "fall guy," taking the rap for higher-ups, including possibly Khrushchev, who stood encouragingly by, reaping a windfall of propaganda as the flamboyant Yevtushenko made headlines all over the world.

[79] K.-S. Karol, in *L'Express*, April 11.

[80] While Fidel Castro was in Moscow in early May, Yevtushenko, then at the depth of his fortunes, went to see him. Nothing is known of the encounter. It seems likely, however, that Castro may have intervened on behalf of his friend.

[81] *Newsweek* (New York, April 29.

[82] Sporadic attacks of the violent type did, however, occur later—see *Izvestia*, May 7, and a poem in *Pravda*, June 3, by Sergei Mikhalkov: "The Titmouse Abroad."

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VASILI AKSIONOV: Twenty-nine years old, with a lantern jaw and straw-colored hair, Vasili Aksionov has been described as a cross between Truman Capote and the boxer Ingemar Johansson. His long-ish stories that are highly unusual in their use of slang—including many imported Western expressions—have made the young writer a favorite among Soviet young people. Chekhov-like, Aksionov has worked as a doctor at Moscow hospitals for part of his brief career. Although his work suggests a skeptical attitude toward slogans of all kinds, he is reputed to be rather orthodox in his political views. (For some English translations, see *Encounter,* London, April 1963, and *Dissonant Voices in Soviet Literature,* ed. by Max Hayward and Patricia Blake, New York, Pantheon Press, 1962.)

ANDREI VOZNESENSKI: A 30-year-old poet whose frail looks belie a booming voice and a considerable presence at poetry readings. The descendant of a Georgian priest, Voznesenski spent part of his childhood in Vladimir. Trained as an architect, he has worked always as a poet. His verses, often a glittering play on rhyme and meaning, owe much to the influence of such poets as Khlebnikov and Tsvetaeva, as well as to Pasternak, to whom Voznesenski was almost a son during the last years of the older poet's life, and whom he had singled out in 1962 as "the only poet to whom, from my school days onwards, I showed my poems" *(Soviet Literature,* Moscow, Dec. 1962, p. 132). (For some of his verses in English, see *Encounter, loc. cit.*)

YURI KAZAKOV: Stammering and bespectacled, the 36-year-old Kazakov is the very picture of self-effacing shyness—backed by a considerable pride in his own work. Unlike many of the younger Soviet writers, he is not drawn to formal experiment—or to what he calls "style-chasing" of any kind—being frank to admit that he owes much to the influence of Ivan Bunin and, to a lesser extent, Chekhov. His critics say that he owes too much to Bunin to this day. The subjects of his short stories often being drunkards, vagabonds, and outcasts of society, he has also been criticized for his "degeneracy" and deep pessimism about the human condition. A protege of Konstantin Paustovski, Kazakov spends much of the year living quietly in Tarussa, near the elderly writer. Every June, however, he travels to Karelia to stay with the fishermen in their huts during the northern "White Nights," which he loves. (A collection of his stories, translated and edited by Gabrielle Azrael will be published by Houghton Mifflin later this year.)

VIKTOR NEKRASOV: Dark-eyed and animated, Nekrasov looks more like a Georgian than the Russian-Ukrainian he is. He is 51 years old, but looks 35. In 1947, he won the Stalin Prize for *In the Trenches of Stalingrad* (in English: *Frontline Stalingrad,* London, Harvill, 1962), which many critics consider the finest Soviet novel of World War II. He has also written a number of remarkably candid short stories about the war, as well as *Home Town,* an account of a Soviet soldier's return from the front, and *Kira Georgievna* (New York, Dutton, 1962), a study of a returnee from a Soviet concentration camp and one of the more probing destalinization novels. Nekrasov began writing for Tvardovski many years ago, when the latter was an editor of *Znamia.* His "On Both Sides of the Ocean," the work that has recently landed him in trouble, is based on a visit to the United States in the autumn of 1961 and to Italy in the spring of 1962.

VLADIMIR TENDRIAKOV: Born in 1923, Tendriakov fought in the war until 1943 and then worked for the Komsomol from 1944 to 1946. Earnest and not given to sociability, he now spends most of his time in the provinces, avoiding the turbulent Moscow and Leningrad literary circles. Tendriakov has published many novelettes and is probably best known in the West for his "Three Seven Ace" (see Hayward and Blake, *op. cit.),* a description of life in a Soviet lumber camp. In his writings Tendriakov is preoccupied with essentially moral questions, set against backgrounds that are grim and almost painfully realistic.

ERNST NEIZVESTNY: Dark-browed and heavy-set, the 38-year-old sculptor works in an extraordinary variety of materials, ranging from bronze to wood, granite to pig iron to plaster. Born in Sverdlovsk, in the Urals, he learned metalworking in a factory. During the war he fought in the Ukraine, was severely wounded, and later spent time in a Soviet prison camp. He was graduated, after his release, from the Surikov Art Institute in Moscow. In the late 1950's, his work had mostly to do with horror: the horror of war and the horror of prison. More recently Neizvestny, like other Soviet intellectuals in the humanist tradition, has become preoccupied with the relationship between man and machine in an age of cybernetics. Attacked by Khrushchev and Ilichev as an "abstractionist," he can more fairly be called an expressionist. The influence a Westerner can recognize most readily in his work is that of the English sculptor Henry Moore.

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Apparently, then, the marked easing of the drive against the intellectuals in April, like the early stages in November, reflected high-level maneuvering inside the Soviet party and the influence of Communist parties abroad. On April 20, Khrushchev was back at his desk in the Kremlin. In a strong speech to industrial workers on April 24, he once again asserted the control of the party center over both left and right. He made it clear that coercion—the method being urged by the right—as a method of dealing with recalcitrants, was out, with the regime relying on maximum moral pressure instead, with the hope that the conscience of the individual writer or artist would coincide with the will of the party: "Poets and writers, too, ought to criticize our shortcomings. The only thing that counts is from what positions this is done and for what end—to assert what is new and Communist, or to deny it."

Nearly three weeks later, *Pravda* published the aforementioned interview of Alexander Tvardovski with UPI correspondent Henry Shapiro, in which the editor of *Novyi mir* congratulated the Central Committee and Khrushchev personally for their "broadmindedness" in approving publication of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich"; rather gently chided Yevtushenko and Voznesenski (whom he called "poets who are young not so much in age as in skill," adding that "a poet should have a fate, not a career"); and lent his support to all his authors who were under fire. (His defense of one of them, Valentin Ovechkin, has a special quality, for Ovechkin, an editor of *Novyi mir,* is said to have criticized Khrushchev at a public meeting in the fall of 1962. Under heavy pressure, he later attempted suicide and had to be hospitalized.) Of the criticisms of Ehrenburg, Tvardovski did not admit that they were correct but merely that he took them "seriously, all the more so since the party leaders have described him as a remarkable writer, a talented publicist, and an eminent public figure."

In a statement in the April issue, which appeared only in May,[83] the editorial board of *Novyi mir* went beyond Tvardovski's statement, granting that the criticism directed at Ehrenburg's memoirs by Khrushchev and Ilichev, was "just, and we bear our share of responsibility," and also conceding that Khrushchev's remarks about Nekrasov (about whom Tvardovski, an old and close friend, had kept silent) had been "correct." Apparently, the acceptance of criticism of Nekrasov was the price of continuing to publish his work. For the editors specifically announced that Nekrasov and other writers who were under fire—Yashin, Tendriakov, and Aksionov—were at work on new manuscripts, and that *Novyi mir* would stick to its 1963 publishing plan, including these authors.

Uncertainty—and Resistance

If the *Novyi mir* statement was a sign that party pressure was still heavy, an editorial in Pravda on May 19 gave new evidence that extreme militancy had at least given way to sober second thoughts. In a statement somewhat reminiscent of Khrushchev's speech to Soviet writers of May 1959, *Pravda* now proclaimed that the party saw "no need to watch over every step" by the intellectuals, "to explain in detail how to write a book, stage a play, make a film, compose music. Setting forth the main aim of creative work, the party urges the masters of literature and art to creative boldness and independence." If not a complete about-face, this statement at least represented a major shift in position compared with the speeches of March 8.

Meanwhile, an event was to occur that had been postponed three times already and could not be put off much longer. Scheduled originally for December, the greatly heralded conference of young writers had been designed to celebrate the revival of Soviet literature and, above all, the appearance of young writers of talent. As winter wore on, however, nearly all those due to be honored fell victim, instead, of the party offensive. How could the meeting be held without its intended heroes, all, now, in "disgrace" with the party or hovering on the brink: Voznesenski, Yevtushenko, Akhmadulina, Aksionov, Gladilin, Kazakov?

Whatever the difficulties, the meeting convened at last, having been preceded by an announcement that two of those originally scheduled to appear had been sent instead to the hinterlands to get "closer to life": Aksionov to a construction project in Siberia and Voznesenski to work part of the time at factory enterprises in Vladimir.[84] In spite of this shadow, the meeting of 170 young writers—untried and all from the provinces—went forward. Remarkably mild references to Voznesenski, Yevtushenko, Rozhdestvenski and Sosnora were made in a speech by Nikolai Rylenkov, an older poet from Smolensk.[85] By far the sharpest speech was

[83] Each issue of *Novyi mir* spends an average of four to six weeks at the censor's. The issue of March 1963, however, which contained the final installment of Part V of the Ehrenburg memoirs was at the censor's more than two months, from Jan. 25 to March 29. The April issue, containing the editorial statement described above, was at the censor's nearly three months, from Feb. 8 to May 3.

[84] By Georgi Markov, *Izvestia,* May 7, 1963.

[85] LG, May 9, 1963.

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delivered, as usual, by the Komsomol head, Sergei Pavlov, who charged that the young poets "in fact distorted Marxism" while parading as "critics of dogmatic distortions of Marxism." Because of its "dullness," Pavlov revealed, the circulation of *Molodaia gvardiia,* the Komsomol literary journal, had dropped to only 60,000 (compared with *Yunost's* 600,000). To brace up circulation, he admitted, "we resorted to a whole series of measures," such as publication of Tendriakov's and Ikramov's "profoundly discreditable" "White Flag," for which the chief editor had now been fired.[86]

BY THIS TIME, the campaign against the intellectuals had received so much attention that it was a subject of lively concern all over the country. In March and April alone, 10,000 provincial leaders attended 16 regional meetings to discuss the forthcoming Central Committee session which, originally scheduled for May 28, was to be devoted exclusively to ideological matters. The meetings, said the Italian Communist correspondent in Moscow, reflected "reservations and perplexity" over the party's drive in the arts.[87] In response to an article attacking Yevtushenko, for instance, the newspaper *Komsomolskaia pravda* received 1200 letters, many of them, apparently, expressions of support for the poet.[88]

Among intellectuals and party officials in Moscow, two proposals were subjects of heated discussion. One was the previously voiced suggestion that the present unions of writers, artists, composers and film workers be abolished and amalgamated into a single union of creative artists. In this way, the conservatives hoped in the future to avert liberal breakthroughs, such as had occurred in the Moscow writers' organization in April 1962, and in the admissions policies of both writers' and artists' unions. Another serious proposal was designed to tighten control over publishing. Under this proposal, the more liberal cultural newspapers would be weeded out, with *Pravda* and *Izvestia* to be expanded to include more material on the arts. A giant Glavpechat would be set up to control publishing operations all over the country, possibly with Adzhubei in charge.

With such sweeping proposals in the air, contradictory steps were taken from day to day which indicated that basic policy decisions had not been made. In the wake of the Wynne-Penkovsky spy trial in May, for example, the papers launched a new "vigilance" campaign with an unusually ominous-sounding editorial warning Soviet citizens against all contacts with Westerners. Yet at precisely this period, just as official anti-Westernism seems to have been at its height, a high-level decision apparently was taken to cease jamming British and American radio broadcasts in Russian! In the case of the Voice of America, jamming stopped on June 13.

As for the writers, the deeds of the party were so far at surprising variance with its words. Anxious rumors to the contrary, since the opening of the drive in December, not a single editor had been fired at any of the major journals in which liberal writers were regularly appearing: *Novyi mir, Yunost, Znamia* or *Moskva.* Surely this was a token of extraordinary editorial solidarity as well as indecision by the party!

Liberal authors, moreover (though, to be sure, with such striking exceptions as Yevtushenko, Okudzhava, Aksionov and others) kept turning up on the pages of newspapers and journals. A major publishing house announced its intention to issue in the second half of the year, as planned, the largest edition ever—100,000 copies—of works of Yuri Kazakov. As for Vladimir Tendriakov, whose work had occasioned an official reprimand by the Komsomol, he had part of a new story published in *Literaturnaia gazeta* on May Day, together with an announcement that the rest of the story would soon be appearing in the journal *Science and Life.*[89] On the other hand, trips abroad by the young liberals had now been banned. So, too, had the poetry readings.

ON THE EVE of the Central Committee session, *Pravda* began publishing "One Hundred Answers" to a questionnaire it had sent to writers inquiring about their current work. The aim of the exercise, no doubt, was to give the impression that Soviet literature was in a healthy state. It is not known how many writers who received the questionnaire failed to reply, or indeed how much pressure they were under to answer. Certain omissions, nonetheless, are striking. Missing were the names of Surkov, Tvardovski, and, for that matter, Kochetov. Sholokhov—who, like the Soviet Union's other famed novelist, Leonid Leonov, had refused to publish a word in favor of the party campaign—was represented by a single, surly sentence. The only liberal to reply was Aksionov. As the Central Committee session drew close, the liberal "conspiracy of silence" continued remarkably firm.

By far the most extraordinary case, however, had been that of Viktor Nekrasov. From a party standpoint, per-

[86] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* May 11, 1963.
[87] Giuseppe Boffa, in *Rinascità* (Rome), June 1.
[88] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* May 23.
[89] The editor, V. N. Bolkhovitinov, was one of the six liberal editors dropped from *Literaturnaia gazeta* on Jan. 22. The deputy editor is Rada N. Adzhubei, daughter of Khrushchev and wife of Adzhubei.

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haps the chief "sin" of this vastly respected writer lay not so much in any single observation of his travel notes in Italy and America, as in his outspoken striving to report only what he saw, and to see nothing through the eyes of prejudice. It is this which makes the reading of his travel notes such an exhilarating experience.

After Khrushchev's speech on March 8, in which he was a principal target, Nekrasov was silent. It was not until April 9 that he was compelled to speak up at a meeting of party members and intellectuals in his home town of Kiev. Difficult as it is to piece together his remarks—he has been given no opportunity to speak for himself in the press—Nekrasov apparently refused to recant, declaring that he would write only "the truth, the great truth, the genuine truth."[90] At this point he collided with the ambitions of Nikolai Podgorny, a rising political protégé of Khrushchev. Nekrasov, charged Podgorny:

. . . has learned nothing and indeed, has no desire to do so. As all of you heard, he considers an admission of errors to be a loss of self-respect as a Communist. For what truth do you, Comrade Nekrasov, stand? Your speech and the ideas you continue to maintain carry a strong flavor of petty-bourgeois anarchy. The party, the people, cannot and will not tolerate this. Comrade Nekrasov, you should ponder this very seriously.[91]

The Long-Awaited Plenum

The attack on Nekrasov was continued by Khrushchev in a speech delivered at the Central Committee Plenum that opened on June 18—a meeting held in an atmosphere of indecisiveness on the side of the party on the one hand, and of silence, even resistance, on the part of the intellectuals on the other. With regard to Nekrasov, to be sure, Khrushchev was scarcely indecisive, demanding that the writer be expelled from the Communist Party. Incensed both by Nekrasov's views and by his refusal to change them,[92] Khrushchev warned that the "weakening of the class war in the international arena" could drive him to more extreme measures. Gogol's hero, Taras Bulba, recalled Khrushchev darkly, "killed his own son, Andrei, for going over to the side of the enemy. Such is the logic of the struggle."

Khrushchev's ire was due, no doubt, to what the party can only consider outrageous pro-Westernism on the part of Nekrasov—an attitude related to the one-world, Christian outlook expressed by Yevtushenko in Germany:

The basis of all fruitful discussion is trust. When is a new Messiah going to appear on earth who simply tells men to "trust one another," and we not crucify him? How can we facilitate such trust? I can criticize the West in many things and with justice. And the West can, with equal justice, criticize the East.[93]

What all these attitudes—pacificism, pro-Westernism, a one-world, Christian outlook—spell is a "peace at any price" sentiment among the Soviet people, which the party itself has fed by its own peace propaganda. It is the strength of this sentiment, more than his refusal to recant, that made Nekrasov a scapegoat as it helped make scapegoats of Ehrenburg and Yevtushenko before him. And it is the strength of this sentiment, too, that has caused party critics in recent months to step up their attacks on Okudzhava, Bondarov and Baklanov for "de-heroization," or pacifism, in their stories of World War II.

In spite of the specter of physical force, however, Khrushchev's speech was milder in some respects than that of March 8. He was at pains to avoid a frontal assault on the entire intellectual milieu or on individuals who might prove to be rallying points, singling out, besides Nekrasov, only the film director Mikhail Romm for criticism. He gave pointed praise to Fedin, Sholokhov and, significantly, Tvardovski. On the one hand, the hint of force; on the other, the hope of conciliation.

The most revealing part of Khrushchev's speech dealt with destalinization. He defended the wisdom of destalinization against charges by his critics that the campaign had destroyed respect for authority and was responsible for the crisis between "fathers and sons." He took credit for the decision to attack Stalin's crimes, thus simultaneously defending himself against the suggestion—implicit in Ehrenburg's memoirs—that he had had a share in those crimes. In 1956, he declared, when the decision was taken to speak out at the 20th CPSU Congress, there was a "very strong struggle." Some people, "feeling very great guilt for the crimes they had committed with Stalin, were afraid." "Stalin is dead," they reasoned, "so are many of his victims. The state is growing, we have leaders, why stir everything up?" Khrushchev, on the other hand, told them: "We ought

[90] Speech by Podgorny, *Pravda Ukrainy,* April 10, 1963.

[91] *Ibid.*

[92] In his speech (*Pravda,* June 20), A. D. Skaba, a Ukrainian party secretary, disclosed, to be sure, that Nekrasov had addressed a letter to the Ukrainian Central Committee. The letter was evidently unsatisfactory.

[93] *Die Zeit,* Feb. 15, 1963: "Let's Break the Ice. Thoughts on My Departure from Germany," by Ye. Yevtushenko. For violent criticism, see *Komsomolskaia pravda,* March 30 and May 23, and *Nedelia,* No. 16, 1963. Yevtushenko's article may have been fully as important in his becoming a victim as his more widely-criticized autobiography.

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to tell the truth at the 20th Congress because it is the first congress after Stalin's death. If we tell it only at the 21st Congress or later, the people might fail to understand. Not to bring into the open and condemn is to approve, to make legitimate in the future." There were "long arguments," Khrushchev continued. But at length even those with anguished consciences "agreed to raise this question at the congress." Thus, Khrushchev's claim: whatever Ehrenburg might say, *his* conscience was clear on the score of the purges.

Had he himself been afraid of Stalin (another implication of Ehrenburg's memoirs)? Not at all. Khrushchev describes an occasion when he spoke up to Stalin. The peasants of the Ukraine are dissatisfied, he told the dictator. The 19th Party Congress (October 1952) has declared that the grain problem is solved, and still the peasants have no white bread to eat. With all the unknowing majesty of a Marie Antoinette came Stalin's reply: "The Ukrainians must be given white bread."

ELSEWHERE IN HIS speech Khrushchev addressed himself to the proposals to tighten organizational control over the arts. He was lukewarm to the idea of set-

ACHILLEAN ARMOR

Premier Khrushchev's sensitivity to the question of his past involvement in the crimes of Stalin has long been evident. The latest of various attempts to absolve him of complicity occurrred at the recent plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. On June 19, Alexei Adzhubei, editor of *Izvestia* and Khrushchev's son-in-law, made the following statement:

When someone among the writers [i.e. Ehrenburg] attempts to assert that Stalins personality cult . . . deprived [the party] of its Leninist fighting spirit . . . let him read, for example, an excerpt from a resolution of March 17, 1937—I repeat of the year 1937—adopted at a meeting . . . of the Moscow party *aktiv*, following a report by Nikita Sergeievich Khrushchev on the Central Committee plenary session that had just ended. This resolution states:

"The meeting of the *aktiv* considers as utterly inadmissible the situation . . . [in party units of the Moscow region] where general party meetings and plenary sessions of the district committees have stopped being places of Bulshevik criticism and self-criticism and are becoming arenas of endless parades, reports of successes designed for loud effect and quite needless greetings to party leaders."

Reading these remarks, one might surmise that the resolution in question had been inspired by Khrushchev (then head of the Moscow party organization) as a demand for more self-criticism within the party and as a protest against the growing adulation of Stalin—at the very time of the dictator's wholesale purges.

Mr. Adzhubei omitted a few facts, however:

(1) The Central Committee plenary session on which Khrushchev "reported" (held in late February 1937) had itself raised the issue of insufficient criticism and self-criticism—at the same time attacking the lack of vigilance among party leaders, which was said to have led to the harboring of Trotskyite agents, spies and saboteurs in the party; and also to the "unjustifiable" expulsion of some members. At this plenum Bukharin and Rykov were expelled from the party. (See *Pravda,* March 6, and 11, 1937.)

(2) At the Moscow party meeting (held March 12-16, 1937), the decisions of the CC plenary session were "unanimously endorsed." In addition, "Comrade Khrushchev informed the meeting of the great importance which Comrade Stalin attributes to the experience of the toilers and low-echelon [party] workers. He spoke in detail about Comrade Stalin's speeches at the plenary session." (*Pravda,* March 17, 1937.)

(3) The resolution from which Adzhubei quoted went on to state:

. . . [Moscow party units] have failed to spot and expose the enemies of the party-Trotskyites and right-wingers . . . The *aktiv's* meeting demands that the party organizations and . . . leaders draw the necessary conclusions from the lessons of wrecking, subversion and espionage [perpetrated by] Japanese, German, and Trotskyite agents and their right-wing collaborators, . . .

The *aktiv's* meeting approves the decision to expel Bukharin and Rykov . . . for their anti-party and treasonable activity, which was bent on the restoration of capitalism and the nullification of socialist victories . . .

(4) Less than three months later, at a Moscow Oblast Party Conference, Khrushchev issued a stinging attack against the "cursed traitors and betrayers of our socialist motherland" (speeches of June 5, 6 and 9, reported in *Pravda* the following days). Although he mentioned only one "Trotskyite traitor" by name (Gamarnik, whose suicided had been revealed on June 1), his reference to other traitors was the first confirmation of rumors that another round of purges was underway: in the following week, eight members of the Red Army elite (including Tukhachevski, Uborevich and Yakir) were tried in secrecy by a special military tribunal, convicted and executed.

It seems, in short, that Mr. Adzhubei was stretching a point.

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ting up a single union in place of the present unions of artists, writers and so on. He had no objection to the continued existence of separate unions, he indicated, so long as their work did not collide with the party line. On the other hand, he was favorably disposed to the creation of a single publishing enterprise for reasons which he illustrated in his usual graphic manner:

A writer writes a bad book. He goes to one publisher; nothing comes of it, so he goes to another. If he lives in Moscow or Leningrad and they don't take his manuscript, then he sometimes goes to some far-off region. There, in some city or other, they'll publish him because it flatters them to put out a book by a writer from the capital.[94]

Tighter controls over publishing, Khrushchev concluded, are needed but are not by themselves enough. New and more vigilant people will have to be drawn into the work of editing and censoring books, plays, symphonies, films and radio broadcasts. Significantly, the recent reliance by the party on literary and art critics to keep creative intellectuals in line was now to be abandoned. For the critics too often had approached their work "not from principled positions but from group positions. We must rearrange this work and organize it differently."

Nothing so clearly illustrates the improvised quality of the plenum, the lack of the old, Stalin-style coordination, than Khrushchev's remarks on the suggested changes in publishing and on the single union of creative artists. With Khrushchev one of the last to speak, the others, apparently unaware that he was going to give it his blessing, scarcely mentioned the proposed publishing reform at all.[95] Several, on the other hand, spoke up for the single union, to which he was to indicate indifference. Those in favor included Ilichev; the Secretary of the Leningrad City Party Committee, G. I. Popov; and the head of the Composers' Union, Tikhon Khrennikov. The final decree adopted by the session made no reference to either proposal.

Some of the speeches provide a clue not only to the air of irresolution at the plenum, but also to the erratic course of the cultural drive from the outset. With Khrushchev preoccupied with more pressing matters, such as the dispute with China or the visit of Fidel Castro, lower-ranking officials had been left to luxuriate in rivalry among themselves. Not a few, therefore, had been using the campaign not only to promote "party spirit" in the arts, but also to advance their own careers.

Thus, Adzhubei, whose newspaper, *Izvestia,* was notable for its downplaying of the cultural offensive, cited several examples of the "low coefficient of useful effect of our ideological work" as carried out by "workers of the Ideological Section of the Central Committee"—meaning, obviously, Ilichev. The latter, on the other hand, was critical of the ministers of secondary and higher education for "shortcomings in rearing the younger generation" and added that "more energetic leadership might have been expected from the Ministry of Culture." To this, the Minister of Culture, Yekaterina Furtseva, obligingly responded that Ilichev's criticisms were "just" and her ministry "guilty."[96]

IN ELOQUENT CONTRAST to his earlier role as a zealot, Sergei Pavlov, the head of the Komsomol, almost failed to refer to the cultural drive and did not mention the young writers and artists at all. Sensing, perhaps, that he may have carried zealotry too far, he now paid more flowery praise to Khrushchev than any speaker at the meeting.

The plenum was notable for the absence of Kochetov —he was expected in England on a tourist visa, but his arrival, if it actually occurred, went unreported—as well as for the failure of Yuri Zhukov, Alexander Prokofiev, and others identified with the harshest stages of the campaign, to address the gathering. Extremes were avoided. So, too, were decisions. Furtseva's vigorous defense of the success of Soviet cultural contacts with the West was another sign, a more positive one, of the softening of the drive. Derisory toward those who gave, and are still giving, moral support to the modern artists, she took a jab also at critics of modern art. One such critic, she recounted, violently attacked Neizvestny at a meeting, only to pay him 12,000 (old) rubles for a statue! And the choice of the outspoken film director Grigori Chukhari as a speaker may even have been a gesture of conciliation toward the liberals.

Ilichev's three-hour speech, while scarcely conciliatory, refrained nevertheless from naming names or giving gratuitous offense. Careful to strike a balance in nearly everything he said, he was at pains not to challenge the entire intellectual milieu as the speeches of March 7-8 had done. Thus, in speaking of those who yearn to be free of party intervention, he added:

[94] Khrushchev is right as to the practice, and some of the books which have appeared by this method would seem good to us, bad to him: an edition of Sologub's *Petty Demon* in Kemerovo in 1958; Voznesenski's *Mozaika* in Vladimir in 1960; *Tarusskiie stranitsy* in Kaluga in 1961 (released for sale by Khruschev himself).

[95] Except for Ilichev, who spoke in favor.

[96] As far back as December 1, during the visit to the Manezh, Khrushchev reprimanded Ilichev and Furtseva for being too permissive in the arts (see *Encounter* transcript).

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But let us all remember that we are speaking of Soviet artists, people who are politically close to us. Our task is not to excommunicate them but to help them understand their artistic and ideological mistakes. It would not be in the spirit of our party to relegate creative workers who have made mistakes to the ranks of the hopeless and incorrigible.

In tougher passages, he called upon the editors of *Yunost, Novyi mir,* and *Neva* to explain their publishing errors. Finally, he warned his audience against thinking that it had all been a "'temporary' campaign, destined soon to pass, that 'all will be forgotten' and that it is possible in the meantime to sit it out and be silent. It won't do! The party is waging not a campaign but a consistent struggle."

What of the Future?

How the party is to wage this "struggle," however, neither Ilichev nor any speaker at the plenum could say. The resolution adopted at the session contained not a single concrete proposal. If the events of last winter prove anything, it is that maintenance of "ideological purity" in the arts—whatever that means—is rarely at the center of party attention for long. Occasionally, owing to a juncture of political circumstances, it can briefly become so. As soon as the leaders turn away to a more pressing crisis or a more practical dilemma, officials of the second and third rank are left to cultivate political pastures of their own in the atmosphere the leaders have established. It was in this fashion, in the interstices of the leaders' attention, so to speak, that literature and art made some of their gains in the 1959-62 period. That the regime may be distracted from its more intangible goals in the future as well is all the more probable in view of the continued ascendancy of economic over ideological tasks.

The party, however, will very likely try to keep its attention from lapsing too long from the arts. Since it is the style of the Khrushchev regime to improvise, to straddle logical impossibles, to avoid principled choices —such as how to ensure conformity of expression without resorting to force—it may turn to devices of the sort it uses in the economy: tighter administrative controls and shake-ups of personnel. The proposal to dissolve the unions of writers, artists, composers, and film workers into a single organization may have been nipped in the bud, not because liberals oppose it, which they do, but because of opposition from conservative writers themselves—they of the vast editions, vast royalties, hence vast levies to the Literary Fund of the Writers' Union. Eager as they are for a tighter rein over their liberal brethren, the privileged ones of the Litfund are more eager still to keep the dachas, sanatoria and overflowing travel funds of the Writers' Union from being parcelled out among indigent sculptors and painters. "The problem," wrote the poet Nikolai Gribachov in a revealing article, "is a major one, for we live on earth, not in heaven."[97] Not even a watered-down proposal for a merger has succeeded so far in meeting these objections.[98] It is fully possible, however, that the system of tightened publishing controls suggested by Khrushchev and Ilichev will be brought into being.

The difficulty, of course, remains that, of all types of human activity, the creative process is the most elusive of bureaucratic control. In the atmosphere of the Soviet Union today, how are mere censors to mold it? Furthermore, the hypocrisy pointed out by Furtseva in her speech is still practiced: officials fulminate against innovation at party meetings, only to protect the innovator by hanging his paintings at home. From the separate arrangements by which officialdom has tried to subdue each of the errant ones in recent months—Voznesenski, Neizvestny, Yevtushenko, Nekrasov, Rozhdestvenski, Aksionov and Ehrenburg—it is apparent that favoritism and protection, the very devices that helped create the permissive climate of recent years, still exist.

WHILE THE BUREAUCRATS can be expected, on the one hand, to have a fling at new administrative controls, literary critics for months have stepped up their efforts to direct the interest of writers and readers from the 1920's, the decade of glittering experiment, back to the 19th century, from formalism to realism, from innovation to tradition, from the West back to Russia itself. On the last point we must pause. Apprehensive at pro-Western sentiment and all that goes with it—pacifism and a feeling that "maybe we're as much to blame as the West"—the party has encouraged nationalist, "Russia-oriented" writers in recent months. For this reason it has not only smiled upon conservative nationalists like Firsov and Gribachov, but has continued to publish liberals with a strong "pro-Russia" strain, writers like Yashin and Kazakov, and even Tendriakov. The difficulty of this policy is twofold. In the first place, as it accepts the break with China, the regime will find its cultural barriers with the West increasingly difficult to maintain. Secondly, as Fiodor Abramov's story "Around and About"—which criticizes the illogic and impoverishment of Khrushchev's collective farms—and the unbridled behavior of the conservatives in April must

[97] LG, June 27.
[98] *Le Monde,* July 3.

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have demonstrated, the "pro-Russia" elements are no less critical of the regime, and far less restrained in their attempts to influence it, than the liberals.

Since it is unlikely, then, that new publishing codes and new officials can plug the dike of experiment for long, or that the regime will find it expedient to do more than unleash the Kochetovs and Poltoratskis in its hour of need and then buy them off with a tourist trip to the West, the main result of the drive may be its impact on the Soviet public. Surely the regime is faced by a genuine dilemma: the breakup of the conformity of thought that existed under Stalin and the emergence of an independent public opinion. Elusive of control from above, this public opinion, from a party point of view, is potentially in opposition. But the recent drive in the arts was not a coherent attempt to deal with the problem. Instigated by a group within the pary for the sake of political advantage and carried on by rival bureaucrats for their own conflicting ends, the drive exacerbated rather than resolved the dilemma. Far from being an assertion of control over the minds of the people, the campaign may, in the long run, represent a stage in the erosion of party control.

If only in the way it handled the drive, the party widened the scope of the problem with which it has to deal. By spreading its attacks throughout the press—to a far greater extent than during the "freezes" of 1954 or 1957—the party advertised the work of abstract artists and pro-Western writers to many citizens who were innocent of their existence before. In the process, the liberal intellectuals no doubt gained rather than lost adherents. If the emergence of public opinion was not a nationwide problem before, surely it is today.

The lack of logic in the drive, moreover, must have rammed home demoralizing lessons to all those acute enough to perceive it. Above all, Khrushchev's praise of Stalin last March, when the drive was at its height, must have been disillusioning to the many Russians for whom destalinization is a painful but deeply felt commitment. Can so transparent a maneuver, executed in full view of the people, have failed to communicate its cynicism to the idealistic young who had not witnessed such tactical about-faces before? Although not previously in opposition, at least some of these young people may find themselves in opposition now. As for those who already constituted an opposition of sorts, they may be less scrupulous in future as to the tactics they feel free to use.

THE GREATEST LESSON of the campaign, however, is that it is not only possible to defy the demands of the extremists but that in some circumstances resistance pays. A correlation already exists between public opinion and the power struggle inside the Communist Party. Thus, the "conspiracy of silence" of the writers and artists and the backing they received from other intellectuals clearly shored up the arguments of the party moderates that force was no answer; used against symbolic individuals, or on a wide enough scale to be effective, it would entail too great a sacrifice of public support.

Conversely, within hours after the recantations of Yevtushenko and Voznesenski on March 29, the right wing was howling for more. By encouraging the demands of the extremists, the recantations had heightened the pressure on all of the liberal left, and hence even on the party center. Far from appeasing the attack, they fed it. Quick to realize that their apologies had been not only unnecessary, but a *political mistake* as well, the poets refused to go farther.

For several years now the wisest and most experienced of the liberals, such as Tvardovski, have been aware that to resist—when it can be done—is to strengthen the position of moderates inside the party. Having accomplished the feat of holding out, often under heavy pressure, Tvardovski and his like may even, on occasion, have been *rewarded* for their resistance by support from moderate elements at the top. What the Tvardovskis have understood all along, the 1962-63 cultural drive may now have taught others.

While there can be no doubt that the climate of opinion inside the Soviet Union helped bring the drive to its present outcome, it is likely that on this occasion the intervention of Communist parties abroad was even more effective. As a lesson in the inner workings of a changing party, however, the campaign must have been very illuminating to all who lived through it. It has helped set the stage, then, for future, more climactic encounters between the regime and the Soviet public.

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EAST GERMANY TODAY

EDITORS' NOTE: Mired in economic difficulties and its people apathetic and despondent under the oppression of one of the most reactionary East European satellite regimes, the "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) presents perhaps the sorriest spectacle in all the Communist world. The two articles that appear below picture conditions in the GDR as they are today, Mr. Jänicke examining the persistently Stalinist orientation of the Ulbricht leadership's policies since the Sixth Congress of the SED (Socialist Unity Party) last January, and Mr. Balow providing an intimate eye-witness account of the life and mood of the East German people. These compose the first part of a continuing series of articles dealing with the more Stalinist of the East European Communist regimes. Articles on Rumania and Czechoslovakia will appear in later issues.

The Persistence of Stalinism

By Martin Janicke

ANYONE WHO HOPED that the new wave of de-stalinization sent coursing through the Soviet-dominated portion of the Communist world by the 22nd CPSU Congress would have political repercussions in East Germany has thus far been bitterly disappointed. Walter Ulbricht, who ranks with Enver Hoxha and Gheorgiu-Dej as one of the last towering pillars of Stalinism in Eastern Europe, appears now as before to be looked upon by the Kremlin as a trustworthy satrap of the East German regime, whose situation Moscow has always considered particularly precarious. His shortcomings and obvious failures in other respects are evidently deemed of secondary importance. Now more than ever, Khrushchev needs reliable satellites, and Ulbricht—at least recently—has proven himself quite useful to the Russians in their conflict with the Chinese.

The Old Guard

Only this would seem to explain why Ulbricht's political predominance as First Secretary of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) still remains intact after the party's Sixth Congress, held from January 15 to 21, 1963. Even today he is surrounded by the same Stalinist guard who, in 1957-58, turned drastically away from the "thaw" of 1956—and indeed from the entire more moderate course pursued since 1953. The Politburo and the Secretariat of the SED Central Committee are still domi-

Mr. Jänicke is a German journalist who has followed and written extensively on East German developments from his vantage point in West Berlin. His book, entitled Die antistalinistische Opposition gegen Ulbricht seit 1953, *is scheduled to appear shortly.*

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nated by the very same leaders [1] who then staged the witch hunt against "revisionist" intellectuals; who brought about ever stricter isolation from the West and, in the Berlin conflict, always went a step farther than Khrushchev; who in 1960 carried out the forcible collectivization of agriculture; and, last but not least, who helped Ulbricht, after a four-year interlude of "collective leadership," to transform the ruling system of the SED, between 1957 and 1960, into his personal dictatorship.

Especially prominent in Ulbricht's Stalinist guard are the following officials, all members of the party Politburo: Erich Honecker, Central Committee Secretary for Organization and Security and evidently Ulbricht's "crown prince"; Willi Stoph, First Deputy Prime Minister; Hermann Matern, Chairman of the Party Central Control Commission; Alfred Neumann, Chairman of the National Economic Council; Paul Verner, First Secretary of the East Berlin district party organization and Central Committee Secretary; Paul Fröhlich, First Secretary of the Leipzig district party organization; and Gerhard Grüneberg, the Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture.

The domination of Ulbricht's small ruling circle was, in fact, reinforced by the Sixth Party Congress at the expense of the Central Committee Plenum, nominally the highest authority in the SED in between congresses. Under the new party statutes ratified by the Congress, the CC Plenum no longer meets four times a year, but only twice. Moreover, the Sixth Congress elections to the Central Committee resulted in the replacement of some 30 percent of the incumbent membership—a turnover as large as that effected by the Fourth Congress after the 1953 year of crisis, and even greater than that made by the Fifth Congress after the unrest of 1956-57.

Since the Sixth Congress in January, Ulbricht's position has been even further strengthened. In April the East German pseudo-parliament enacted a law divesting the Council of Ministers of more of its authority and explicitly downgrading it to the status of "executive organ of the parliament *(Volkskammer) and the State Council (Staatsrat)*" [emphasis added]—the latter body being under Ulbricht's thumb. In addition to these organizational changes, the renewed accentuation of the cult of personality surrounding the East German dictator in recent months demonstrates that Ulbricht's power remains overwhelming.

[1] The members of the newly-designated Politburo are: W. Ulbricht, O. Grotewohl, H. Matern, E. Honecker, B. Leuschner, W. Stoph, A. Neumann, P. Froehlich, P. Verner, K. Hager, H. Warnke, E. Mückenberger, A. Norden, F. Ebert. The following are candidate members: Dr. E. Apel, Dr. G. Mittag, H. Axen, H. Sinderman, G. Grüneberg, M. Müller, G. Ewald, H. Jarowinski. The members of the Secretariat are: Ulbricht, Grüneberg, Hager, Honecker, Mittag, Norden, Verner.

The Economic Picture

Although the Sixth Congress thus brought no change in the basically Stalinist character of the East German power structure or in the composition of the ruling group, it did seem to herald certain noteworthy modifications of the regime's economic policies. These modifications appeared indicative of a trend towards a more pragmatic and less doctrinaire direction of the economy—a trend that was novel both by reason of its scope and for the fact that it originated from the leadership. Heretofore, pressure in this direction has always come from the economy itself as an expression of deep-seated resistance to the centralized, bureaucratic planning leviathan, and it met with bitter opposition from the Ulbricht group. Thus, charges of undue "managerial emphasis *(Managertum)*—meaning an orientation emphasizing strict economic profitability at the expense of the primarily ideological aims of the party—cost former Deputy Prime Minister Fritz Selbmann his position in 1958. Many economic functionaries and managers were simultaneously dismissed for the same offense, as were such leading economists as Fritz Behrens, Arne Benary and Gunter Kohlmey.

The economists were accused of using the arguments of their science to champion the primacy of practical economic factors (supply and demand, producers' material self-interest, and operating costs as a determinant of prices, etc.) against the arbitrary ideological-political planning of the central agencies. They wanted to free the functioning of the economy as far as possible from non-economic constraints and to create a system that would be planned "from above" only in broad outline and would operate largely according to the laws of the market. At least within certain limits, enterprises would regulate their prices on the basis of profitability, would decide (or have a voice in deciding) the marketing of their output, and would grant their employees a share in enterprise profits. In place of the perennial output norms, production drives, and appeals to "socialist consciousness" would be substituted the incentive of material self-interest, and excessive administrative constraints would be replaced by stronger self-administration "from below." Behrens and Benary even dared to point out that this would, in effect, further the "withering away of the state" envisioned by Marxist ideology.

Significantly, the orthodox Stalinists did not reply at the time with economic arguments, but invoked the

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authority of the traditional ideology. The extreme violence of their reaction was in keeping with the mistrust that every bureaucratic and dictatorial leadership must necessarily feel towards everything spontaneous, unregimented, and uncontrolled—and, after all, the "revisionists" base their economic stand precisely on the claim that the spontaneity of economic action is a force whose suppression must lead to serious consequences.

In the light of all this, it is quite remarkable that Professor Behrens, who was compelled as recently as 1960 to come out with another self-criticism of his "revisionist" views, published an article in a widely-read East German weekly late last year [2] endorsing the quite similar views of his unorthodox Soviet colleague, Professor Liberman. Still more astonishing is the fact that certain of Liberman's concepts (for example, the thesis that what is useful for a whole society cannot run counter to the interests of economic enterprise and its employees) found an echo in Ulbricht's own report to the Sixth Party Congress. Even the wording was similar. Moreover, other passages in the First Secretary's speech bore a strikingly close resemblance to the formerly condemned Behrens-Benary criticisms of 1956-57, for example his statement:

> One should not suppose that it is feasible to overcome deficiencies stemming from improper treatment of the material interests of people by appeals to moral sentiment and ideological consciousness.[3]

The fact that Ulbricht himself until a year ago was one of the most zealous champions of trying to increase production by means of propaganda campaigns supplemented by political pressure [4] has, of course—as is customary in such circumstances—been hushed up.

BUT THE SEEMING reversal of Ulbricht's position involved more than mere matters of economic-political style; it touched the foundations of the economic system as a whole. For, according to Ulbricht, the newly-stressed principle of material interest (in effect, a concession to the "capitalistic" motive of individual self-interest) was to be applied not only in such simple forms as wage incentives, bonuses for individual performance, etc., but also in "more complicated forms such as prices, prime costs, profits, and the like." It was precisely in the latter areas that the central economic bureaucracy heretofore left enterprise hardly any leeway, and the results were widespread unprofitability, lack of incentive to introduce technical innovations, and a

[2] *Sonntag*, November 18, 1962.

[3] *Neues Deutschland*, January 16, 1963.

[4] The most recent example was the so-called campaign to mobilize production, staged after the erection of the Berlin Wall. The slogan was: "Produce more in the same time at the same pay!"

SPEAKING OF PERSONALITY CULTS

Wessiner Bauern an die Werktätigen der Landwirtschaft:

Wir stimmen mit Marzahner Maschinenbauern überein

Erfüllte Pläne, saubere Felder und hohe Erträge — uns allen zum Nutzen, Walter Ulbricht zu Ehren!

FRONT-PAGE HEADLINE from the SED (Communist Party) organ, *Neues Deutschland*, May 16, 1963: "The Farmers of Wessin to the Workers in Agriculture: We Agree with the Machine-Tool Workers of Marzahn—Fulfilled Plans, Clean Fields and High Outputs—For the Good of Us All, to Honor Walter Ulbricht!" (For many weeks preceding Ulbricht's June 30th birthday, East Germans were daily exhorted to pay homage to their Communist boss by working harder. *Cf.* on the same subject *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1962, p. 9.)

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production that was not attuned to the market and was generally unsatisfactory in both quality and quantity.

From now on, the central authorities are to concentrate mainly on the over-all index figures of the plans and leave all questions of detail to the enterprises. Also, the Associations of Nationalized Enterprises (Vereinigungen Volkseigener Betriebe, or VVB), which are jointly managed groups of enterprises accounting (in 1961) for about 65 percent of total East German industrial goods production, are to be granted "considerable powers" in matters ranging from technological research to the marketing of products. As the regime puts it, these "socialistic combines" (!) will now be entrusted with "carrying out the [central] plan creatively." Four of the VVB's are already experimenting to determine the practical effects of greater autonomy on production, sales, profitability, etc.

In agriculture, too, the regime evidently hopes that introduction of the principle of material interest will bring about an improvement. It proposes, for example, to eliminate uneconomic agricultural subsidies, the need for which arose not least—apart from certain other psychological compulsions—from disregard of the principle of profitability. The system of arbitrarily fixed farm prices hitherto in force is to be readjusted to bring it more into line with the profitability concept.

Anyone who heard Ulbricht set forth these plans at the Sixth Party Congress might almost have gotten the impression that the SED boss, at least in his economic policies, had gone over to the "revisionist" camp which he detests so much. Actually, he was merely bringing East German policy into line with the latest Soviet model—as was also made evident by the reorganization of the entire economic and party administration on the basis of the "production principle" (*i.e.,* the separation of industry and agriculture).[5] Furthermore, the conspicuous failures of Ulbricht's economic policies[6] had adversely affected the whole Soviet East European bloc, and it is quite likely that pressures from the Comecon organization, which for some time has ceased regarding certain "free market" concepts as taboo, had a part in influencing the turnabout in the East German leader's position. Only these factors can satisfactorily explain why Ulbricht—at least outwardly—appropriated to himself the basic contentions of his longstanding critics among the economic technocracy.

In another significant imitation of the Soviet example, the Sixth Congress for the first time gave professional economists a representation worth mentioning in the party Politburo. Besides the new head of the State Planning Commission, Dr. Erich Apel, who had already become a candidate member of the Politburo in 1961, the following economic experts were added to the roster of candidate members: Central Committee Secretary Dr. Günter Mittag, graduate economist Herbert Jarowinski, and graduate agronomist Margarete Müller. (Professor Karl-Heinz Bartsch, an agricultural expert, was also elected to candidate membership but had to resign shortly thereafter because of the discovery that he had concealed his past Nazi affiliations.)

That the Ulbricht leadership—consisting almost exclusively of typical party *apparatchiks* without professional training—only grudgingly granted these experts a place in the Politburo is evident from the fact that they were admitted merely as candidate members. They are consequently restricted to a mere advisory role in that body, and in any case they lack the necessary power base to enable them to challenge Ulbricht successfully. This fact is of particular importance in view of the fact that the SED boss, now as before, adheres to his characteristic Stalinist leadership style in dealing with economic matters. A recent evidence of this has been the installation in May of a "Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate" under whose aegis a host of centrally directed inspection officers armed with extraordinary powers will watch over the East German economy in order to guard against mismanagement and "violations of state discipline"—if necessary, with the help of the State Prosecutor.

Hence it would appear that Ulbricht really has no intention whatever of permitting the sense of responsibility and the material self-interest of the lower economic entities to become genuinely effective, either economically or psychologically. It is inherent in the total power concentrated in his hands that it can neither submit to any diminution nor renounce its habitual regulatory interference in the functioning of the economy. Thus, only a few months after the apparent reorientation of East German economic policy at the Sixth Congress, the customary methods of compulsion and control are once more reasserting themselves. The efforts of the reformist economic experts to resolve economic problems by economic, and not political,

[5] The reorganization called for the establishment of separate industrial and agricultural councils at each administrative level. The same dualism is carried over into the party organization, where separate bureaus for industry and agriculture have been set up at all levels from the Politburo down to local party headquarters.

[6] Proof of these failures has been the decline in East Germany's rate of industrial growth from 12.4 percent in 1959 to 8 percent in 1960, and 6.2 percent in 1961. Today it is among the lowest in the Soviet East European bloc.

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means—an approach which Ulbricht himself appeared to espouse at the Congress—have thereby been robbed of much of their potential effectiveness.

Troubles on the "Cultural Front"

Meanwhile, in almost all non-economic areas, the East German leadership has been moving towards a re-tightening of the controls which were slightly relaxed during 1962. This has been particularly evident in the regime's posture toward the artistic and literary intelligentsia, which has been shifting back towards the rigidity that had characterized it after 1957. Apart from some cautious, isolated concessions made by the leadership after 1960 and almost immediately withdrawn, this rigidity continued until the beginning of last year, when a limited relaxation set in. The stepped-up cultural thaw in the Soviet Union seemed to inspire some East German artists, writers, and even the editors of some publications with new courage. More and more voices joined that of Brecht's disciple, Heinz Kahlau, in asserting that people were now "socially strong enough" to permit doing away with restrictive "precautions, reservations, theses, taboos, and the like," and especially giving youth the opportunity to "search for the truth independently." [7]

Some writers, resorting to poetically veiled allusions and similes, ventured up to, perhaps beyond, the very borderline of what was officially tolerated. Among them was the young lyric poet Günter Kunert, who like Kahlau had protested against the regime's cultural policies in 1956 and later been forced to come out with a "self-criticism." In his poem "Interfragmentarium"—which was subtitled "On the Work of Franz K." in transparent allusion to Franz Kafka, whose writings were until recently proscribed in East Germany [8]—he seemed to overstep by far the limits set by the party:

The sleeper rises from his bed
Unrefreshed; furtively
He looks around to see
If anything of his dream still lingers in the room.

How does the mirror look today
On him who is now arisen? Has it
Already become suspicious?

On a thread hanging from the ceiling
(Who knows what sort of thread?)
Descends a spider (Who knows what kind?)
Towards him seated at the table, to hear
What he is thinking.

* * * * *

Stillness. Casemate stillness. Stillness of
a rock-hewn cellar.
Sometimes broken by noise: muffled
Tramping over ceiling and stairs,
Pacing on stairways and floors,
Striding through corridors and rooms:
That power which bears many names,
Too many. . . .

Kunert's poem appeared in the literary review *Sinn und Form* (No. 3, 1962), which—together with the magazine *Neue Deutsche Literatur*—had often been castigated by the party for its unorthodox attitude. In May 1962 the party authorities finally decided to take concrete action to force a change in the editorial staff of *Sinn und Form*. Bodo Uhse, a "true party-liner," was assigned as assistant to the editor-in-chief, Peter Huchel, who promptly tendered his resignation in protest against the party's interference. However, the extraordinarily generous terms of Huchel's contract, entered into some years before, permitted him to continue editing the magazine as he saw fit for the remainder of the year, and according to his many critics at the Sixth Party Congress, he used the opportunity "to show, before leaving his post, what sort of fellow he is." This charge was inspired chiefly by the last issue of *Sinn und Form* personally edited by Huchel (No. 5-6, 1962), which started off by reproducing a speech of Brecht's assailing "the extremely severe measures being taken in the fascist states against Reason"—a theme which in the circumstances could only have been meant to apply to current conditions in East Germany. Nor did the rest of Huchel's farewell issue pay any attention whatever to the party's literary taboos. Although in the end *Sinn und Form* was not forced to suspend publication as at first anticipated, it was quite clear that the party orthodoxy intended to make an "example" of it.

The trend towards a renewed constriction of intellectual freedom was illustrated even more clearly by the fate of a contemporary play, "Die Sorgen und die Macht" (Cares and Power), written by Dr. Peter Hacks. This young playright, who moved from West to East Germany in 1955, identifies himself in all his writings with the basic aims of the SED, yet at the same time echoes a great many of the rather outspoken criticisms heard even among party members. In addition—like many other critics beside himself, who some years back were still making frequent resort to Western arguments—he utilizes the method of pitting the ideal picture of communism, as portrayed in Communist propaganda since the 22nd CPSU Congress, against existing conditions of "socialist" misery. The most controversial passage in Hacks' "Die Sorgen und die Macht" was the fol-

[7] *Sonntag*, July 1, 1962.

[8] During last year, however, some books on Kafka were published in East Germany.

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lowing monologue spoken by Party Comrade Emma Holdefleiss:

> Colleagues, if you would picture communism
> To yourself, then turn your eyes
> Upon what now is, and take the opposite;
> For the road is little like the destination.
> Take as many joys as sorrows now you know,
> Take as much abundance as now there is privation,
> And so, with the gray colors of the present,
> Paint yourself the bright-hued picture of the future.[9]

Since 1959, Hacks and his numerous protégés had repeatedly tried to stage "Die Sorgen und die Macht" in a Soviet-zone theater, but each time the party, after some wavering, had intervened to frustrate the attempt. At last, however, after many revisions by the author, the play was performed for the first time on October 2, 1962, in East Berlin's Deutsches Theater, with which Hacks himself had been actively associated as a producer, and whose manager, Wolfgang Langhoff, had a previous record of repeated official reprimands for deviating from the party line. The party's immediate reaction to the staging of Hacks' play was comparatively moderate. The SED organ *Neues Deutschland* initiated a published discussion of the piece, in the course of which the play elicited favorable comments as well as criticisms. In response to the criticisms, the controversial passage quoted above was toned down in later performances of the play. Despite this, however, Hacks was still made the target of sharp attacks at the Sixth Congress, and soon thereafter (early March 1963) it was announced that he had lost his position at the Deutsches Theater. Not many weeks later Wolfgang Langhoff was also dismissed.

At the end of March the SED Politburo held a two-day conference with artists and writers at which the party's new cultural line was unequivocally laid down and well-known intellectuals were called to account for their "oppositionist" behavior. The fire of party criticism was turned against not only Kunert, Huchel, Hacks, and Langhoff, but also the prominent party writer Stephan Hermlin[10] and Anna Seghers. The party's indictment of the offenders could hardly have been more severe: it accused them of "ideological diversion," "petty-bourgeois nihilism," and "assaults on socialist ideology" and on "the leading role of the party." What was at issue, according to the official spokesmen, was no longer simply the formulas of "socialist realism," but "the sovereignty of

[9] See H. Kersten, "Die Sorgen um die Macht," *SBZ-Archiv*, No. 1/2, 1962.

[10] Among other "offenses," Hermlin had organized a poetry recital at the East Berlin Academy of Arts, at which numerous works later condemned officially as "replete with the spirit of pessimism, of uninformed, carping criticism, and hostility towards the party" were presented. (Similarly controversial recitals took place in Halle, Jena and Leipzig.) In March this year Hermlin was forced to relinquish his membership in the (East) German Academy of Arts.

An Artist's Degradation

The performance of Peter Hacks' "Cares and Power" and my staging of the play do not represent an isolated lapse from a proper cultural policy on the part of the Deutsches Theater under my management, but rather they are the result of erroneous views held by me and many of my staff regarding the nature of our cultural policy . . . and the result of false criteria which I have held up till now concerning the quality of contemporary plays, and which, I must confess openly today, have probably also influenced me on a number of other questions.

I need not tell you how much I now suffer, for all my aspirations . . . have been devoted to my party, to its unity and cohesion, and to the strengthening of its fighting power. But what good are such aspirations if they are ineffective because they lack ideological clarity?

The play "Cares and Power" has not contributed to an increase in the fighting strength of the party. On the contrary, it has reduced that strength and has distorted the most important issue—the confidence of the people, of the working class, in its party—thus supporting the line pursued by the enemies of the party.

I am responsible for this serious mistake, and I must apologize to the party, to every comrade, and particularly to those who are working day and night to build socialism. . . .

Though imbued with the desire to expand the means of expressing socialist realism, in reality I failed to do so and instead diluted and distorted our concept of the road and the destination . . . and adulterated it with petty-bourgeois views. In spite of an honest and subjective intention to fight every form of ideological coexistence, I have actually practiced ideological coexistence.

With great patience and friendship, the party leadership endeavored to point out my mistakes. . . . As an artist I was standing in an uncomfortable position on the ladder of our progress, one foot still on the step of concepts and criteria carried over from the former bourgeois heritage and no longer useful in the German Democratic Republic, and the other on the right step, the step of the Bitterfeld road. With your help, comrades, I am convinced that I shall succeed in standing with both feet on the only correct step.

—From speech by Wolfgang Langhoff at the SED Politburo meeting with writers and artists, *Neues Deutschland*, April 17, 1963.

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the workers and peasants, and the road to socialism." Ulbricht himself left no doubt that he intended to make it his own personal concern to see that the intellectuals hewed to the party line:

We shall not permit false, dangerous, and harmful tendencies to be foisted upon the people, nor will we tolerate attempts, made under the banner of the fight against Stalinism and the personality cult, to upset the fundamental policy of the party and government and to disrupt our work.[11]

The regime's campaign against the writers reached its climax at the end of May and now seems to be in at least temporary abeyance. At the instance of the party leadership, the East German Writers' Association convoked a conference of delegates which was charged with electing a new executive board, although there was no statutory reason for a new election. The balloting resulted in the unseating of almost half the old board members, including virtually all the more prominent ones who were known to harbor critical views of the regime's policies. Among them were not only Hacks, Hermlin, and Huchel—as was to be expected—but also Bodo Uhse, who had earlier been appointed Huchel's successor as editor of *Sinn und Form*; Willi Bredel, who only in January had been elected to the SED Central Committee; Lilli Becher, the widow of Johannes R. Becher; the veteran Communist writers Harald Hause and Stefan Heym, both known to be critical of the regime; and finally the overly "liberal" former secretary of the Writers' Association, Otto Braun. Altogether 23 former board members were deposed and replaced almost exclusively by unknowns loyal to the party line.

Also subjected to the withering fire of the leading party dogmatists were some prominent figures in the art world. In February, the painter Willi Sitte—formerly the recipient of party honors—was compelled to publish a "self-criticism" in *Neues Deutschland* confessing that he had deviated from the path of "socialist realism." Since then attacks have also been made against the well-known sculptor, Professor Fritz Cremer, for showing too great an interest in certain modernistic art forms and thereby giving evidence of his disloyalty to party directives. Still further proof of the renewed ascendancy of Stalinist dogmatism in the artistic field has been provided by the recent declaration of the Artists' Association—obviously inspired by the party—proclaiming an agreement to cooperate with the state trade union (FDGB) "whereby the union may give the artists greater assistance in following the path prescribed by the party of the working class," and the influence upon the artists of "the most progressive working-class elements and the socialist ideology" may be strengthened.

[11] *Neues Deutschland*, March 4, 1963.

The Persistence of Stalinism

In the study of contemporary totalitarianism doubt continually arises whether the long-prevailing concepts developed by such scholars as Hannah Arendt, C. J. Friedrich, or Franz Neumann, are still valid. Post-Stalin communism, it is argued, can no longer be placed on the same footing with totalitarianism of the fascist or national-socialist varieties. This objection cannot easily be passed over. After all, the Communist systems of Tito and Gomulka provide reason enough for reexamining the hitherto established concepts of totalitarianism. At the same time, however, it would certainly be going too far to define post-Stalin communism as no longer "totalitarian" but merely as authoritarian, or "total" in a new sense.

This conclusion, at the very least, appears valid for the "German Democratic Republic." No one, of course, would want to belittle the significance of the anti-Stalinist policy changes of 1953 and 1956. But for all the relaxation and denunciation of the terror of bygone days, and for all the emphasis placed on "socialist legality," the Stalinist-totalitarian make-up of the East German regime, as personally exemplified by Ulbricht and his hangers-on, has not been eliminated; it has merely been thrust into the background.

The leadership group cannot relinquish physical and psychological terror, or the threat of it, from its arsenal of power techniques so long as it does not possess a minimum degree of broad democratic legitimacy, and so long as it can preserve its mastery within the party only by typical Stalinist methods (purges, etc.). Nor can Ulbricht, hated even in the higher echelons of the party as the symbol of all misdeeds and failures since 1945, personally afford to allow the most inconsequential "liberalization" or democratization of the system, because every broadening of freedom of thought automatically tends to generate a stronger demand for his removal. Hence, a necessary ingredient of his policy (in contrast to the policy of Gomulka) is the compulsion for self-preservation by the methods of the totalitarian state. This compulsion has varied in degree. But whenever it manifested itself, whenever opposition arose to bring into play a terroristic defense reaction, it became clear that Ulbricht—in spite of all the destalinization measures initiated by Moscow—had managed, behind the outer facade of reforms, to preserve intact the Stalinist-totalitarian kernel of the system.

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The events of August 13, 1961, demonstrated that terror could again break out overnight and hold the whole society in suspense. Then it was a question of suppressing a welling-up of opposition from the population at large. Today the population in general tends to be apathetic. On the other hand, unrest grips the intellectuals, who have long felt themselves challenged by the primitive anti-intellectualism of the Ulbricht group. And this feeble opposition—which indeed could spread at any time to the rest of the population—is already enough to call forth a sharp counter-reaction from the Stalinist minority at the helm, whose insecurity remains today as great as ever.

Ulbricht has thus far not succeeded in achieving the inner consolidation of his regime. Nor do the partial ideological successes which Communist indoctrination and upbringing may have scored among the younger generation of East Germans, isolated from Western influence, do him much good, if any. For even in the eyes of the young Marxists Ulbricht's past labels him as an incorrigible Stalinist. And the discontent nourished by his tearing asunder of the last connections between the two segments of the German people, as well as by the lack of any improvement in living conditions—looked upon by the populace as a result of his overall collectivization policy—remains undiminished to this day.

Notes on a Somber Journey

By Erich Balow

TO THE VISITOR traveling by rail to East Germany, the crossing of the border into the so-called "German Democratic Republic" seems less spectacular than a confrontation with the Wall that divides East and West Berlin. Most of the passengers try not to pay any attention to the parallel barbed-wire fences marking the frontier, nor to the sinister additional coil of barbed wire laid between them, winding like a serpent to the distant horizon. The train moves across an innocent-looking strip of pasture—in reality a minefield—and then draws up to a new series of barbed-wire entanglements.

In the eyes of the outside world, the Berlin Wall has come to symbolize the entrapped state of the people of East Germany. Yet, in many ways, the barbed wire along the main frontier suggests even more dramatically the inhumanity of life in a police state. For while certainly no less deadly and impenetrable than a solid wall, the fence seems to express a still greater insult to human dignity. By it, a government that calls itself "democratic" has fenced in its people like cattle.

Erich Balow is the pseudonym of a young literary critic who left East Germany a few years ago and now lives in the United States. Fear of possible reprisals against his relatives in East Germany whom he visited last spring prevents the use of his real name.

As the train stopped at the border checkpoint, a young "People's Police" officer with a fresh, open face entered our car. Passing by our compartment, he stopped to exchange jokes with two young girls who shared it with me, and there were a few moments of unrestrained laughter. Then, some minutes later, he and another officer showed up with stern, immovable faces. In clipped words they asked for our passports and entry permits. One of the girls tried to catch the first officer's eye in search of some sign of recognition, but his face remained blank—he obviously was afraid of his teammate. (It is the rule for East German policemen to work in pairs, one presumably spying on the other—mistrust being the basis for keeping order in a police state.) As the inspection proceeded, a soft female voice came over the loudspeaker of the railroad station inviting "travellers from West Germany who wish to take up permanent residence in the German Democratic Republic" to report to Office No. 2 at the border police station. Not very surprisingly, nobody seemed interested.

Travelling by train in East Germany is not only less comfortable than in West Germany but also much more time-consuming. This is due primarily to the fact that even today, 17 years after the once well-organized German railroad system was dismanted on Soviet or-

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ders, the East German railways still remain reduced to single-track operation; that is, all trains, passenger and freight, local and express, must use a single track in both directions, even on the most important and frequently-used lines. Thus, a delay of only one train upsets the whole timetable, and poor connections and hours of delay are the result. Even the speed of the trains is considerably slower than in prewar times. All this is true in spite of the much publicized achievements of "Railroad Workers' Brigades" or "Youth Brigades," and in spite of all the colorful and alluring posters and slogans displayed at railroad stations and along the tracks.

Buildings, Old and New

My travels took me to several places in East Germany. I paid a visit to the old cultural landmark of Weimar and went to see friends in various other towns and cities. Weimar, I found, still retains some of its old charm. The houses in which Goethe and Schiller lived are very well kept, particular care being lavished on the "Goethe-Haus" and its museum in order to make them a cultural showcase. A closer look at the town, however, reveals the deplorable state of other old and beautiful buildings which used to contribute so much toward making Weimar a strikingly uniform example of empire architecture. Though the government boasts its "cultivation of the national cultural heritage," the reality does not match its claims. I also found, for example, that little had been done to preserve the picturesque beauty of a historic town in the Hartz mountains, once famous for its ancient, richly painted and carved frame houses, which now appear beyond restoration.

Generally speaking, houses badly in need of fresh paint with plaster falling off the outside walls, are a familiar sight. Riding through the countryside, I found the villages we passed by especially depressing and ghost-like. As a consequence of collectivization, buildings such as stables and barns on once private farms are no longer used (livestock, grain, etc. now being kept in a single locale on each collective farm) and have become completely dilapidated. The only buildings still occupied are the houses in which the erstwhile farm owners live, watching their former properties fall into ruin around them.

The city in which I spent a few days with old friends still showed the scars of World War II. Partly repaired buildings and empty lots—though cleaned of ruins—met the eye right in the center of town. Even new buildings, most of them still in Stalinist "wedding-cake" style, looked run-down because of poor material or poor workmanship, or both. When I commented to my East German friends on the rather delayed state of reconstruction in contrast to the building boom in West Germany, they remarked drily that they were glad there had not been more construction in recent years. "Just think of it," they said, "how awful if the whole city had been rebuilt with this junk! As it is, there still may be hope for something better."

While visiting a brand-new apartment building, we stopped in to see a newly-married couple, who proudly showed us their apartment. At first sight it appeared nice and fairly modern, but more careful scrutiny revealed that by Western standards the workmanship and quality of materials left much to be desired. I was surprised to learn that all the apartments in this project had only old-fashioned coal-burning stoves to heat individual rooms—coal, of course, being rationed.

The young couple told me that they started the process of trying to obtain their apartment three years before. As housing is desperately scarce in East Germany, it is subject to strict official control and living space is allotted in proportion to the size of the family. Single people or couples who formerly occupied large old-style apartments all to themselves have been forced either to sublet part of their living quarters or even move out altogether. In order to be eligible for a new apartment, our young couple had to pledge themselves to perform several hundred hours of labor in so-called "construction shifts" *(Aufbauschichten)* removing rubble, carting bricks, and excavating ground for the foundations of new buildings. This labor was without pay and had to be performed in their spare time—on Sundays and after hours on workdays. Since they both were working six days a week on their jobs, as is the rule in East Germany, it took them about two and a half years to complete the required amount of labor. After a further waiting period of a few months and the payment of a substantial sum in addition to their labor, they could finally get married and move in.

IT TOOK THE newlyweds just about as long to obtain furniture of acceptable quality and get delivery on a television set and a very simple washing machine (the waiting period for the last two items was two-and-a-half to three years.) Even such small items as linoleum and steel nails for hanging pictures had to be supplied by friends in West Germany. Owning a second-hand car in addition to all this luxury, this particular young couple enjoys a living standard beyond the reach of many of their compatriots. In a country which im-

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ports only a few cars from Czechoslovakia and the USSR in addition to its own limited production of two makes of passenger cars—the medium-sized "Wartburg" (roughly equivalent to the Cadillac as a status symbol and priced accordingly) and the small "Trabant"—ownership of a private automobile is a rarity primarily restricted to state functionaries and doctors. The waiting period for a new car is usually five years, possibly even longer. Needless to say, the cost of gasoline to private car owners is disproportionately high.

Discussing vacation plans with my new acquaintances, I found that arranging a stay at a summer resort in East Germany also presents its problems and inconveniences. Making independent arrangements as an individual is practically out of the question. *Ferienplätze* (vacation accommodations) are obtainable only through the state enterprise or agency where one works, organizations such as the Communist Youth Organization and the trade unions, or the state travel agency DER (Deutsches Reisebüro). Each state enterprise, agency, or organization receives a limited number of "openings" for the vacation spots throughout the country, and usually demand by far exceeds the supply. If one is lucky enough to get accommodations through his enterprise or organization, their cost is quite low, and there are also special reductions in travel fare. The rooms are in so-called "vacation homes," consisting mainly of old-time resort hotels and former mansions, or in private quarters controlled by the authorities. All this means that it is almost impossible for anyone to go on a vacation entirely on his own; unless he wants to camp in a tent, he will probably be unable to find lodging. In other words, vacationing is simply a monopoly of the state. Making arrangements through the state-run travel agency is more expensive and more difficult than through an enterprise or organization. Sometimes people line up in front of its offices 24 hours before openings at vacation resorts are to be distributed. Trips abroad are very popular, but rather expensive and generally rare. Since the erection of the Wall, such travel has been restricted entirely to the "democratic countries" (*i.e.*, countries behind the iron curtain) and is conducted only in groups led by an officially appointed guide who alone is furnished with a passport. Everybody else in the group, before departure, has to turn in his regular identity card to the East German authorities in exchange for a temporary one, thus ensuring against deviations from the official itinerary.

Heard in East Germany

Depressing as their situation may be, or perhaps just because of it, the East Germans preserve a grim kind of humor in their political jokes. Here are some samples.

On the border situation: **(Question) "What should we do if the border with West Germany were to be opened?" (Answer) "Climb the nearest tree to escape being crushed in the stampede."**

On Ulbricht: **Ulbricht, having died, is refused entrance to Heaven by St. Peter and sent down to Hell. The next day three miserable, harassed devils come and knock at St. Peter's gate, begging: "Please, grant us political asylum."**

On the economic situation: **"Did you know that we have already surpassed the West German living standard by ten years? They only have the standard of 1937 [the prewar high point in Germany, now actually far surpassed in West Germany], while we have the standard of 1947 [generally considered the low point in postwar Germany]!"**

E.B.

Hard Life of the Hausfrau

Everyday life in East Germany is full of tribulations, particularly for the housewife, who must spend the better part of her day in food lines or on time-consuming errands which a 30-minute trip to the nearest supermarket or drugstore would quickly dispose of in the United States. Even trying to purchase a screw for a minor repair, or an ordinary pail, for example, can prove a harrowing and frustrating experience. The housewife begins the day by lining up for milk at seven in the morning, then hurries on to the green-grocer's for another long wait—the shop's supply of fruit and vegetables from the wholesale market probably won't come in before 11 or 12 o'clock, but unless one is among the first in line, there will be no chance of obtaining such special treats as Brussels sprouts, cauliflower, or apples. With few exceptions, East Germany depends on its own production of vegetables and fruits, and the supply is both inadequate and restricted by season. When I once saw some imported grapefruit in a shopwindow, apparently not much in demand, I found out that they cost 1.40 East German marks apiece, which would be roughly equivalent to $1.40 in the United States on the basis of relative average incomes.

After lunch the housewife may have to queue up again at her grocery store to obtain the family butter ration. Butter is sold only on certain days—for instance, on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The housewife had better be there half an hour or an

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hour ahead of time, or the supply may have run out before her turn comes. Another time-consuming trip will take her to the butcher's where, for example, beef may be sold only on Wednesday mornings, pork on Friday afternoons, and cold cuts at still another time. (All butcher's shops are now run by the state. The only food outlets not yet state-operated are a few grocery stores, and these are at a great disadvantage since the state stores are given preference in allocating supplies of scarce items.)

Since last summer, meat rationing has been re-introduced, in addition to the rationing of butter. The consumer does not receive ration cards as such, but only a registration card enabling him to sign up at a certain bucher's or grocer's shop, where he must thereafter buy all his meat or butter. The pro's and con's of ration cards as against this kind of registration are debatable. While a coupon on a ration card would represent the holder's claim to a certain definite amount of meat or butter, mere registration only entitles the consumer to purchase these items when and to the extent that they may be available. Therefore, there are really no fixed rations. To my recollection, butter at the time of my stay was being distributed at the rate of about half a pound per person per ten days (East German margarine is, by the way, inedible). The meat situation was just as bad, and the supply even more irregular. To add to these difficulties, a person travelling to another place on his own finds that he has no claim to rationed items anywhere except at his place of residence.

But if shopping for the family food is a strenuous and frustrating daily chore for the East German housewife, the problem of obtaining everyday services that are taken for granted in the United States is equally complicated. Take the simple matter of laundry. Walking along a city street one day, I spotted a long line of people in front of a building, mysteriously laden with bags and baskets full of clothes. As I was studying a sign on the wall which read, "On Friday at 2:30 p.m. laundry will be picked up here," a truck drove up, the driver distributed laundry bags, and the people transferred their dirty clothes to the bags right on the sidewalk and handed them back. In answer to my inquiry, I was told that after two or three weeks the owners would have to be on the watch for a sign telling them the day and time the laundry would be returned to the pick-up point, when the same procedure would take place in reverse.

Even a stroke of good fortune in East Germany can be marred by frustration. One of the people I met happened to be the lucky winner of several thousand East German marks in the state-run lottery. On the day she collected the money, she went out on a big shopping spree—only to return home hours later with every penny still in her pocket. She found that the big purchases she had planned in her first excitement involved long waiting periods for delivery, while others would require days of persistent hunting.

Aggravating as these material hardships and annoyances may be, they are not the main burden on the people's minds. Party boss and State Council Chairman Walter Ulbricht, whose countenance stares at his subjects from posters, newspapers, and postage stamps, maintains his system of terror without letup. An atmosphere of mistrust of one's neighbor, of fear and resignation, prevails everywhere. Because of Ulbricht's omnipresent spies, people waiting in lines for hours on end don't even dare to utter any complaint or to criticize the shortages in food supplies; they simply await their turn docilely and silently. In restaurants, too, I noticed that my friends fell silent whenever a waiter approached our table. Dancing one evening in a cafe with a girl I had known for a few years, I happened to remark, in a voice that could possibly have been audible to the couples dancing around us, that the last time we had danced together had been in West Berlin two years before. She suddenly grew pale and glanced around nervously. Later she explained to me that before that visit she had been obliged to sign a pledge at her place of work that she would never set foot in West Berlin. My innocent remark could easily have given her away.

Escape Via the Air Waves

Since the East Germans are now denied all physical access to the West, the only other remaining contact is via television and radio. West German and West European televison and radio programs are very popular with East German viewers and listeners, but they have to be tuned in in secrecy. In order to put a stop to this without flatly forbidding it—which would defy the letter of the "constitution"—Ulbricht's code stipulates that tuning in Western broadcasts shall be considered anti-Communist propaganda and hence a criminal act if any outsiders are present or if any information or comment derived from these programs is ever mentioned to other persons or discussed with them. This means that if any East German has his television set or radio tuned to a Western program and a friend or neighbor drops in, even if only for a few minutes, the owner is automatically guilty, in the eyes of the law, of spreading anti-Communist propaganda, though he may be watching a variety show or a sports event. Even a roof-top televison antenna can betray its owner since

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it is easy to tell just by looking at it whether the antenna is directed towards a West or an East German station. I was told of campaigns in local newspapers publicly denouncing Mr. So-an-so, living at such-and-such a street, for having his television antenna oriented to pick up Western stations. Also, there have been reports of drives conducted by groups of FDJ (Freie Deutsche Jugend, the Communist youth organization) members, who climbed up on the roofs of houses and "adjusted" antennas in the East German direction.

In a further effort to prevent reception of Western radio and television programs even within the privacy of the family, parents are required by the school authorities to sign a pledge that they will not permit exposure of their children to such broadcasts. This makes disobedience quite risky for the parents, for though adults may be accustomed through past experience to practice political "double-think," children are likely to give themselves away sooner or later. For instance, it has actually happened that children, when asked in their drawing class at school to sketch a picture of the clock that appears on the television screen before each newscast, thoughtlessly reproduced the clock they had seen on the West German program, which differs from the East German one in not being adorned with a political legend. Cramped living quarters, moreover, make it difficult to tune in foreign broadcasts without children being present.

Nevertheless, East Germans are willing to run the risk of committing a political crime in order to cling to their only remaining link with life in a free society —a link that is all the more precious for its news coverage, commentary on current events, and presentation of a world otherwise closed to them. I found that surprisingly many East Germans are better informed about political developments in the Western hemisphere, and more interested in political matters generally, than their West German cousins, and that listening to the evening newscasts of West German, British, and American stations is a daily event of great importance to many of them. West German television programs are also much appreciated for the non-political entertainment they offer—including occasionally even American films and programs transmitted from the United States via Telstar. Many East German housewives would much rather watch a program about Queen Elizabeth or Jacqueline Kennedy than one about heroes of labor or a collective farm's success in raising more piglets. Even Western commercials receive undivided attention because they often show new products which East Germans otherwise might never hear of.

The only West German fare broadcast over the East German television network with official approval is a weekly show "manufactured" by East German propagandist Karl Eduard von Schnitzler[1] and designed to discourage his viewers from watching Western programs. Von Schnitzler's show, entitled "Der schwarze Kanal" (The Black [*i.e.,* West German] Channel), presents filmed portions of West German telecasts brazenly taken out of their original context—*e.g.,* answers lifted from an interview with a political figure in West Germany—and combined with von Schnitzler's own contrived questions and comments. The effect of this is to manipulate the material in the crudest manner for Communist propaganda purposes.

Western musical programs are very popular with young East Germans, who complain about the lack of modern dance music and jazz over domestic stations, which are allowed to devote only a small percentage of their broadcasting time to "Western" music. The newspapers have carried innumerable "letters to the editors" and discussions on the question of whether it is ethical for East Germans to listen to musical programs of West German stations, usually coming to the conclusion that even Beethoven, when broadcast from West Germany, must be considered harmful for East German listeners. However, one perfectly acceptable way of supplementing the meager domestic supply of popular dance music is to tune in the so-called "Freiheitssender" (freedom station), which purports to be a West German Communist underground station but actually is located in East Germany. It is allowed to broadcast Louis Armstrong, Elvis Presley, and the latest Western jazz hits without limitation, but its programs are heavily larded with propaganda and "news" from the Communist "underground."

The Impact of Isolation

In their isolation from the outside world, people almost gratefully welcome any visitor from the West. In spite of all the difficulties they have to contend with in their daily lives, they do their utmost to make a guest comfortable, even if it means personal sacrifices. And yet, they constantly apologize for the limitations upon their hospitality. For his part, the visitor occasionally has the embarrased feeling that he is being treated like a privileged individual—that everything emanating from the West is looked upon by his East German hosts as superior by definition.

[1]Von Schnitzler, originally from a wealthy banking family in Cologne, is a defector from West Germany, having worked for the newspaper *Die Neue Zeitung* prior to going over to the Communist zone.

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In my conversations I noticed at times a marked difference in attitude between the younger generation and those over thirty years old. Not very surprisingly, the young people brought up under the present regime seem to have no real conception of life beyond the frontiers of their country, and therefore no basis of comparison, whereas the older people still have vivid memories of better living conditions and an existence dignified by greater personal freedom than they now have under communism.

The contrast between the two generations was dramatized rather impressively for me one evening when I went to see the opera *Fidelio* and observed the reactions of the audience while the "Prisoners' Chorus" was being sung. The younger spectators gave the impression of merely watching and listening without being deeply affected, whereas many of the older persons in the audience were profoundly moved, some of them

Träume brauchen die Tat

Ein Lied zum VII. Parlament der FDJ / Von Günter Engelmann

Wir sind zwischen Trümmern geboren.
Wir haben sie selbst weggeräumt,
Und haben gehungert, gefroren,
Trotz allem von Schönheit geträumt.

Die Träume brauchen die Tat,
Und Taten braucht unser Staat.
Er braucht unsern Schweiß, unsre Fröhlichkeit,
Unser Denken und unsre Ehrlichkeit,
Ja, Hände braucht unser Staat,
Und Träume brauchen die Tat.

Wir suchen nach gangbaren Wegen.
Wir baggern ein Hindernis fort,
Und Sümpfe sind trocken zu legen,
Die Tat nimmt die Träume beim Wort.

Refrain

Wir sehnen uns heut nach Gestirnen
Und nähn noch der Erde ein Kleid.
Mit Fäusten und unseren Hirnen
Bewegen wir unsere Zeit.

Refrain

Es wird mit den besten Genossen
Und von ihrer großen Partei
Ein Zeitalter heute erschlossen,
Von Angst und von Grausamkeit frei.

Refrain

Günter Engelmann:

Wir — Reserve der Partei

Unruhig, beständig im täglichen Kampf,
Selbst noch lernend schon lehrend,
Die Ökonomie beherrschend,
Kollektiv die Verantwortung tragend,
Die Beschlüsse verwirklichend,
Menschlich zum Unwissenden sprechend,
Konsequent und marxistisch
Werden wir, junge Menschen,
Zur
Reserve der Partei.

Little are Dreams without Deeds

(A song dedicated to the Seventh Parliament of the FDJ*)

Born in the midst of ruins,
Together we cleared them away.
We suffered from hunger and shivered with cold,
Yet dreamed of beauty all day.

But little are dreams without deeds,
And deeds are what our state needs.
It needs our sweat and happiness' fruit;
It needs our minds and honesty too.
Yes, hands are what our state needs,
For little are dreams without deeds.

We seek after passable roads,
Removing the obstacles' growth.
And as marshes need to be dried,
So deeds must supersede dreams.

Refrain

Today we reach for the heavens,
While sewing a robe for the earth.
With fists of steel and minds sublime
Forward we move our time.

Refrain

Thanks to the best of the comrades
And the magnificent party that's theirs,
An age is unfolding before us
That knows no horror or fear.

Refrain

* Freie Deutsche Jugend, the East German Communist youth organization.

Gunter Engelmann

We—the reserve of the Party

Restless, always in daily battle,
Still learning while teaching already
Controlling the economy,
Collectively bearing responsibility,
Putting decisions into effect,
Humanly speaking to the ignorant,
Consistently and in the spirit of Marx,
We, young people,
Become
The reserve of the party.

—Translated by C. F.

Above are "poetic" works by one Günter Engelmann, reprinted and translated from the East German party organ *Neues Deutschland*, May 25, 1963. The original poems are reproduced photographically.

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fighting back tears as if their own feelings were expressed in the lyrics exalting liberty and lamenting its loss. The applause after this scene sounded almost like a demonstration. This incident by no means implies that young East Germans have become converted to communism. On the contrary, many are disillusioned and dissatisfied. But their resistance or objection to the regime seems to be based on instinct and parental influence rather than on profound criticism, for which they simply lack the necessary perspective and information. They themselves can hardly be blamed for this.

The cultural isolation in which the East Germans now live severely limits topics of conversation with them. Among other things, I found it difficult to talk about literature even with young intellectuals and writers. Their knowledge of contemporary German literature consists mainly of Thomas and Heinrich Mann and some more or less unsavory Communist writers, while their acquaintance with 20th-century American literature does not extend much beyond Theodore Dreiser, with some Hemingway and Steinbeck thrown in. One young writer confided to me that he had read James Joyce and had been very much intrigued by the novelty of his technique. I could not bring myself to tell him that, for us, experiments in literature did not end with Joyce.

East Germans, of course, have no access to literature other than that officially sanctioned by the regime. Mailing books into the country is subject to severe restriction with respect to author and content, imposed under a special index drawn up by the authorities. (Not even a Western fashion magazine can be sent into East Germany.) My conversations left me with the sad feeling that cultural isolation is one of the most deplorable aspects of East German life, and that the alienation of the country's young people from their contemporaries outside the Communist bloc will even increase in geometric progression as time passes. Apparently there is no way to prevent this development.

The Significance of the Wall

Judging from my personal observations, the general mood of the people is one of total resignation and disillusionment. This is mainly the result of the creation of the Wall, which has greatly changed the life and the entire attitude of the East Germans. Until August 1961 there still seemed to be a glimmer of hope for a change, and people tried to keep some sort of "inner resistance" alive. Even during the first weeks of the Wall's existence, they refused to believe in the permanence of the situation, and when they at last understood that complete isolation was there to stay, the realization came as a severe shock. It is still incomprehensible to them why the Western Allies did not intervene to prevent Ulbricht from hermetically sealing off East Germany. In their eyes West Berlin was much more than just an enclave in Communist territory that had to be held for reasons of Western prestige; it was a stronghold and haven of freedom for the seventeen million people enslaved in East Germany. It was vitally important to them in two respects: first, it provided the last possible avenue of escape when conditions became too unbearable or one's personal safety was threatened; secondly, it offered at least momentary respite from Communist oppression for those who were able to visit it occasionally. Here, they could mingle with people from the West, meet friends and relatives from beyond the Iron Curtain (who were denied permission to enter the GDR), and take advantage of the cultural life—see Western plays and pictures, read Western books and newspapers, and buy goods unavailable at home.

Without West Berlin as a safety valve, they now are completely at Ulbricht's mercy. The failure of the West even to keep this one last sanctuary open for them fills them with a sense of betrayal; and they feel bitter, too, at the injustice of history, which by mere geographic accident made them alone carry the burden of penitence for an all-German national guilt, while their West German compatriots enjoy the privileges of freedom and prosperity. They still are forced to subsist with a standard of living far below that to which they were accustomed before the war.[2] Much worse, in their lives one form of terrorism has—after a very brief interval—simply been replaced by another which, though less murderous than its predecessor, affects the average German, the man in the street, perhaps even more because it pervades every minute of his daily life.

Considering all these things, it is not surprising that saying good-bye to my East German friends was a painful experience. As the train which was to take me back to the world of freedom started pulling out of the station, I could read in their faces how much they envied me the ability to leave while they must remain behind. After I had passed the barbed-wire barricades at the frontier and left the train at the West German station, I had the strange sensation that a burden had suddenly been lifted from me. The faces of the people around me wore quite a different expression.

They were free, and not even aware of it.

They took their freedom for granted.

[2] East Germany has, in fact, never come close to the living standard of 1937, which economists consider to have been the peak in prewar Germany.

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The Metamorphoses of Ilya Ehrenburg

By Victor Erlich

EDITORS' NOTE: Mr. Erlich's essay-review is based on the five parts of Ehrenburg's autobiography that have appeared thus far in the Soviet literary journal, Novyi mir. *The concluding installment of Part V, featured in the March 1963 issue, carried Ehrenburg's narrative through the end of World War II. In a recent interview (*Pravda, *May 12)* Novyi mir's *editor, A. Tvardovski, indicated that until further notice, no more installments would be published in the journal. Whether Ehrenburg had intended all along to break off his narrative with the close of the war, or whether he chose to do so in light of the recent attacks against him by Khrushchev and Ilichev, is of course a moot question. So far only the first two parts of the memoirs have appeared in English, under the title* People and Life, *1891-1921. (A. A. Knopf, 1962). Mr. Erlich has used quotations from this translation.*

ASIDE FROM BEING singled out as one of the chief targets of Khrushchev's present drive against the intellectuals, Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs, *People, Years, Life,* have several compelling claims on our attention. Ranging as it does from the pre-1914 Bohemian haunts of Montparnasse to the battlefields of the Soviet-Nazi war, this kaleidoscopic chronicle outlines in vivid if fragmentary detail some of the most eventful "years" and some of the most event-making "people" in recent Russian and European history. What with its wealth of personal asides, its thinly-veiled hints and self-conscious and self-justifying polemics, Ehrenburg's autobiography is an apologia as well as a testimony, as much a confession as a recollection. Thus, in spite of its omissions and evasions, it cannot but yield some insights into one of the most tortuous and ambiguous careers in the annals of Soviet literature. Finally, as the first relatively candid account of the Stalinist era offered by a major Soviet literary figure, *People, Years, Life* affords many revealing glimpses of how the literary intelligentsia of Ehrenburg's generation really felt about the savagery of the Stalin blood purges, the sterility of Soviet art, and the debasement of esthetic standards under the aegis of socialist realism.

Here are a few salient samples of Ehrenburg's plain —or nearly plain—speaking:

> **A. Lunacharsky [Lenin's first Commissar of Education and a relatively broadminded Bolshevik intelligent] . . . proved a "good shepherd": "I have said dozens of times that the Commissariat of Education must be impartial in its attitude to different trends of artistic life. As far as questions of form are concerned, the taste of the People's Commissar and all other representatives of authority must be set aside." It is a pity that people with authority or interest in the world of art very rarely remember these sensible words.[1]**

> **I do not believe that collective farmers depicted on canvas in the manner of the academic (Bolognese) school can give many people pleasure, or that it is possible to convey the rhythms of the second half of the twentieth century by that profusion of subsidiary clauses which Lev Tolstoy uses so brilliantly.[2]**

[1] *People and Life,* pp. 74-75.
[2] *Ibid.,* p. 293.

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I have seen how in a progressive society people allegedly dedicated to novel ideas committed dishonorable acts for personal advantage, betrayed comrades and friends, how wives disavowed their husbands and resourceful sons heaped abuse upon hapless fathers.[3]

As for me, I did not experience any fear at the front in Spain during the air-raids, only in times of peace, waiting for a ring or a knock at the door. . . .[4]

[V. A. Antonovich-Ovseenko, the Soviet Consul to Barcelona during the Spanish Civil War] was a brave and dedicated man; he perished only because the woodchoppers were fulfilling their devilish norms.[5]

I realized that people are accused of crimes which they did not commit and could not have committed. I was asking myself and others: Why? No one could answer this question. We were in the dark.[6]

[Shortly after Ehrenburg's return to Moscow in the summer of 1940] I was asked to attend a meeting of Moscow writers . . . Stalin had invited a group of writers, called Avdeienko an "enemy", and attacked two plays—*The Snowstorm* by Leonov and *The Little House* by Kataiev. I had to vote Avdeienko's expulsion from the union. A number of writers vied with each other in denouncing Leonov and Kataiev. I was taken aback. The war was approaching. Is Stalin so sure of our might that he can afford to devote himself to literary criticism?[7]

Who knows how lonely we were in those years? There were many speeches. The guns were already roaring here and there. The radio never stopped blaring, but the human voice somehow gave out. There was much we could not admit even to those dearest to us. Only once in a while we would clasp a friend's hand more firmly than usual—we were members of a *great conspiracy of silence*.[8] (Italics added).

I knew—I would have to live with my teeth clenched, mastering the most difficult of the arts—the art of silence.[9]

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT of these long-delayed admissions proved too explosive for the bureaucrats' comfort. The literary diehards had long been antagonized by Ehrenburg's persistent digs at socialist realism and by his affectionate recollections of the "modernist" artists and of hererodox writers and poets. At the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, that staunchest of all reactionary littérateurs, V. Kochetov, spoke scornfully, without ever mentioning Ehrenburg's name, about "writers of melancholy memoirs who . . . rummage around in the garbage pail of their unreliable memories in order to drag to the light of day some decomposed literary cadavers and show them off as living things." [10]

Politically more significant was the campaign launched by V. Yermilov, a literary critic with a long and distinguished reputation as an *apparatchik* and police informer, in the January 30, 1963, issue of *Izvestia*. Yermilov, too, was clearly displeased by Ehrenburg's "modernistic" bias, but he concentrated his fire on the account of the 1930's in *People, Years, Life*. While conceding, as any good Khrushchevite would, that many "abuses of power" did in fact occur, the official publicist proceeded to undermine some of Ehrenburg's disturbing testimony by urging two somewhat incompatible propositions: a) most of Ehrenburg's contemporaries trusted Stalin and did not know that crimes were committed, b) many of them had actually protested. Ehrenburg's "theory of silence," he declared, was an insult to an entire generation of Soviet men and women. Though, when challenged by Ehrenburg, Yermilov failed to cite any instances of public protests against the "cult of personality" made in the 1930's, *Izvestia* sided with him in no uncertain terms and thus administered an unequivocal rebuke to the aging writer. More recently, Ilichev, the party's chief ideological expert, and Khrushchev himself called Ehrenburg to task for an unduly "somber" and "onesided" portrayal of the Stalin era and reminded him in rather ominous tones of his earlier works such as the anti-Bolshevik poem "A Prayer for Russia" (1917) and a heterodox novel *The Stormy Life of Lazik Roitschwantz* (1928), "widely used in anti-Communist propaganda." [11] It is ironical—since Ehrenburg's chief offense in the eyes of the Ilichevs lies in an excess of candor—that the official charge leveled against him should have been that of hypocrisy.

"The theory of silence," orated Ilichev at the March 8 "meeting of party and government leaders with workers in literature and the arts," "is not true even with regard to Ehrenburg himself. After all, you were not silent then, Ilya Grigorievich, but eulogized, eulogized with all your talent as a publicist. And it turns out you did not believe but wrote." [12]

One hates to concede a point to Ilichev, especially when he upbraids a writer for acting at long last upon his better impulses. The fact of the matter is, though,

[3] *Novyi mir*, 9, 1961, p. 114.
[4] *People and Life*, p. 346.
[5] *Novyi mir*, No. 5, 1962, p. 112.
[6] *Ibid.*, No. 6, 1962, p. 152.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 147.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1961, p. 146.

[10] For a brief profile of Kochetov, see "Literary Psychopathology," by Ronald Hingley, *Problems of Communism*, Sept.-Oct. 1962, p. 44.
[11] *Cf. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, New York, Vol. XV, No. 10, April 3, 1963, p. 6.
[12] *Ibid.*

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that this particular accusation is one which is not easily refuted and which underscores the ambiguity of Ehrenburg's public role and the inevitable incompleteness of his account of "Russia's terrible years."

FOR ALL ITS ominous effectiveness, the phrase "the great conspiracy of silence" tells only part of the story. It must have been trying enough for anyone not devoid of moral sensivity "to live with clenched teeth," to look away when friends, associates, and relatives were being morally and physically destroyed by Stalin's terror machine, or, as Ehrenburg puts it rather abstractly, "ground under the wheels of history." Yet, for a writer, especially one who was predominantly a publicist, "silence" was seldom enough. In order to survive the nightmare, let alone to acquire and maintain the prominent position in the Soviet cultural hierarchy which Ehrenburg held during and immediately after the Second World War, it was often necessary to offer more positive proofs of loyalty—notably, "spontaneously" to denounce the victims and "eulogize" the executioner.

In his memoirs, Ehrenburg maintains that when, upon his return to the USSR from his Spanish assignment at the end of 1937, he was strongly urged by the editors of *Izvestia* to join in denouncing the native "fifth column," he excused himself, claiming insufficient knowledge of the local conditions. The grim charges made recently by a fellow writer, the widow of an Old Bolshevik, Galina Serebriakova,[13] make one wonder whether Ehrenburg actually managed to keep these pressures at bay. Yet even those inclined to give Ehrenburg the benefit of the doubt cannot easily disregard the vocal contribution he made to the "cult of personality". His glowing praise of the tyrant is part of the public record. Suffice it to mention the grandiloquent finale to the luridly anti-American potboiler *The Ninth Wave* (1952), with its apotheosis of Stalin as a "man of peace," or an article written in 1949 where the Leader is portrayed as a strategic genius, the architect of victory, the epitome of wisdom, sympathy and forbearance, the intrepid "captain of the ship":

Braving the wind, peering into the dark night, the captain stands at the helm. Great is his responsibility, great his feat. I often think about the man who took upon himself a tremendous load, I think about the burden, about courage, about greatness. People work, plant apple trees, nurse babies, read poetry or sleep peacefully. And he steers the ship.[14]

The hackneyed rhetoric, the embarrassing sycophancy, of passages such as these—and they could be multiplied —are proof enough, if proof indeed were needed, that it took more than silence to earn the two Stalin prizes for literature that were bestowed on Ilya Ehrenburg. (He said himself to an American writer: "I have told the truth, but not the whole truth."[15]) More importantly, they are a measure of how far Ehrenburg had strayed, during twenty years of collaboration with the Stalin regime, from the sardonic intransigence and the free-wheeling muckraking of *Julio Jurenito* (1922), the novel which established his reputation in the West as one of the most effective debunkers of "both your houses."

How and why did the iconoclast and the "bourgeois nihilist" of the 1920's turn into the semi-official propagandist and apologist of the subsequent two decades? What were the external or internal pressures which triggered the transformation? It would be both strange and disappointing if so extensive and so self-conscious an account as *People, Years, Life* failed to shed any light on this crucial query. It would be still more surprising had this highly delicate matter been handled without equivocation or self-deception.

As has been already noted by several reviewers, Ehrenburg's memory and candor are inevitably selective. He conveys the flavor of the lean yet exhilarating years of 1908-1914 when, "down and out in Paris," he rubbed shoulders with such makers of modern art as Modigliani, de Rivera, Léger and Picasso at the famous Rotonde, and, in his own words, "shuttled between the novels of the French neo-Catholic Léon Bloy and Picasso's eviscerated violins, hatred of the well-oiled bourgeois life of France, and love of the French national character."[16] But he is often tantalizingly cryptic in dealing with such sensitive matters as his early response to the Bolshevik Revolution and the moral crisis which allegedly preceded his first "positive" Soviet novel, *The Second Day* (1933).

IT IS A MATTER of record that Ehrenburg first reacted to Bolshevism with a mixture of awe, apprehension and dismay, and that shortly after the termination

[13] There is no question but that Serebriakova is being used by the party hierarchy to discredit Ehrenburg. In his now famous March 8 speech in which he repeatedly chided Ehrenburg, Khrushchev praised Serebriakova for having produced constructive Soviet novels even though, in contradistinction to Ehrenburg, she had suffered under the "cult of personality". All this argues for taking with a grain of salt Serebriakova's statement that Ehrenburg behaved "dishonorably" during the purges, but not necessarily for dismissing it out of hand.

[14] *Sochineniia* (Works), Vol. V, Moscow, 1945, p. 895.

[15] Patricia Blake, "New Voices in Russian Writing", *Encounter*, London, April, 1963, p. 38.

[16] *People and Life*, p. 198.

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of the Civil War he seemed eager to leave the "new Russia" for his old stamping grounds. (Some Western observers have been puzzled by the remarkable ease with which he secured, in 1921, permission to go abroad.[17]) In his memoirs Ehrenburg keeps admitting apologetically that he failed to grasp the significance of what was happening in Russia, that he often got "muddled." Once in a while, in a half-ironical, half-apologetic manner, he lets the reader in on the reasons for his confusion and ambivalence: "Of course I was still myself. I was frightened by senseless sacrifice, by the ferocity in handling human beings, and by the oversimplification of the complex world of the emotions." [18]

[17] See for instance T. R. Fyvel's astute profile of Ehrenburg in the December 1961 issue of *Encounter*, pp. 82-90.

[18] *People and Life*, p. 336.

Works of Ilya Ehrenburg published in English

The Extraordinary Adventures of Julio Jurenito and his Disciples (1922). New York, Covici-Friede, 1930. Same with title *Julio Jurenito*, London, MacGibbon, 1958.

The Love of Jeanne Ney, (1924). New York, Doubleday, 1930.

A Street in Moscow (1927). New York, Covici-Friede, 1932; London, Grayson, 1934.

The Stormy Life of Lasik Roitschwantz (1928). New York, Polyglot Library, 1960, and Lyle Stuart, 1962; Toronto, Burns and MacEachern, 1960.

Out of Chaos (1933). New York, Holt, 1934.

The Fall of Paris (1941). London, Hutchinson, 1942; Toronto, Ryerson, 1942; New York, Knopf, 1943.

Russia at War (1942). London, Hamilton, 1943; Melbourne, Jaboor, 1944. Same with title *Tempering of Russia*, New York, Knopf, 1944; Toronto, Ryerson, 1944.

European Crossroad. New York, Knopf, 1947.

The Storm (1948). New York, Gaer, 1949; London, Hutchinson, 1949.

The Ninth Wave (1951-52). London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1955.

A Change of Season (1954-56). London, MacGibbon, 1961; Toronto, Ambassador, 1961; New York, Knopf, 1962. (Includes *The Thaw* and *The Spring*.)

Chekhov, Stendhal, and Other Essays. London, MacGibbon, 1962; Toronto, Ambassador, 1962.

People and Life. London, MacGibbon, 1961; Toronto, Ambassador, 1961; New York, Knopf, 1962.

His reference to his Apocalyptic dirge, "A Prayer for Russia," is understandably vague: "I was writing very bad poems at the time. Art does not tolerate falsehood, and I was trying to deceive myself. I prayed to a god in whom I did not believe and dressed myself in other men's clothing." [19] Ten years later, during sleepless nights in his Paris flat, Ehrenburg allegedly reexamined his life and found it wanting. The role of an observer was not enough, he felt: "I understand that the soldier's fate is not the dreamer's, and that one must take one's place in the ranks." [20]

If this is not exactly illuminating, some of the clues scattered through the narrative are not devoid of interest: "I could not live by negation alone. I was chilled by satirical smirks." It is entirely possible that at times negativism, which back in the 1920's was Ehrenburg's trademark, was becoming something of a burden. It is fair to assume that for Ehrenburg, as for many of his contemporaries caught in the dilemmas of post-1918 Europe, irony was both a refuge and a mask. It was a refuge from, or protection against, unequivocal political commitments, a mask concealing an inner conflict—a conflict between inability to believe anything and a yearning for belief and certainty,[21] a conflict between sophistication and *engagement*, between an awareness of the "complex world of the emotions" and a morbid fascination with the decisiveness of the simple-minded who, for better or worse, were going to inherit the earth. In short, for a sensitive young intellectual cynicism was a way of keeping at arm's length the emotional confusion and disarray engendered by the ordeal of the war and its revolutionary aftermath.

Lenin's widow, N. Krupskaya, generally a reliable witness, claims in her memoirs [22] that her husband liked *Julio Jurenito*. "The 'Shaggy Ilya' [Ehrenburg's nickname among the Russian émigrés in pre-1914 Paris] has done a good job!" he allegedly exclaimed, having read Ehrenburg's first novel. Offhand, this reaction of Lenin's would seem to indicate a greater capacity for self-irony than we might expect from the Bolshevik

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 262-263.

[20] *Novyi mir*, 11, 1961, p. 147.

[21] The chief protagonist of a semi-autobiographical quasi-novel, *The Summer of 1925* (1926), which G. Struve has called "the most personal, sincere and earnest of all Ehrenburg's works," describes himself thus: ". . . I do not believe in anything. That is how I am constructed, and my calcified spine is no longer capable of strengthening. But there are hours . . . when I am ready out of malice to love, out of desperation to believe, believe anything you like." (Quoted from an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by John Roger Shaw, *Ilya Ehrenburg: The Career of a Soviet Writer*.)

[22] Nadezhda Krupskaya, *Memories about Lenin*, Vol. I, Appendix.

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leader. For the "master" of Ehrenburg's mock-hagiographic novel, the Mexican incendiary who rejects in one sweep all extant institutions, systems and doctrines, has little use for Marxism-Leninism. Having lustily exposed the hypocrisy and greed of the capitalist West, Julio Jurenito turns on the Communist pieties. Characteristically, he is prepared to accept Bolshevik paternalism provided that it calls a spade a spade and proclaims the historically necessary abolition of freedom. The encounter between Jurenito and the "important Communist" is a deliberate parody of the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. After the Communist's long and impassioned harangue, Jurenito kisses the speaker's "high steep brow." Clearly Jurenito knows his Dostoevsky.

Yet when all is said and done, Lenin's ability to enjoy the Ehrenburg novel is not altogether surprising. Though hardly a sophisticated literary critic, Lenin was shrewd enough to perceive and exploit typical attitudes of the intelligentsia for his own propagandistic and long-range political purposes. Not only was the relentless exposure of capitalism grist for the Leninist mill, but, perhaps more importantly, the Bolshevik leader may well have realized that the free-swinging "nihilism," the total negation of the status quo which informed *Julio Jurenito,* would in the long run provide but a flimsy defense against the harsh pressures and insidious blandishments of the Communist system—the more flimsy, one might add, since the early Ehrenburg's "burning hatred for the present" was overlaid by a sense of impotence about the "wave of the future" and strongly tinged with self-doubt and self-contempt.

AS EHRENBURG HIMSELF tells us, during his prewar apprenticeship with the Left-Bank Bohemia, his rebellion against "the well-oiled bourgeois life" was held in check by his reverence for Western Europe's artistic treasures and a vague hankering for its religious traditions—as evidenced by his interest in French neo-Catholicism. The war, which turned a "shaggy" young poet into an angry reporter, was a bitterly disillusioning, indeed a traumatic, experience. Ehrenburg's collection of First World War sketches, *The Face of War,* records faithfully his bewilderment and horror at the sight of the mechanized brutality of the front and the chauvinistic hysteria and cynicism of the rear. To the near-expatriate, the Armageddon spelled more than the end of an era: it epitomized the doom of the world which, in spite of its failings, he had grown to cherish, the precariousness of the liberal Western civilization of which he was about to become an integral if dissident part. "The Apocalyptic well of the abyss is open and the seals are broken. Terrible spirits have been called to life, nor is it for diplomats to pacify them at any conference." [23]

The same theme of "death, darkness and devastation" dominates the turgid verses which Ehrenburg was producing during the first years of the Revolution. Nor is the bloody ordeal to be redeemed by the quality of life which is to emerge from it: the antiseptic beehive, the "paradise built of concrete" is anticipated here with apprehension rather than with hope. Another obsessive leitmotif in these lurid visions is the inevitability of the dread City of the Future, indeed the ultimate irrelevance of one's own feelings about that inexorable historical process, the obsolescence of one's self. A 1920 poem, whose opening line proclaims "I came into the world on the eve," is a monotonous celebration of the author's imminent demise: "Alone, alone, amid the fire I gaze at the . . . rosy dawn of the day after my death." [24] Another line reads: "Born yesterday, I loved yesterday's wisdom." In the murky light of these reluctant prophecies, the literary and esthetic sophistication is not so much a value to be preserved as a 19th-century ballast, an anachronism to be pointed to with a mixture of ironic embarrassment and slightly perverse pride, as one is about to surrender to the Will of History.

IT IS SUCH an act of moral *harakiri* that lies at the core of the novel generally considered as a turning point in Ehrenburg's literary career, *The Second Day.* Though ostensibly a production novel, a saga of "socialist construction," it is primarily about the reorientation (*perestroika*) of Ilya Ehrenburg, a public burial of his old untractable self and an unveiling of his new "positive" personality. The main protagonist of the story, Volodia Safonov, is in many respects the old Ilya Ehrenburg's alter ego: a brooding and sensitive intellectual, he is the perennial outsider, a lone wolf poisoned by irony and weighed down by sophistication. Volodia can't "get with it"; he is unable to integrate himself into the "collective" which amid unspeakable hardships, doggedly and heroically, is building a new industrial plant; he is clearly out of step with his society and his era. His only attempt to break out of his isolation fails miserably. At first, the strongminded, idealistic Irina, who like so many positive female characters in Russian fiction combines sensitivity with a longing for a cause, is fascinated by Volodia's superior intelligence. Yet ultimately she grows tired of his carping criticism, of his corrosive irony, and opts for the future in the person of

[23] See fn. 21.
[24] See fn. 21.

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Kolka Rozhkov, a robust, simpleminded and enthusiastic young worker and member of the Komsomol. Volodia commits suicide. Exit "yesterday's wisdom," defeated ignominously on the battlegrounds of constructive social action and personal relations.

The message is all too clear, though at times not devoid of characteristic deviousness. Perhaps in an attempt to salvage a measure of self-esteem, the Ehrenburg of *Julio Jurenito* covers his retreat by a few parting shots, a few perfunctory yet pointed barbs at the victors. Here, for instance, is the passage introducing Safonov:

> **His whole existence is an error. He does not explain Dr. Faust's malaise by invoking the characteristics of the era of primitive accumulation . . . He knows that Spring is older than the Revolution. Consequently he does not know anything. He is dense and illiterate.**[25]

It is this undercurrent of ambivalence, along with fresh and effective reporting, that makes *The Second Day* superior to and different from the run-of-the-mill Soviet industrial novel. With Volodya Safonov safely out of the way, there was nothing to prevent Ehrenburg's next production novel, *Without Stopping to Draw Breath* (1935), from degenerating into pure, unadulterated Soviet industrial soap opera.

Yet it is not through thinly fictionalized eulogies of Soviet industrialization that the new Ehrenburg was to make his distinctive contribution. For all his enthusiasm for the builder of Kuznetsk, Ehrenburg was far from eager to exchange the relative comforts of the decadent West for the wholesome rigors of "socialist construction." More importantly, one suspects, the Soviet regime was anxious to make political use of Ehrenburg's valuable skills and connections, his expertise at exposing the cesspools of Western Europe, and his contacts among the literary and artistic set of Montparnasse. As a roving correspondent of *Izvestia,* he was to shuttle between the battlefields of the strife-torn and demoralized Europe of the 1930's, be it Vienna in February 1934 or Spain of 1936-38. As an intellectual troubleshooter and go-between, he was to become an important liaison man between the Soviet regime and the "progressive" Western European intelligentsia. From now on his services were to be handsomely rewarded, his free-floating sarcasm channeled, his satirical gifts harnessed.

THIS IS NOT to say that through all the successive twenty years Ehrenburg the publicist was merely a mouthpiece of the regime. There were moments or periods during that time when his natural proclivities seemed to coincide with the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet Union. This is especially true of the "Popular Front" era and of the period 1941-45, when Ehrenburg became one of the most effective Soviet war propagandists. There is no doubt that he hated and feared fascism with its naked cult of violence, its backwoods anti-intellectualism, and its blatant chauvinism. By the same token, when in 1941 the German armies overran Ehrenburg's homeland, "the enemy of communism," as T. R. Fyvel put it, "was also the enemy of Mother Russia, the enemy of France and all that was civilized, and the diabolical foe of all Jews."[26]

It is the element of personal involvement, along with superior reportorial skills, that lifts Ehrenburg's journalism time and again far above the dreary, propagandistic Soviet hack-work. Many pages of his reports on the Spanish Civil War are eloquent, fresh, and vivid. His fiery wartime radio speeches and articles urging a ruthless destruction of the German invaders owe some of their strident effectiveness to the authenticity of his underlying emotions.

Yet even at these junctures Ehrenburg's enthusiasm and indignation were often manipulated from above. In his *Izvestia* articles on the abortive uprising of the Austrian Social-Democratic *Schutzbund* in 1934, he hailed the courage of the anti-Fascist Austrian workers, but did not forget to condemn the alleged opportunism and political cowardice of the Social Democratic leaders, some of whom were fighting in the ranks while those lines were written. He was entranced by the bravery and austere pride of the Spanish Loyalists, regardless of their party affiliations, and he wrote about them affectionately and shrewdly. But he predictably glossed over the sinister crimes of Stalin's agents in Spain. Worse still, when André Gide, then a recent defector from the Soviet fold, protested along with some other French writers against the brutal persecution of the non-Stalinist Left in Catalonia, Ehrenburg did not hesitate to brand his erstwhile comrade-in-arms as a "venomous old man and renegade with a bad conscience."[27]

In his autobiography Ehrenburg strongly hints at his inward protest against the Nazi-Soviet pact. Though allegedly he realized that this move was "inevitable," he found it difficult to swallow. He points to the fact that during this trying period he wrote an anti-German

[25] *Den vtoroi,* Gosizdat, 1934, p. 45.

[26] See Fyvel, *loc. cit.* (fn. 17), p. 86.

[27] The reference made in *People, Years, Life* to this disgraceful episode is positively mendacious: "In 1937, in Spain, I read his article—he was accusing the Republican authorities of violence. I lost my temper and called him "an old man with a renegade's venom and a bad conscience." (*Novyi mir,* No. 4, 1962, p. 43.)

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O Lord, the great land
Lies sodden, naked!
She wished a little cheer from her grief
And made merry, stumbled, lies now in the muck
"Not long for this world," they say.
Where are we to live?
Look, the eyes of Thy weary bondwoman
Weep bitter tears
Only a chemise in tatters
And the flush from her stupid spree
And she sings and laughs and groans . . .
But do not call her Thine—
See, her swarthy church-worn hands
Are covered with blood.
. . . And someone shouts: "Here, come to me!
Ah, see the naked creature sprawl!" . . .

For all the graves
O Lord, hear our prayer
For those who bear their cross
For those who bear no cross nor stone
For stones where our churches stood
For votive lights extinguished, for silent belfries
For the desolation that now reigns
O Lord, hear our prayer. . . .

O Lord, forgive us.
Rise golden sun
White churches, sky-blue steeples
Devout Russia!

For Russia,
O Lord, hear our prayer.

—From "A Prayer for Russia" (1917).

* * *

How splendid that the hydro-electric station was being built next to the factory! How often that factory had been mentioned in the German communiques! That was where the Germans had run their heads agains a stone wall. The Americans might well roar and threaten and count the miles separating them from Moscow, Baku, or the Volga; in Stalingrad a hydroelectric station was being built. The town was again in the front line. The Ural was sending machinery, Siberia—timber, people were streaming in from all parts of the Soviet Union. A great battle was on—for electric power, for light, for life. . . .

He settled down to go through the newspapers, and America surrounded him. An Institute of Chemistry considered biological warfare the most practical because it didn't destroy the economy of the enemy country. . . . In West Berlin during street manoeuvres American troops had successfully used tear gas. . . . Negotiations with General Sinamura for the setting up of twenty Japanese divisions were proceeding satisfactorily. . . . In Atlanta an old Negro had been hanged for insulting a white woman. . . . In Chicago fourteen people who were carrying on peace propaganda had been arrested. . . . "Catch" machines had brought in fifteen million dollars that year; Golden Superman had thrown Red Phantom at the seventeenth hold; the audience had demanded: "Finish him off!" . . . In Albany a thirteen-year-old boy had strangled an old woman for the sake of twenty dollars.

—From *The Ninth Wave* (1951).

* * *

By nature I am a doubting Thomas. In 1920 and 1921 I had many doubts. . . . Naturally enough, I thought above all of the future of art. . . . Once I spoke to Lunacharsky about my doubts. He replied that communism must lead to multiformity, not uniformity, and that an artist's work cannnot be cut from a single pattern. He spoke of the Derzhimordas [name of police chief in Gogol's *Inspector-General*] who cannot understand the nature of art. A year later, in an article published in the journal *The Press and the Revolution,* he used the same definition. He said that censorship was necessary in a period of transition, and added: "But the man who says 'away with all these prejudices about free speech: state control is inherent in our Communist system; censorship is not a dreadful concomitant of a period of transition but a proper feature of ordered, socialized, Socialist life'—the man who concludes from this that criticism itself must become a kind of informer's report or a means to fit works of art forcibly on a primitive revolutionary cobbler's last, this man, if you scratch him a little, will turn out to be a Derzhimorda. He has attained some power, but has derived nothing from it but the pleasure of swaggering, bullying, and, above all, ordering people to 'go there' and 'keep out of here.' ". . .

It was not the epoch I quarreled with but my own self. There was a great deal of confusion in my mind. I was for industrial aesthetics and planned economy. . . . yet I often asked myself what would happen to the vast variety of human character in the new, more rational and more just society. Would not the improved machines, which I myself extolled, become a surrogate for art? Would not technology suppress those emotions which, troubled though they sometimes are, humankind holds dear? . . . Many of the doubts I entertained in 1921 were naive and have been proved false by life—many, but by no means all.

—From *People, Years, Life* (1960).

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novel, *The Fall of Paris*. Yet anyone who has read the book will recall that this demagogically slanted panorama of French politics in the late 1930's manages to skirt the impact of the Soviet-Nazi agreement on the position of the French Communists in 1939-40.

In the closing section of *People, Years, Life* Ehrenburg dwells with understandable satisfaction on the role which he played during the Soviet-Nazi war as one of the most popular correspondents of *Red Star*. No wonder: the period 1941-45 was Ehrenburg's "finest hour." It was the only moment in his long career when "Ilya Ehrenburg" became a household or, if one will, a foxhole word throughout the Soviet Union. However, owing to the selectiveness of Ehrenburgs account of his wartime activities and to the fact that the narrative is not carried beyond 1945, one of the murkiest episodes in his public career is significantly omitted. When Hitler's armies were advancing toward the heart of Russia, he joined with such Soviet Jewish cultural figures as the theater director Mikhoels and the writers Bergelson, Fefer and Markish in an impassioned plea addressed to the Jewish "masses" the world over. The statement of the so-called Jewish anti-Fascist Committee invoked the common Jewish heritage, the ties which bind Jews of all countries and continents, and urged common defence of these values against the Nazi onslaught. Several years later most of the signatories were in the dock, arraigned by the dictator's paranoiac anti-Semitism. A recent book on the tragedy of the Soviet Jews[28] claims that Ehrenburg not only acquiesced in the persecution of his former associates, but actually testified against them. While in the last years such charges have been too persistent to be discounted as mere ugly rumors, I would prefer to stick to incontrovertible fact, to the public record.

Many will recall Ehrenburg's virulently "anti-Zionist" article published in *Pravda* of October 26, 1948, where the very idea of Jewish identity and solidarity, which in 1942 was being mobilized in behalf of the Soviet war effort, was branded as "counterrevolutionary" and "bourgeois." (As at the Slansky trial in 1952, "Zionism" was clearly a misnomer, a label for Jewish ethnic consciousness.) Ehrenburg knew too well the inner workings of the system he had served for over fifteen years not to realize the sinister repercussions of the campaign he was thus helping to launch. The arrests promptly followed. Was this part of the hidden cost of survival? One wonders.

THE MORE RECENT phase of the story is still fresh in our memory. It is common knowledge that ever since *The Thaw*—a shoddy piece of literature but, in spite of its equivocations, a timely and significant human document—Ehrenburg has been one of the most vocal spokesmen for the "liberal" wing of the Soviet intelligentsia and, along with K. Paustovski and N. Aseiev, one of the most influential elder sponsors of the young heterodox poets and writers. In his widely quoted critical essays, "Lessons of Stendhal" and "On Reading Chekhov," in his appreciative introductions to the volumes of such recently rehabilitated masters as M. Tsvetaeva and I. Babel, in the recent collective letter to Khrushchev in behalf of variety in the arts which he co-signed, he has stood foursquare for a measure of creative freedom and integrity, for esthetic pluralism, for sense and sensibility.

It is worth noting that Ehrenburg's present non-conformism centers almost entirely around the defense of literary and esthetic standards. This fact, it seems to me, is doubly significant. It is a commentary both on the role of literature in present-day Russia as a repository of residual humanistic values, and on the nature of Ehrenburg's sturdiest loyalties. It seems that the "passion for art" which he imbibed in the early stage of his stormy life survived all the twists and turns, all the compromises, evasions—if not outright betrayals—of his "complex path," to use a Soviet euphemism, only to assert itself in a somewhat more permissive atmosphere when the risks of creative integrity seemed slight or at least manageable.[29]

Is Ehrenburg's, thus, fundamentally a case of the dedicated artist sucked into the mire of totalitarian politics? Not exactly. His essential gifts and instincts are those of a superior publicist rather than a full-fledged creative writer. The virtues of his best work—a rapid pace, a shrewd and vivid social observation, timeliness, alertness, versatility—are journalistic rather than literary. At

[28] Lénéman, *La tragédie des Juifs en URSS*, Paris, 1959.

[29] In his excellent volume *The Pasternak Affair—Courage of Genius* (New York, 1962), Robert Conquest, viewing Pasternak's activities from the vantage point of his post-Stalin role, suggests that Ehrenburg may have decided to collaborate with the regime so as to be available and "play a useful part when things have changed". This charitable interpretation of Ehrenburg's metamorphoses presupposes a longer-range political vision and a sturdier civic-mindedness than seems reasonable to assume in an astute but remarkably pliable man. Perhaps we ought to distinguish between some long-range consequences of Ehrenburg's overt conformity and its initial motives. It is my strong impression that he was betrayed into official apologetics by a mixture of political opportunism, personal weakness, and genuine ideological confusion. If so, all one can say with some certainty is that his *modus vivendi* with the Stalin regime has, in fact, increased his potential for survival and hence for assuming a more beneficient public role "when things have changed" some.

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most, two of Ehrenburg's many, indeed all too many, novels—*Julio Jurenito* and *The Stormy Life of Lazik Roitschwantz,* in which Ehrenburg's satirical gifts are fully deployed—can be adjudged real literary successes. This is especially true of the Roitschwantz saga, only recently translated—much to Ehrenburg's embarrassment—into English, a sad yet irresistibly funny Odyssey of a small-town Jewish tailor, baffled and buffeted by the bureaucratic rigidities of post-1918 Europe, a peculiarly engaging book in which the savage satire of *Julio Jurenito* is tempered by the diffident, self-deprecating Jewish folk humor. The bulk of Ehrenburg's fiction, including *The Grabber* (1926), *The Life of Nikolai Kurbov* (1923), *The Love of Jeanne Ney* (1923), *In the Protochny Lane* (1927), not to mention Ehrenburg's fundamentally dishonest orthodox novels, is, in D. S. Mirsky's apt if somewhat harsh phrase, "superficially interesting and essentially cheap." [30] A restless, mercurial, derivative writer, shifting with dizzying rapidity from genre to genre and from style to style, Ehrenburg was too eclectic to create works of enduring value, and too undiscriminating to avoid the pitfalls of sentimentality and melodrama.

YET, IF BY AND LARGE Ehrenburg is no more than a second-rate artist, he has been a remarkable cultural middleman, an affectionate witness and a knowledgeable interpreter of the modern literary and artistic ferment. His sense of literary values has been considerably more enduring and reliable than his potential for major literary achievement. Though rarely capable of excellence, he has been ready to recognize it, acclaim it and rejoice in it, unless doing so entailed serious political risks. His critical acumen and profound love of poetry were already apparent in the small anthology *Portraits of the Russian Poets,* where strategic selections from Russian Symbolists and post-Symbolists, such as Blok, Akhmatova, Mayakovsky and Pasternak, were bolstered by the editor's acute and judicious thumbnail sketches of these masters.

This capacity for disinterested enthusiasm is evident in what are perhaps the most appealing pages in Ehrenburg's chronicle—the warm and vivid recollections of the author's illustrious contemporaries, encountered in the course of his far-flung career: Modigliani, Picasso, de Rivera, Mayakovsky, Tsvetaeva, Mandelshtam, Meyerhold. Once again a qualification is in order. When a critical assessment or a personal reminiscence gets involved with a delicate political issue, such as the Pasternak affair, the purity of the response is difficult to maintain. Thus, in his reminiscences of Pasternak, Ehrenburg speaks with both sides of his mouth: "I was fond of him, and I loved and still love his poetry."[31] We have no reason to doubt the sincerity of this straightforward statement. Yet the tribute is promptly qualified by a somewhat acid reference to Pasternak's alleged egotism and his complete lack of a sense of history. ("He heard hearts beat and the grass grow, but he never heard the footsteps of the age." [32]) As one might expect, "reading the manuscript of *Doctor Zhivago* saddened" Ehrenburg.[33] (Whatever his actual feelings may have been—and for all we know they could have been negative—he clearly had to say this sort of thing in order to get away with the enthusiastic praise of Pasternak's lyrical verse.) At some time Ehrenburg's gyrations lead him to relapse into the kind of intellectual demagoguery which stood him in good stead in the previous years. Pasternak's view of *Doctor Zhivago* as a culmination of his literary achievement reminds Ehrenburg of "Gogol, who regarded *The Inspector-General* and Part One of *Dead Souls* as trifles, and thought he had found the right path when he started Part Two of *Dead Souls.*" [34] Whatever one's view of the place of *Doctor Zhivago* in the Pasternak canon, the parallel between that noble novel and the ponderously dismal failure of Part Two of *Dead Souls* is a shabby debating trick worthy only of Ehrenburg the official apologist.

Such jarring notes are totally absent from Ehrenburg's homage to another pure poet, a victim of Stalin's personal vindictiveness—the frail, vulnerable, dazzling Ossip Mandelshtam. Not that this subject was free from explosive implications. But Mandelshtam was a target of Stalin's, not Khrushchev's, cultural terror. Thus Ehrenburg's affection and admiration for one of modern Russia's finest lyricists could assert itself without crippling qualifications and innuendos: "I remember many of his lines. I repeat them as incantations, and looking back I am happy that I once lived by his side." [35] Coming from an influential and celebrated littérateur, this tribute is touching in its self-effacing modesty, its delight in, and reverence for, genuine creativity.

There is no doubt but that in the last six or seven years Ehrenburg, in Louis Fischer's apt phrase, "has been working his way back to decency." He has endeavored to play the role of the elder statesman of Soviet literature, a one-man bridge between the searching young

[30] *Contemporary Russian Literature,* New York, 1926.

[31] *People and Life,* p. 278.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 281.
[33] *Ibid.,* p. 285.
[34] *Ibid,* p. 285.
[35] *Ibid.,* p. 348.

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intelligentsia and the literary and artistic heritage of pre-Stalin Russia. To quote Fischer again, he "has the courage of the age" or, if one may put it differently, the old man's overriding concern with posterity. For one cannot help but feel that in the post-Stalin period Ehrenburg has been laboring strenuously towards a more respectful obituary, a more favorable historical verdict than the unredeemed two decades spent in the service of Stalin's propaganda machine would have warranted.

Since not all the returns are in, and the story is still unfolding, it would be difficult to say with any assurance or precision what such a verdict will or should be. Yet two predictions may be in order. Whatever the exact terms of the judgment, it will disappoint both the admirers of Ehrenburg, who bill him as the conscience of Soviet literature, and his detractors, who view him simply as an opportunistic weathervane: the record is much too ambiguous and contradictory to yield either a blanket condemnation or a clean bill of health. Moreover, since the career of Ilya Ehrenburg has larger implications, as this article has tried to point out, its assessment is likely to have some bearing on such disparate matters as the uses and pitfalls of irony, the moral cost of collaboration with totalitarianism, and the remarkable resilience of literary sensibility.

Perspectives on East Central Europe

Eastern Europe in the Post-War World, by Hubert Ripka. New York, Praeger, 1961.
*East Central Europe and the World*s *Developments in the Post-Stalin Era,* Stephen D. Kertesz, Ed. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1962.
Die Entwicklung der kommunistischen Parteien in Ost-Mitteleuropa, by Alexander Korab. Hamburg, Terrapress-Verlan, 1962.
Revolution in Hungary, by Paul E. Zinner. New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1961.
Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960, by Edward Taborsky. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961.
Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People, by Richard F. Staar. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1962.
Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur, by Fritz Schenk. Cologne and Berlin, Kiepenheuer and Witsch, 1962.

Reviewed by Melvin Croan

IN A SYMPOSIUM published in 1956 *(The Fate of East Central Europe: Hopes and Failures of American Foreign Policy,* Notre Dame, Notre Dame University Press), Professor Stephen D. Kertesz called attention to the dual character of Soviet control over the satellites. "It is a dire threat to the security of the Western world," he wrote then, "but it may also prove to be the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system." These words, so timely when written, have lost none of their relevance since. In his introduction to the present volume, *East Central Europe and the World,* a sequel devoted to the developments of the post-Stalin period, Professor Kertesz has wisely chosen to restate the same basic thought. "This duality," he observes, "remains one of the major characteristics of Eastern Europe, despite all that has happened since Stalin's death."

Any such reminder of the inherent vulnerability of the Soviet position in East Central Europe—no less than of the menace which that position has posed to the West—is now doubly welcome. It comes as a useful corrective to the mistaken notion that East Europe no longer counts in world affairs; and it serves as a timely challenge to the unfortunate tendency to dismiss internal developments in the Communist states of East Central Europe as invariably and exclusively the re-

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sult of Soviet policy. While adequate comprehension of both the internal development of these states and their role in international politics is impossible without prior reference to the Soviet Union, to focus on the Soviet "center" alone tends to produce an excessively narrow range of vision. It is liable to obscure other dimensions in a multiple set of relationships between the ruling Communist parties and the Soviet party, within the separate Communist elites themselves, and between the individual regimes and the societies they rule. Events of the last decade should prompt a recognition of the need to look beyond the obvious uniformities, to watch carefully the subtle process of diversification within East Central Europe as a whole, and, finally, to study closely specific characteristics of particular countries of the Soviet bloc. Indeed, neglecting these internal factors is tantamount to accepting the proposition that Soviet power has permanently sealed the fate of East Central Europe. It is clear also that such neglect narrows the scope for effective Western policy in the area.

HUBERT RIPKA'S posthumously published essay, *Eastern Europe in the Post-War World,* is devoted precisely to questions of grand policy. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the Polish October and the Hungarian Revolution (to each of which he devotes an informative chapter), Ripka proposes to extricate East Central Europe from Soviet control. Toward that end, he advances a specific plan calling for far-reaching military disengagement and extensive political neutralization designed to meet the security needs of both the Soviet Union and the West.

Thanks to widespread public debate in recent years about one version or another of these tantalizing themes, Ripka's proposals will not strike the reader as exactly novel. Even without the gratuituous publisher's note to the effect that had the author lived longer, he might have wished to revise his conclusions, it is easy to dismiss Ripka's suggestions as totally outdated today and largely unrealistic even when first propounded more than five years ago. Precisely because this is the case, it may be tempting to dismiss the book out of hand. Yet, Hubert Ripka, who in the 1930's served as the foreign editor of the distinguished Czech liberal newspaper, *Lidové Noviny,* and subsequently held responsible governmental positions under President Benes, writes knowledgeably about the general political evolution of East Central Europe. Ripka's analysis of how interwar rivalries among the great powers contributed to internal divisiveness throughout the region merits attention, as do his claims on behalf of the capacity of its people to develop their own democratic traditions, if given the chance to do so. That his hope for a truly independent East Central Europe functioning as both bridge and buffer between the Soviet Union and the West seems illusory for the present need not rule out forever that combination of "internal and external pressure" which, as Ripka anticipated, "could eventually persuade the Russians seriously to negotiate with the West about a new political settlement in Europe."

While Ripka's treatise was inspired by the events of 1956, which to his mind foreshadowed "the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the fall of communism," the contributors to the volume edited by Kertesz take a look at the post-1956 period from a less immediate vantage point and they are considerably less sanguine about the prospects. Indeed, their major emphasis is upon "the skill and rapidity with which the Soviet Union has recovered from the various forms of disaster which threatened it then," to borrow a felicitous formulation from Robert F. Byrnes' concluding remarks. At the same time, however, the Kertesz volume is informed by an appropriate awareness of the innovations and complexities of the Khrushchev era in bloc relations. It delineates the ways in which the Soviet leadership has had to take account of divergent interests and distinctive problems within the bloc, and devotes special attention to China's unexpected role as a "new power" in Europe. All these facets of the post-Stalin period are enormously significant, even though events subsequent to the publication of the book have already demonstrated the limitations on China's role in Europe and the rapidity with which it is being played out.

In dealing with a collaborative enterprise such as that edited by Kertesz, the reviewer is traditionally obliged to disclaim responsibility for assessing each individual contribution. Suffice it to note that in this case there are fifteen separate essays, covering both internal developments and foreign relations, largely country-by-country, and that the geographic coverage stretches the customary limits to make room for the Baltic States on the one side and Finland and Austria on the other. If there is anything missing from this comprehensive survey, it is perhaps an incisive analysis of the prospects and pitfalls of economic integration. The topic receives passing mention at various points throughout the book, but it is treated far too sketchily in view of its obvious importance in Khrushchev's program to secure Soviet hegemony in East Central Europe through shared interests and mutual assist-

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ance (*i.e.*, economic interdependence). The absence of such discussion will be missed all the more since developments in the economic sphere do have, as the editor rightly suggests, "an important long-range effect on relations between Western and Eastern Europe."

APART FROM THE economic ties which bind the individual Communist regimes to one another and to the Soviet Union, another crucial theme deserving separate treatment involves the cohesiveness and purposefulness of the ruling parties and their leaderships. It is almost a "law" of totalitarian politics that when the totalitarian party is monolithic, the entire system is dynamic; when, however, the party is divided internally and the dissension exposed to the public, the whole totalitarian edifice may be threatened with collapse. In view of the variety of Communist politics in East Central Europe in the post-Stalin period, a comparative study of the various Communist parties has long been overdue. For this reason alone, the publication of Alexander Korab's *Entwicklung der kommunistischen Parteien in Ost-Mitteleuropa* should evoke considerable interest.

For the present, Korab limits himself to the Communist parties in three countries—Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—with the promise of a second volume in the future to be devoted to the Balkan parties. Korab's presentation is essentially chronological in method. Beginning with the founding of each party, he carries the story up to the present day, and while he marshals much useful data on inter-party factionalism, the treatment of each party is entirely self-contained. There is, alas, little or no attempt at comparative analysis. What is more, the theoretical underpinnings of Korab's study are, at best, rather weak, and some points of interpretation seem quite dubious. How else to evaluate, for example, his ascription of the origins of the concept of "people's democracy" in East Central Europe to Mao Tse-tung's "new democracy"?

One would have expected Mr. Korab, a journalist who has been covering Polish and Soviet affairs for the Swiss newspaper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung,* to have devoted special attention to those recent developments with which he may be presumed to be most familiar. That he has not done so may be attributed to his decision to write a large general history. To be sure, Korab does offer pertinent observations on the prospects for domestic autonomy in Poland, the strength of nationalism in Hungary, and the characteristics of party leadership in Czechoslovakia; unfortunately, however, the short shrift accorded to the period since 1956 may cause his concluding judgments on the Gomulka, Kadar, and Novotny regimes to appear both superficial and glib.

FEW TOPICS IN postwar East European politics have evoked more serious study or penetrating analysis than the Hungarian Revolution. Among the several excellent contributions to this subject that have appeared thus far, Paul R. Zinner's masterful study, *Revolution in Hungary,* must be accorded a special place of honor. Professor Zinner's effort has been modestly advertised as an "essay." Actually, it contains at least three separate essays. The first deals with the Communist takeover between 1945 and 1948, in both its social and diplomatic contexts. This is followed by an analysis of the physiology of the totalitarian system that was established in Hungary in 1948 and the symptoms of its disintegration which led to the outbreak of the revolution in 1956. Here is a lucid account of the repression and revival of social forces, the ferment among the intellectuals, the students and the workers, together with an astute discussion of the confusion and factional struggle within the party. The third part of the book retells the story of the revolution itself, reconstructing the day-by-day events as they unfolded in Budapest and in the Hungarian countryside.

Numerous personal vignettes enliven the presentation. There is Imre Nagy, a tragic figure forced into the role of a national hero, a bewildered man swept along by events not of his own making; and Janos Kadar, who emerges not only as a rank opportunist but also as a villainous traitor. There is Cardinal Mindszenty, presented as haughty and self-righteous but entirely peripheral to the main events; and Jozsef Dudas, depicted as a fiery self-seeker momentarily thrust to the fore, only to be bypassed by the mainstream of the revolution. Behind them all lurk the Soviets, at first vacillating and indecisive, but then ruthless in their massive intervention and deceitful in their feigned negotiations.

Despite these sharply-etched characterizations, Zinner's judgment is balanced throughout. Where personal motives are unclear, alternative explanations are examined. Where documentation is lacking, as in the case of certain key Soviet decisions and actions, the author studiously avoids improvisation. All of this makes for a persuasive as well as a moving account of the Hungarian Revolution. Much of the vividness of color and the sense of intimacy with events can be laid to the author's skillful use of the resources of the Columbia University Hungarian Refugee Project and

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its interview materials with 250 respondents who actually participated in or were close to the episodes described. The reader is left unaware of what proportion of the narrative is based directly upon such eyewitness testimony and how much of it represents Zinner's own inference. Offend though it may the formal requirements of narrow scholarship, the author's decision against identifying his sources at every step has helped to preserve the high drama of revolution. To have done otherwise might have entailed sacrificing the moral legacy of the revolution itself, and it is this legacy above all else that emerges from Zinner's work.

TURNING FROM HUNGARY to the history of Czechoslovakia reopens the question of an apparent paradox that has not been adequately explained. While Hungary witnessed a violent upheaval in 1956, and Poland a significant change of regime, and while rumblings of unrest were heard even in East Germany, Czechoslovakia—the only democratic state in East Central Europe during the interwar period—remained quiescent. Except for some comments on the "overcautious, strictly realistic Czech mentality, and a corresponding behavioral pattern," Professor Taborsky's study of *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948-1960,* does not really elaborate upon the political passivity of 1956. The reader will look in vain for an analysis of the historical factors and social forces which have shaped and conditioned this attitude and "behavioral pattern." He will regret also the author's disinclination to assess the impact of the twin tragedies of 1938 and 1948 upon the Czech national psychology, as well as his reluctance to venture an explanation for the apparent internal cohesion of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the post-Stalin period.

If the weakness of Professor Taborsky's book lies in his neglect of these important questions, its strength may be found in the author's excellent treatment of the institutional-administrative structure of the Czechoslovak Communist regime. In this latter respect the volume is truly a mine of useful information and an indispensable reference for all serious students of East European affairs. The organization of the book into four separate sections serves the author's purposes more than adequately. Part One introduces the reader to the party and its National Front "partners," and leads him carefully through the details of the party's organizational structure into a revealing exploration of how the party actually functions in power. Part Two, the longest section of the book, is given over to a discussion of the formal structure of the government and includes a point-by-point comparison of the Ninth-of-May (1948) Constitution with the "Socialist Constitution" of 1960.

Although Taborsky's painstaking presentation may seem at times to go to unnecessary lengths, his judiciously balanced and closely reasoned assessment of all the available evidence is always applied to good effect. This is especially the case in Part Three, where

THE SYSTEM THAT FAILED

According to Lenin, revolutions will occur when the rulers cannot and the people will not continue in the old way. In Hungary, both conditions were met.

The unwillingness of the population to be governed in the old way reflected years of accumulated grievances. . . . An exact scale of individual deprivation cannot be easily determined. But grievances caused by great and prolonged personal insecurity, affronts to individual dignity and self-respect, and humiliation of the national ego seemed to have a consistent priority over dissatisfactions with material conditions of life. People felt a revulsion against the lies which saturated their existence, and they despised the atmosphere of moral depravity which surrounded them. . . .

The structure of popular grievances gave the [Hungarian] revolution the predominant character of a national and democratic uprising rather than of a social revolution in the traditional sense of classes contesting for supremacy.

Although the Communists have denounced it as a counter-revolution, it was anything but that. The revolution provided unexcelled evidence of the dimensions of change in social structure and attitudes that had taken place in a little over ten years. Chief among these was the growth of the workers' political consciousness, which clearly belied the Leninist thesis that the working class cannot rise above economic consciousness without the guidance of its vanguard, the Communist Party. Many revolutionaries harbored deep hatred for Hungary's former ruling classes. Others, including intellectuals and students, regardless of Party affiliation, had a sincere devotion to a humane type of socialism. They had no use for bourgeois institutions as they had known them in their country or as they had understood them to be in the West. Their Western orientation consisted of a desire to have cultural and intellectual intercourse with the West on their terms, but not to imitate Western political, social, and economic institutions. . . . They wanted to substitute acceptable new values and patterns of human existence for the old ones, which the totalitarian Communist system had promised but failed to do.

—***From Revolution in Hungary by Paul E. Zinner, pp. 359-61.***

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he turns to an examination of the economic achievements of the regime. Having presented vast amounts of relevant data on both the industrial and agrarian sectors of the economy, Taborsky suggests that the average standard of living in Czechoslovakia is probably lower today than in 1937. "Communist economic policies," he concludes, "have thus far significantly delayed rather than accelerated the country's progress toward higher living standards."

Striking and important as are Professor Taborsky's conclusions on economic development, his most forceful summary of the paradoxes of Czechoslovak communism comes in the final section of the book which deals with the regime's efforts to remake Czechoslovak society through mass indoctrination. Taborsky doubts that these efforts have been successful, but this does not cause him to indulge in any optimism about the future of the regime itself. On the contrary, he argues that the weakness of the party, its isolation from the people, and its very failure to transform "the great majority of Czechs and Slovaks into genuine believers in Marxism-Leninism" all serve to perpetuate the regime's reliance on coercion and its dependence on the Soviet Union. Currents of "liberalization" elsewhere in East Central Europe, and even the sneaking disdain of the Czech Communist leaders for their Soviet masters, have so far had very little effect in a party so completely on the defensive.

IN COMPARISON WITH the overwhelming greyness of Czechoslovak communism, Poland since 1956 offers many subtle shades and striking contrasts. Years after Gomulka's partial retreat from the victories of the "Polish October", and despite his present loyalty to Khrushchev in Communist bloc and international affairs, much about Poland remains unique. To mention only the most obvious, there is the continued vibrancy of Polish intellectual life in defiance of official controls; the distinctive operation of Polish agriculture; sustained and spirited resistance of the Church to encroachments by the regime; and the prevailing ideological skepticism within the party, accompanied by new forms of factional infighting. All of these phenomena attest to a pattern of politics at once different from and more complex than that which obtains elsewhere in East Central Europe. Surely, the political evolution of Poland since 1956 should inspire an exciting study. Unfortunately, Richard F. Starr's *Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People* fails to convey any of the intrinsic fascination of recent Polish politics or to offer even a barely adequate analysis of any of these developments. Indeed, Professor Staar's thesis that there has been a systematic and relentless conversion of Poland to the specifications of the Soviet totalitarian model leads him to dismiss the entire post-1956 period as only the third and highest stage of Poland's subjugation.

In his effort to represent Gomulka as a Soviet puppet and contemporary Poland as a Stalinist state (often by not very relevant documentation dating from the pre-1956 period), Professor Staar simply overlooks the crises and adjustments that have taken place in Soviet-bloc relations since Stalin's death. His discussion of the regime's handling of social forces is, if anything, even more shallow. Unaccountably, he has limited his treatment to the minor political parties, the Church, and the anti-Church movements, lumping all three together under the designation "pressure groups"—an ambiguous and misleading label, as the author himself admits. All told, the publication of Professor Staar's ill-conceived book makes the need for a truly discriminating account on Poland that much more urgent.

Among the books under review, Fritz Schenk's volume of autobiographical memoirs, *Im Vorzimmer der Diktatur,* stands in a special category. In place of the usual extramural presentation, Schenk introduces us into the very "antechamber of the dictatorship" for an enthralling inside view of the Ulbricht regime. Between 1952 and 1957, when he fled to the West, Schenk was active in the East German economic apparatus, serving during most of that period as personal secretary to Bruno Leuschner, then Chairman of the State Planning Commission and a candidate member of the party Politburo. His assignments brought him into close contact with many of the leading figures of the SED regime, including Walter Ulbricht himself, as well as with the Soviet authorities in East Germany. Schenk is thus able to convey, in a matter-of-fact presentation that is remarkably free of any personal apologetics, a set of vivid impressions of the East German regime and its leading personalities. To relieve the 1953 uprising from besieged governmental positions or to experience the 1956 unrest from the point of view of the secret police adds a new dimension to one's understanding of the Ulbricht regime's uncanny knack of courting political disaster and yet managing to survive all the same. The failure of Ulbricht's opponents to combine effectively to unseat him becomes more intelligible in the light of Schenk's observations about the isolation of members of the SED leadership from one another as well as from the population at large, and his revelations about the omnipresence of police surveillance of all leading party and government func-

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tionaries. To avoid having to serve himself as a secret police informer, Schenk made good his escape to West Berlin. One cannot help wondering how many would-be Schenks have been permanently shut in by the Wall.

WHAT CAN BE said, on the basis of this literary survey, about the future of East Central Europe? Almost all the books here reviewed—with the conspicuous exception of Staar's volume—contribute something by way of significant information or suggestive analysis, and many are quite explicit in their political prognoses or policy prescriptions. The latter range all the way from chance observations by Fritz Schenk about the importance of East-West trade (a theme which he developed at greater length in his earlier book, *Magie der Planwirtschaft,* in which he argued for a stringent Western embargo on strategic materials), to the elaborate special pleading of Hubert Ripka. On the matter of future internal evolution, Taborsky's view that rising living standards may engender demands for more freedom is the most conventional. So, too, is his assumption that any such liberalization must first take hold in the Soviet Union in order to become operative in East Central Europe. Zinner, for his part, cautions that it would be idle to speculate about a repetition of the exact circumstances leading up to the Hungarian revolution, but adds an important reminder about "the inseparable nature of national and international politics in our time." Accordingly, he calls for continued attentiveness to the internal tensions that beset Communist regimes everywhere.

For the moment, however, perhaps the most opportune thought comes from Professor Kertesz. Challenging the conventional belief that the satellites are wholly dependent on stimuli from the Soviet Union, he suggests that they may also serve as "transmission belts" between the West and the USSR. Now more than ever, this approach may open up opportunities—on both sides—to stimulate peaceful change, benefiting, not least of all, the long-harassed peoples of Eastern Europe.

Seeds of Revolution

Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia: Legal Marxism and Legal Populism, by Arthur P. Mendel. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961.
Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897, by Richard Pipes. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963.
The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia: Political and Social Institutions Under the Last Three Tsars, by Jacob Walkin. New York, Praeger, 1962.

Reviewed by Donald W. Treadgold

THE LAST CENTURY of Russian Tsarism, especially the reign of the last Tsar, has in recent years been the subject of increasingly exhaustive and sophisticated studies by American scholars. Only the period from the Revolution of 1905 to the Revolution of 1917 has thus far been unaccountably neglected. Two of the books here considered, those by Professors Mendel and Pipes, belong to what may be called the Karpovich school of Russian historiography in the United States; this school, represented by former students of the late Professor Michael Karpovich of Harvard University and primarily concerned with intellectual history, has produced not only the largest number of American books on Tsarist Russia, but also some of the best.

The third book under review, by Dr. Jacob Walkin, is not a product of the same school. The author, a U.S. Foreign Service officer recently serving in Hong Kong and Jakarta, has been distant from the American university scene for some time, and this is perhaps

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the reason why his bibliography contains no item later than 1954. It thus omits a number of important American works, as well as one significant German book, Victor Leontovitsch's *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland,* which has some themes in common with Walkin's though it takes a different point of departure. Nevertheless, Dr. Walkin's relative isolation may have served the scholarly profession well. In a manner which some of his university colleagues have hesitated to attempt, he has ventured to give us an integrated view of institutional change in 19th- and early 20th-century Russia. In fact, his book is the first serious effort in English to reinterpret modern Russian institutional history.

Walkin's categories of analysis—state and society, or *vlast i obshchestvennost*—have been developed originally by German sociology, but Walkin takes them directly from the Russian liberal lawyer, the late V. A. Maklakov, and uses them to develop a line of argument that gives coherent structure to the mass of information he has assembled. The central theme of the book runs as follows: Russia up to the mid-18th century had a powerful state without an organized society, but from then until 1917 society was in the process of rapid organization, in part as a result of state initiative, but still at the expense of the state. The workers and peasants, however, were not fully assimilated by the emergent society despite the nascent labor movement (on which Professor Pipes' book casts much light) and the emergence of individual peasant proprietorship following Stolypin's reforms; as a result, when state power finally broke down in 1917, the working class and the peasants raised a whirlwind which, harnessed by Lenin, carried the Bolsheviks to power. Thus Walkin attempts an explanation of the Revolution.

He illustrates also, though quite unwittingly, the difference between the Russian institutional background and that of the West. Russia before the 18th century, he points out, had no powerful landed nobility (not having adopted, as the West had done, the laws of primogeniture), no strong middle class, no independent peasant class—in fact, no developed classes below the ruling bureaucracy. He speaks of the "passivity" of Russian society and goes so far as to refer to "a state without a society" in old Russia. Yet, although he holds this view and defends it ably, he nevertheless persists in declaring that the Russian state was merely a variant of Western "absolute monarchy" (pp. 3, 4, 183, 245). In only one sentence, unrelated to anything else in the text, does he express an observation more consistent with the bulk of his evidence. "The traditional social pattern in Russia," he states on this occasion, "is similar to that of the Far East. . . . The three basic institutions (there were hardly any others)—the family, the commune, and the autocracy—differed more in size than in structure . . ." (p. 176).

In spite of these flaws, however, the sound and clear manner in which Walkin has analyzed Russian institutional development deserves high praise. Though not as lavishly documented or as stylistically dazzling as certain other recent works on Russia produced by American historians, his book contributes more than any other volume in English that I know of to our understanding of the fundamental processes of Russian institutional history.

PROFESSORS MENDEL AND PIPES, on the other hand, are not concerned with what old Russia was like, but with what the intelligentsia (Pipes also deals with the workers) of the 1890's wanted to do to create a new Russia. Mendel's subject is what he calls the "Legal Populists," including N. K. Mikhailovsky, N. F. Danielson, and V. P. Vorontsov, and the Legal Marxists, including G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Struve, N. A. Berdiaev, S. N. Bulgakov, and M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky. His book provides a useful, detailed examination of several important essays of the period, which illuminate the intellectual background of the Russian Revolution in many ways.

Mendel's main argument begins to come into view when one unexpectedly encounters, as the epigraph to the second chapter, a quotation from Jawaharlal Nehru on economic development. Professor Mendel believes that stress on the development of agriculture and handicrafts, rather than forced industrialization, is the preferable way to develop a backward economy. He regards the "minimalist" (as distinquished from the "maximalist") Legal Populists as the precursors of this view, which he also finds represented among a minority of contemporary specialists on the economies of underdeveloped areas, to whose works he devotes several pages.

The issue that chiefly interests him is what was the soundest perspective in the 1890's for the economic development of Russia. Though the Legal Populists were worsted in the debate that took place at the time, Mendel believes that theirs was the soundest outlook; and though he does his best to avoid distorting the facts or the analysis to his favorites' advantage, he makes it quite clear who his favorites are. His basis for doing so, however, is not so clear. To begin with, his chief "minimalist," Vorontsov, unfortunately seems to have

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become a "maximalist" himself by the mid-1890's (p. 58); and a "maximalist" Populist was not very far removed from being a Marxist. Indeed, as Mendel mentions, the Populists of the 1890's quoted Marx and followed Marx in many respects; and what is more, the case can be (and in fact has been) made—which Mendel does *not* mention—that, in view of Marx's own analysis of Russian society and his pronouncements on the prospects for a revolution in Russia, the Russian Populists were at least as good Marxists as the Russian Social Democrats. His preference for the Legal Populists has apparently led him to a halfhearted effort at distortion in which he attempts to deny that they were revolutionaries (p. 77), but, honest scholar that he is, he promptly proceeds to give ample proof that they were indeed just that.

One who doubts that either the Legal Populists or the Legal Marxists earned the right to be considered prophets of Russian progress in the 1890's may well also doubt the proposition that the problem of Russian development in the last decades of the 19th century could be satisfactorily considered in terms of economics alone—without, in other words, placing the economic predicaments of the country within the proper institutional and cultural context. In this concentration on economic issues, Mendel fails not only to do justice to the path by which Struve, Berdiaev and Bulgakov escaped from Marxism (chapters 6 and 7), but also to provide a broad enough basis on which to evaluate Mikhailovsky and Plekhanov; and incidentally, he is also led to repeat the superficial if currently fashionable *bon mot* (it scarcely deserves any more serious description) that Witte was in effect the precursor of the Soviet leaders (p. 243). It is unfair to both the Legal Populists and the Legal Marxists to imply that they were no more than some kind of early developmental economists, for they were men who were seeking, however rightly or wrongly, to understand and to alter the whole basis of the Russian state, society and culture. Professor Mendel's cautions concerning the price of forced industrialization are well taken, and his sympathetic and scholarly reconsideration of the Legal Populists in particular is timely. If he has not yet found sure ground of his own from which to study the subject of his interest, he is not alone.

PROFESSOR PIPES, in the preface to his book, states that it presents background to Lenin's *What is to be Done?* and makes a plea that his task requires the use of much detail and therefore the reader's close attention. In fact, the book has nothing to do with *What is to be Done?*, except to show that the Lenin of 1902 is scarcely discernible in his activities of the mid-1890's. Nor does it require any special effort on the part of the reader: it is clearly organized and extremely well written. What it shows about the labor movement in St. Petersburg in the 1890's is of great interest to the historian of Russia in general and of the Russian revolutionary movement in particular; and although it is merely a byproduct of a study the author is preparing on Peter Struve as part of a larger plan of study of Russian conservatism, it is a self-contained work, impeccable in its scholarship and admirable in its detachment. The distortions of Soviet historiography are corrected without polemic, the clichés of earlier writers evaluated without partisanship.

From the book there emerges a picture of a group of revolutionaries, not at all clearly differentiated into Populists and Marxists (as Mendel's book rightly suggests from another standpoint), who sought to organize and lead St. Petersburg labor, and of a group of workers who sought to organize and lead themselves; the account conveys an atmosphere not of mutual hostility between the two groups, but of a consciousness of pervasive differences. The author shows, among other things, that the Marxists did not lead the strike movement of the 1890's, which was essentially spontaneous, and that Lenin did not lead the Marxists at this point. That is a significant double contribution. He might have gone on to evaluate the relationship of the 11½-hour day law of 1897 to the immediately preceding strike movement he so painstakingly describes, and to suggest whether continuation of the labor movement on the lines of the mid-1890's was a hopeful possibility. He does argue that if the history of Russia "after 1917" had proceeded "in the same fashion as that of the West" (which seems somewhat vague), "there is every reason to believe that the Russian labor movement would have become as effective a social and political force as its counterpart" in the West (p. 119).

Very possibly. But what of the period from 1897 to 1917, in which the Russian labor movement did grow, but sporadically and feebly and with so little self-assurance that it was instantly politicalized in 1905 and again in 1917 by some of the very intellectuals whose influence it had thrown off in 1895-97? For a time at least, the Tsarist regime thought the labor movement was so strong that it must be tolerated—and hence the unsuccessful experiment in "police socialism." Why then did it fail to fulfill the promises of the 1890's? The question is only raised by Professor Pipes' book. The answer would have taken him beyond his topic, but

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it would certainly bear on Dr. Walkin's problem of the organization of Russian society. The Russian gentry, the middle class, the professional men, the farmers, the workers, were all in the process of organization, but the latter two classes lagged behind. Perhaps, in retrospect, it was the failure of an independent labor movement to take root that was most fateful of all in determining the outcome, since it was the capture of that movement by the Bolsheviks that made possible their seizure of power.

Chinese Communism, Past and Present

M. N. Roy's Mission to China, by Robert C. North and Xenia J. Eudin. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1963.
The Russo-Chinese Borderlands: Zone of Peaceful Contact or Potential Conflict? by W. A. Douglas Jackson. New York, D. Van Nostrand, 1962.
Communist China's Foreign Policy, by R. G. Boyd. New York, Praeger, 1962.
China's Cultural Diplomacy, by Herbert Passin. New York, Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by Franz Michael

IF CHINESE COMMUNISM was once misunderstood and misrepresented by many as a movement that was not truly Communist but a brand of agrarian reformism, this myth has long since been dispelled. Today, however, the special role which Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants have recently assumed in the Communist bloc and international Communist movement through their challenge to Khrushchev's leadership in matters of policy has caused a new quarrel of the experts over the background of this challenge and raised again the question of a difference between the Chinese and Soviet brands of communism.

Some believe that Mao Tse-tung formed a divergent strain of Communist doctrine early in the game as a result of his experiences in the period of Communist cooperation with the Chinese Nationalists, which ended disastrously for the Communists in 1927. The policy that led to this catastrophe, it is held, was Stalin's blunder—a blunder allegedly still resented by Mao, who never accepted Stalin's emphasis on urban revolution and the necessity of Chinese Communist cooperation with the Kuomintang under the latter's leadership.

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Another reason for the current differences between the Chinese and Soviet leaderships is believed to lie in a strong element of nationalism which Chinese communism is thought to contain. Indeed, the thesis of a Chinese "national communism" that motivates Peking's foreign policy and determines China's conflict with the Soviet Union—a thesis which this reviewer considers as mistaken as the old image of the "agrarian reformers"—has gained wide currency abroad in recent years.

Most of the increasing number of books on Chinese communism and Soviet-Chinese relations are written within the frame of reference of these broader issues. Thus, the four books dealt with here, different as they are in subject matter and approach, can all be related to the basic questions of the character of Chinese communism, its relationship to the overall Communist movement and the Soviet leadership, and its attitudes towards the neutrals and the West.

In the crucial year 1927, when the Communist-Kuomintang split signalled the defeat of Communist strategy and the victory of the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek, the Indian Communist M. N. Roy, as a Comintern agent in China, played an outstanding role in the policy decisions that led to the debacle. He has written his own account of those events in *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* (Calcutta, Ren-

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aissance Publishers, 1946).[1] However, the documents that formed the basis of this account, containing unchallengeable evidence of the attitudes of the various Communist participants, have until now not been available to students. After returning to the USSR, Roy compiled his own speeches and articles, together with various party theses, manifestos, declarations, and proclamations concerning China, in a volume which was published in Moscow, but which remained inaccessible to outsiders, including Roy himself after he escaped from the Soviet Union in disgrace and was labelled a "Trotskyite". Copies of this invaluable record were finally discovered at the University of California library and the Hoover Institute and Library at Stanford University, and the compilation has now been translated and published with an introductory discussion by Robert North and Xenia Eudin relating the documents to the historical background of the time.

In their admirably argued introduction, the authors reassess the crucial issue then confronting the Communists in China on the basis of the newly-discovered material. This issue was the basic irreconcilability of two Communist strategies shortly to become known by the slogans "revolution from above" and "revolution from below." There was no disagreement on these strategies in themselves, but where controversy arose was over the relative emphasis to be placed on either method at any given time. "Revolution from above" involved Communist cooperation with all nationalist forces in the fight against "imperialism" as envisaged by Lenin, and in China it was this strategy that dictated the Communist alliance with the Kuomintang under Kuomintang leadership. On the other hand, "revolution from below," which in the Chinese context meant Communist support of the "agrarian revolution," was also a recognized part of Communist strategy in China from the outset—as it had been in Soviet Russia—but had to be soft-pedalled as long as the Communists continued to give priority to cooperation with the "national bourgeoisie" under the strategy of "revolution from above."

At what point the Chinese Communists should abandon their alliance with the Nationalists—first with Chiang Kai-shek and then with the Left Kuomintang—remained a moot political question. What the Roy documents suggest, and the analytical introduction by Mr. North and Miss Eudin brings out, is that there was not a clearcut confrontation of two opposing views, but rather a welter of divergent interpretations of Comintern directives and a variety of stands taken by all concerned. It was only in retrospect that the dividing lines became oversimplified and that a distinction was drawn between those alleged to have blindly followed Moscow and those who supposedly knew better but were frustrated by Stalin's extreme inflexibility. Thus, the authors observe:

> **The truth of the matter seems to be that everyone—Trotsky not excluded—was a better prophet after the fact than beforehand. . . . The essential fact was not that the Chinese Communists were forced to submit themselves—against their better judgment—to a single, dogmatic, and uniquely mistaken line from Moscow. . . . [but rather] that virtually everyone "contended," that hardly anyone agreed with anyone else, and that the misperceptions, the errors, and the contradictory decisions were by no means attributable only to Stalin, but were widely shared by both the Chinese and the Russian Communists. (p. 7)**

Roy himself, the documents show, argued consistently for reliance on agrarian revolution and adhered to this position even after a clash over the two conflicting strategies took place at the Fifth Congress of the CCP. The ultimate Communist victory in China, the authors believe, was the result of Mao Tse-tung's success—after the Soviet withdrawal in 1927—in working out "his own special mixture of so many revolutionary elements 'from below' and so many others 'from above'."

The basic contradiction between the two strategies nevertheless still remains a problem facing the Communist leaders in Moscow and Peking even today. For, in the underdeveloped countries, they find themselves confronted by the old question of whether to support a Nasser, a Nkrumah, a Sukarno—or, one might add, a Nehru, or even an Emperor of Ethiopia—or to work through local Communist parties for revolution from below, and how to reconcile these contradictory strategic policies. In spite of the present Chinese Communist claim to a monopoly on the revolution from below, no actual difference can be observed in the past use of both strategies by the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaderships. The documentation offered in the North-Eudin volume confirms this and refutes the belief that the Chinese Communists have a unique strategy of revolution derived from their history.

IF THE PRESENT Sino-Soviet conflict does not stem from any fundamental disagreement over strategy in the early association between the Soviet and Chinese Communists, does it have any basis in territorial issues? A view that has found expression both in Europe and in the United States holds that Chinese population pressure threatens the Soviet Asian borderlands, that this

[1] Roy's book first appeared in a German edition, published in 1930: *Revolution und Konterrevolution in China,* Berlin, Soziologische Verlagsanstalt.

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threat has been instrumental in motivating Khrushchev's coexistence policy and may even lead him into a common front with the West against what promises to be a new "yellow peril." This view would not have to be taken seriously were it not for the fact that it has been espoused by recognized journalists and is claimed to have made an impression on some leading Western statesmen. In Europe the thesis was advanced by Dr. Wilhelm Starlinger, a German prisoner repatriated from Soviet Russia, in a book which reportedly came to the attention of Chancellor Adenauer and, through him, to the attention of General de Gaulle, whose vision of a European unity reaching to the Urals is said to have been shaped partly by it.[2] Similar ideas have been echoed by various political commentators in the United States. Again, much of recent discussion about Outer Mongolia has been concerned with a possible Soviet-Chinese conflict over control of this Central Asian border state. It is all the more useful, therefore, to have Professor Jackson's sober appraisal of the geographical conditions of the "borderlands" and their role in Soviet-Chinese relations, past and present.

The possibilities for economic development on both sides of the border, especially the Chinese side, are obviously still vast, but they require capital investment on the largest scale, and in this field obvious Soviet superiority would put the Chinese at a grave disadvantage in any race to settle the border territories. Indeed, what conflict there has been in the past resulted from the Russian, and later Soviet, push into territory across the Chinese border—a push that led to the establishment of Russian and Soviet interests in Sinkiang and Manchuria and to the Chinese loss of Outer Mongolia to Soviet control. However, the Russian-Soviet push, described in detail in Professor Jackson's chapter on the "Zone of Tension," ended with the Communist takeover in China, and the "Zone of Tension" became a "Zone of Stabilization." In the author's words, "the common ideology of Russian and Chinese communism has brought a stability to the borderlands which has hitherto not existed," and the minor discrepancies that have been found in Soviet and Chinese maps of the frontier areas, for instance in the Pamirs and along the Manchurian border, may not be deemed significant" (pp. 86-7). Indeed, the unprecedented Soviet surrender of Russia's historic interests in Sinkiang and Manchuria was all the more significant because it was voluntary, and it increased the possibilities of close Sino-Soviet cooperation. In the author's view, these possibilities have not been basically affected by the recent conflict between Moscow and Peking because "the leaders of the two countries differ not in terms of their objective, but rather over the strategy and methods of achieving the objective" (p. 96). Even if one might now be inclined to ascribe greater seriousness to the conflict than Professor Jackson did in writing his book a year ago, the fact remains that the borderlands have not been a cause of friction. On the contrary, the Chinese Communists, in their most recent acrimonious attacks on the Soviet leadership, made a clear-cut distinction between China's territorial claims vis-à-vis Communist and non-Communist countries.

STILL, IT IS in the field of foreign policy that the most obvious points of friction in Sino-Soviet relations lie. It is generally assumed that since the current conflict became acute, there has no longer been consultation, let alone cooperation, between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships in most of their important foreign policy decisions and actions. Chinese indignation over Soviet action in the Cuban crisis and Soviet disapproval of China's action against India, as well as the two partners' clashing statements on "peaceful coexistence," are cited as evidences of a deep-seated conflict of international outlook and interest between the two Communist powers.

In his study, R. G. Boyd undertakes to evaluate the goals and objectives of Communist China's foreign policy and to explain its special character within the framework of world communism. The author sees no question that the Chinese Communists, in the words of Foreign Minister Chen Yi (1959), "have always considered their revolution as part of the world socialist revolution" (p. 40), that their major objective has been the establishment of world communism, and that "the truth of national salvation that the Chinese people found was Marxism-Leninism" (p. 39). From the outset, the Chinese Communists stressed the pioneer role and leadership of the Soviet party and the Communist purpose of all their policy.

Mr. Boyd recalls that in point of fact it was the Chinese Communists, rather than the Soviets, who initiated the formula of "peaceful coexistence," first enunciating it in their 1954 accord with India and fully expounding it at the Bandung Conference of 1955. This "peaceful coexistence" referred primarily to Chinese relations with the Afro-Asian countries and their nationalist non-Communist leaderships, but it also included Chou En-lai's offer to negotiate for a peaceful settlement of con-

[2] For comments on Dr. Starlinger's book, *Grenzen der Sowjetmacht* (Wurzburg, Holzner-Verlag, 1955), see review by Eric Willenz in *Problems of Communism*, No. 6, 1955, pp. 48-50.

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flicts with the United States. The policy was soon followed by the Soviet leaders and has never been renounced by the Chinese Communist leadership, although since 1958—when Soviet successes in missile development were apparently interpreted by Mao as signifying a shift in the East-West balance of power—it has been overshadowed by Peking's demand for a more aggressive Communist-bloc line towards the West—without, however, risking a major war.

In Mr. Boyd's view, the growth of Sino-Soviet friction results from the "chauvinist spirit" of Chinese communism and the pull of Chinese "national interest." He sees this "chauvinist spirit" as impelling the Chinese leadership to seek to displace Soviet authority over the international Communist movement and to win for Communist China not simply equality with the Soviet Union but the leading position in the world Communist system. It might, he suggests, even bring a return to traditional Chinese values, replacing the Communist concept of "struggle" with the native one of "harmony," although for the present at least the author sees only "intense opposition to any search for values outside the crude and limited framework of Marxism-Leninism" (p. 51).

The author attempts to divide "national interest" into what he calls "objective national interest" and interest "posited by Communist doctrine." The first category is found, upon examination, to embrace the search for security of the state, avoidance of war, and stress on an economic development effort affording eventual independence from Soviet domination but eschewing Western support. However, the author himself sees no conflict between these "national" concerns and Communist objectives, except that Chinese "chauvinism" tends to produce a marked cautiousness in policy and an unwillingness to take undue national risks for a Communist cause. Indeed, he believes that "while China advocates stronger Soviet militancy towards the West, she will nevertheless oppose any trend towards her own involvement with the West" (p. 89). The author stresses that the Chinese attempt to project an image of aggressive dedication to global Communist goals involves no great risk because Peking's policy remains flexible enough to permit a retreat to "peaceful coexistence" in case of danger—which would seem to suggest that, in fact, Chinese policy does not differ essentially from that of the Soviet leadership.

All in all, Mr. Boyd's attempt to introduce the concepts of "chauvinism" and "national interest" into his explanation of Chinese Communist policy seems rather forced. A cautious chauvinism that lets the other fellow take the risks would appear to be something of a contradiction in terms. And the goals of Mr. Boyd's so-called "national interests" in no way conflict with overall Communist objectives. What is important in his interpretation is that he correctly recognizes Chinese Communist policy as being cautious rather than recklessly aggressive. But it is hardly necessary to use the prop of "national interests" or "chauvinism" to explain that cautiousness.

ONE OF THE MOST fascinating aspects of the Chinese part in advancing overall Communist objectives is Peking's cultural diplomacy, treated in Herbert Passin's informative and perceptive study. Since China's military strength, though formidable in relation to that of her weaker neighbors such as India, does not yet make her a serious threat to the major Western powers, and since economic weakness restricts her capacity to compete in aid to underdeveloped and non-aligned countries, cultural diplomacy is the only area in which the Chinese can make a significant contribution to the international Communist offensive. Cultural propaganda requires mass organization and skillful manipulation of the propaganda image, but it involves comparatively little expense. The Chinese, as Passin shows, have been engaged in a "sustained and massive program" in this field —a program which has been even more active in promoting visits by foreigners to China than in the dispatch of Chinese technical, artistic, and scholarly delegations abroad.

By last year the Chinese had played host to an estimated 75,000 to 100,000 foreign guests, whose visits were mainly political or ceremonial in nature. Passin provides an interesting breakdown of these foreign visitors and delegations, ranging from the group of resident foreigners, "peace" champions such as the New Zealander Rewi Alley, and visitors from the Soviet Union and Communist-bloc countries, to businessmen, scholars, and journalists from the non-Communist Asian countries and countries of the West. Most important, he presents a detailed picture of how the Chinese manipulate and completely control the observations and experiences of their foreign guests, using cultural diplomacy as a tool of Communist policy.

Passin's evaluation of these Chinese Communist activities and their results is especially valuable in view of the pressure being exerted abroad in favor of facilitating visits to Communist China for the sake of better contacts and understanding. The author finds that the more political the purposes of the visit and the friendlier the visitor's attitude—and the less he knows about the country and the language—the more likely the Communists are to admit him. The visitor who is not

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already biased in favor of the Communist regime, if he is admitted at all, "sees China only through a screen . . . and only very selected portions of China at that" (p. 118). In fact, a more accurate picture of conditions inside the country can be gained from the observation post of Hong Kong than from a "guided tour" of China itself. Passin also describes one of the most insidious aspects of the controlled admission of foreigners—the successful intimidation of non-Communist visitors who, in order to be able to return another time and not show themselves ungrateful for favors received—or even, in some cases, to avoid conflict with prevailing views at home—knowingly give out inaccurate or highly selective reports of what they have seen in China.

But in spite of all these obvious dangers and the tight Chinese restrictions on foreign visitors, Passin believes that such visits nevertheless do produce some useful information. Even negative experiences tell their story, and the more serious the visitor and the better his background, the more useful his observations will be to the outside world.

In sum, this reviewer believes that all four books discussed here—different as they are in topic and approach—offer evidence to refute the view that the Chinese Communists represent a variant of Communist ideological tradition or that they have modified their communism by adapting it to national interests. North and Eudin dispel the notion that the two strategies of "revolution from above" and "revolution from below" were, or are, two opposed Communist traditions. Jackson holds that nationalist conflicts over the Asian borderlands disappeared when the countries on both sides became Communist. Boyd, indeed, believes that Chinese policy reflects both nationalist and Communist purposes, but his Chinese "nationalism" boils down in the end to little more than a reluctance to accept major risks in pursuing Communist policy. And Passin's book, while dealing with a topic outside this framework, indicates the skill of the Chinese Communists in using cultural propaganda to further overall Communist purposes. In this reviewer's opinion, the Chinese Communists' pursuit of these objectives can be characterized as "fractional" rather than "national," and flexible rather than ideologically intransigent.

Impressions of Mainland China

Escape from Red China,
by Robert Loh, as told to Humphrey Evans.
New York, Coward-McCann, 1962.

The Other Side of the River: Red China Today,
by Edgar Snow.
New York, Random House, 1962.

Reviewed by Joseph R. Fiszman

BOTH BOOKS UNDER REVIEW constitute testimonies of the authors' respective creeds. Mr. Snow's giant opus (810 pp.) purports to be the product not merely of journalistic observation, but of objective and exhaustive scholarship; however, it is precisely the personal element in it—deriving from the author's attempt to explain his own political position, past and present, towards China—which gives *The Other Side of the River* special interest. Conversely, Mr. Loh's story—frankly based on personal experiences and perceptions—suffers by reason of these intrinsic limitations, and one wishes that the author had attempted a more generalized (and detached) account of life in Communist China. His formal training as a political scientist, in conjunction with his direct experience of the Chinese Communist system in operation, should have enabled Mr. Loh to offer his readers some broader assessments of Chinese Communist behavior, present and future, and thus to produce a work of more lasting impact.

Edgar Snow is the dean of American journalism on China. His now classic *Red Star over China* (published in 1938) is basic reading for any student of the Yenan period of Chinese communism and, perhaps even more, of the Western reaction to it. Measured against this earlier work, the author's present effort—the result of a recent visit to Communist China—is disappointing

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indeed. It is an often disconnected and jumbled series of essays (86 in all), which start out on some particular theme but frequently lose the thread midway. It is also a pretentious book. For example, after extending the usual acknowledgments, the author goes on to say in the preface that "no one is responsible except the facts and myself." But, as any good social scientist knows, ascertaining "the facts" is a difficult, often elusive matter, and Mr. Snow's reporting of them is sometimes quite non-objective. Quite often he cites as "fact" official statements and handouts.

In comparing the political organization of Nationalist and Communist China, Snow observes a similarity in basic structure. He is quick to point out, however, that the Communists, unlike the Nationalists, have succeeded in creating for themselves a wide base of voluntary acceptance and consensus—democratic centralism *par excellence*—embracing all strata of the population, except perhaps the "ten percent opposition" acknowledged by Mao Tse-tung. To be sure, the Communist leadership has managed to redirect some of the basic response patterns in China, to channel them away from the traditional and center them around the party and state. It has been especially successful in holding the minds of elementary school children, as revealed in a recent amazing study by the Canadian child psychologist, Dennis Lazure. Yet the myth of voluntary consensus suffered a shattering blow in the wave of anti-party criticism that burst forth in 1957 during the short spell of freedom of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign. Much of that criticism came from quarters *outside* the mere ten percent of the population which the regime admitted to be still unreformed.

Moreover, it is safe to say that the "Hundred Flowers" campaign was not, as Mr. Snow would have us believe, motivated by a desire on the part of the leadership to find out how the ten percent of oppositionists felt, but more likely by its anxiety to avoid a repetition in China of Poznan and Budapest, to keep existing tensions among the people within prescribed limits, and to flush out the malcontents. As Mr. Loh indicates in his book, the "anti-rightist" terror unleashed on the heels of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign was comparable in severity only to the purges which had taken place in the early years of Communist rule. Yet, Mr. Snow feels justified in reporting that "to be arrested as a counter-revolutionary in China, one must take some overt action against the state, not merely express a reactionary opinion. Membership in a subversive society or an illegal group would be considered overt action if the clear intent was sabotage."

For a seasoned journalist and student of politics, Mr. Snow displays an appalling lack of sensitivity and an annoying tendency to offer pat and definitive-sounding answers to rather complex questions. He tries to dispel doubt from the reader's mind by resorting to such vague and misleading formulas as "all those who have been there" would agree, or "all students" feel, that such and such is true. Emotional and quick to form judgments, he does not pause to check or reconcile the many contradictions in his book. For example, he writes in one place that youths in their twenties today have more authority in China than "anywhere in the world," yet notes elsewhere that the country is ruled by approximately 800 party veterans, all advanced in years. Or again, he dwells at length on the absence of crime in Communist China, attributing this to the efficiency of the law enforcement system, which he says makes the disposition of stolen goods impossible; yet, only seventeen pages farther on, he remarks that the most common civil felony in China is theft of state property "for resale or personal use."

Snow's interview with Premier Chou En-lai, which is hailed as a historical *coup,* is rather disappointing. More than anything else, it reveals how evasive Chou managed to be in his responses to Snow's probing. For example, when the author asked some rather leading questions concerning Sino-Soviet difficulties, Chou replied much in the manner of a loyal son questioned by an outsider about family troubles. As a matter of fact, Snow's own conclusions regarding the future of Sino-Soviet relations—though again stated in unqualified terms and perhaps even correct in their general assessment—seem to bear little relation to what the author was told by Chou and other Chinese Communist leaders in their various supposedly frank conversations.

Of particular interest to the student of comparative Communist systems is the matter of the relative levels of bureaucratization and formalization reached by the Chinese and Russian revolutions. Both Snow and Loh (who visited the USSR with a Chinese official delegation) give the impression that the Chinese Communists are puritanical, dedicated, and almost childishly naive and unsophisticated in their sense of mission, whereas the Russians of today have exchanged their erstwhile revolutionary dreams for bourgeois rewards and comforts. Yet the Chinese party leaders of the stature of Mao and Chou En-lai obviously love their comfort, too, with their limousines and private Pullman cars and their naps after lunch—a far cry from the cave existence in Yenan. The Chinese are nevertheless the "underdogs," the "poor relations," in their partnership with the Soviet

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Union, and Snow's sympathies clearly lie with them rather than with the Russians.

Next to the USSR, the villian of Snow's piece is the United States. According to him, if Khrushchev believes that peaceful coexistence is possible, it is because the United States has displayed towards the USSR, even before formal recognition was extended, an attitude far different from the one it has manifested towards Peking. "Conciliatory moves" on the part of Communist China, he contends, were rejected by the West, which has responded by threatening the peace and security of the Communists on the mainland.

For all its biases, Mr. Snow's book still has some substantial merits. It offers a scattering of informative tidbits, however slanted their presentation. Moreover, much of what the author reports is undoubtedly correct, and much of his analysis sounds convincing. He shows considerable insight, for example, in discussing the Chinese Communist style of rule and patterns of leadership, and comparing them with the Soviet. As he points out, there is no doubt more voluntary cohesion and freedom as well as more stability within the highest echelon of the Chinese Communist leadership than there ever was in the USSR, especially under Stalin. An amazing number of the top Chinese Communist leaders come from Mao's native Hunan Province, and they are bound together by a common experience of long years. Snow's discussion of the military component of the Chinese Communist elite is particularly informative. The marshals and generals are the highest-paid government employees, and the salary scale moves staggeringly upward with rank.

Snow's work can perhaps best be described as a tragic book—and a difficult one for a conscientious reviewer to assess. It is full of glaring shortcomings; yet despite that, it is useful and, in a sense, fascinating. It is fascinating because it reminds one of an old warrior returning to the field of his youthful battles, this time aged, somewhat less convinced of the righteousness of the cause, and viewing the scene through the tinted glasses of nostalgia and age. It is perhaps because Mr. Snow tries so hard to explain the past battles and his part in them that his attempt to revive the old battlecry is so feeble. The halved circle on the jacket of the book, the Taoist symbol for *yang* and *yin*—light and darkness —is curiously appropriate here.

OF QUITE A DIFFERENT order is the book produced by Robert Loh with the aid of Humphrey Evans. Mr. Loh was a student in the United States when the Communists came to power on the Chinese mainland. Attracted by what then seemed to be the beginning of a renaissance in Chinese political and social life, he returned home—only to flee the country in 1957, disappointed and bewildered. His many personal travails, first as a college instructor in Shanghai and then as a member of the "national bourgeoisie" in the employ of a semi-private industrial enterprise before its total takeover by the government, make for rather exciting reading.

Loh's eight years in Communist China gave him a keen insight into the psychology of the party cadres. Indeed, it was by utilizing this insight and his grasp of the esoteric communication patterns which evolved within the Communist system that he successfully manipulated his survival—although not without experiencing some close calls when he evidently misread the symbols employed and the real intent behind certain types of Communist behavior.

What emerges from Loh's book, too, is a picture of a brand of communism that still preserves its revolutionary virginity, as it were, especially in comparison with that of the USSR. Ideology is by far a greater determinant of behavior in China than it is in Russia, perhaps because the Chinese Communist leadership has not as yet developed sufficiently deep-rooted non-ideological points of reference (managerial, etc.). Thus, like Snow, Loh stresses the puritanism of the cadres, their almost childish lack of sophistication, their simplicity and devotion. It is a humorless society of true believers, always quick to echo the clichés born of the new moral code.

Yet, despite their seemingly rigid adherence to the values of the ideology, the Chinese Communists—apparently without malice or hypocrisy, indeed quite sincerely —expected native Chinese "capitalists" to "advise" and assist the new regime, within their particular areas of competence, in the task of "building socialism." This would seem to be a non-Marxist expectation, to say the least, but the Communists were apparently calculating that the "national bourgeois" elements would respond to the party's call for national unity—an appeal whose efficacy was heightened by China's hostile isolation from the Western world. After all, this had been the appeal of Mao's united front slogan during the war against Japan and later during the Civil War period. At the same time, the Chinese Communists' treatment of "collaborating" members of the ex-capitalist class was relatively mild. As the private management representative in a jointly run state-private flour mill, Mr. Loh, for example, received a much higher cash remuneration than did the state representative who actually was in

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charge. Remarks Loh: "The fact of my bourgeois background *in itself* was no obstacle there."

No doubt the Chinese Communists were successful in creating among many non-Communist Chinese a sense of identification with the new regime, and were aided in this by the memory of past national grievances and by popular pride in China's newly-won great-power status. After escaping to Hong Kong, Mr. Loh discovered with amazement, in talking with fellow Chinese, that while they almost without exception disapproved of some of the Communist regime's policies, "they were proud of the strength which they credit the Communists with giving to the motherland."

Despite the revolutionary zeal of the party activists, however, Loh was able to discern a creeping entrenchment of bureaucratic patterns. His picture of Communist China is thus a fascinating quilt wherein threads of almost religious fanaticism and sweeping social upheaval are interwoven with threads of old-fashioned red tape and revived oligarchical tendencies (widespread nepotism is a manifestation of the latter).

That the "Hundred Flowers" campaign was not designed to find out what the population wanted or what the "ten percent" in opposition had to say (as claimed by Snow), but rather reflected official fears related to events in Eastern Europe, becomes clear from some of the incidents Loh reports. Specifically, he mentions the publication in the Chinese press of the full text of Gomulka's famous 1956 speech, various remarks made by Chinese officials at closed meetings, and the comparatively short duration of the campaign itself, which in China quickly took a "non-Polish" turn. Yet many questions remain: If the objective of Mao's "Hundred Flowers" policy was to avoid a Chinese repetition of the Hungarian revolt, which had resulted from Stalin-type repressions, why did he subsequently turn back to Stalinist methods and finally become the most intransigent opponent of destalinization within the Communist bloc?

NOT ONLY DOES the Chinese population at large live under pressure—physical as well as psychological and social—but the party cadres themselves are not free from terror born of insecurity. Both Loh and Snow point out that what is required of an often half-literate cadre could very well trip up a much more astute and manipulative personality type under similar or even less strenuous organizational conditions. For example, he is expected to be a good hand at the game of inner-party politics and at the same time to remain incorruptibly loyal; he is expected to be imaginative but not to show independence; he must participate in criticism and self-criticism meetings lest he betray mistrust of the party's promises of immunity offered (especially at the height of the "Hundred Flowers" campaign) to those who voice critical opinions, while he must at the same time be careful not to fall into a trap. Loh cites examples—so tragicomic as to seem fictitious, yet having the quality of genuineness—of cadres walking the tightrope between "right" and "left deviationism." Since in China the former is more dangerous than the latter, the result is often a crude, even brutal leftism or, at best, political inertia.

Loh maintains that, contrary to the expectations of some that China would somehow transform the character of communism, communism has instead changed the face of China to such an extent that little remains of the past. It is, of course, still a moot question to what extent each has influenced the other. To reinforce his contention, Loh points out that the Russians have managed to bind the Chinese economy and production plans so tightly to their own economic and industrial programs that the Chinese have been made virtually dependent upon Soviet bloc assistance and helpless without it. However, as his escape from China occurred before the Sino-Soviet conflict emerged into the open, Loh, like many anti-Communist Chinese before him, may perhaps be overstating the "subservience," voluntary or otherwise, of the Chinese Communists to their erstwhile "elder brothers."

NOT SURPRISINGLY, *Escape from Red China* contains the usual shortcomings of this type of literature, be the author a refugee from China or from the USSR. At moments, in fact, it reads somewhat like an Oriental version of Kravchenko's *I Choose Freedom*—tragic love affairs and all. These romantic touches invite skepticism on the reader's part, which is regrettable in view of the informative value of Mr. Loh's general observations.

It is unfortunate too, that the writing of Mr. Loh's book is quite choppy. The narrative, especially at the beginning, is jerky and confusing, and it takes the reader a good while to get the "feel" of it. It is not clear, for example, when the story begins to deal with the post-war period. Similarly, many details of Mr. Loh's life in Communist China and of his subsequent escape are left hazy and unclear. Since much of his behavior during this period might be interpreted as "collaboration" with the Communists, the book tries to explain it somewhat flippantly and cynically on the one hand, yet in terms of necessity for survival on the other. Since the inner

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dilemmas involved in the second explanation point to a social and political tragedy far transcending Loh's personal tragedy, and since they have implications for our thinking regarding the whole phenomenon of collaboration and collaborators, they should and could have been presented with more conviction and depth.

Neither of the two books under review offers any startlingly new substantive material about conditions in Communist China. Indeed, the serious Western student of Chinese Communist affairs may feel amazed to find how much of the factual information provided by the authors merely corroborates what he already knows from other sources. It is, in fact, against the background of what we already know about mainland China that the strengths and weaknesses of Snow's and Loh's volumes can be assessed. And since the weaknesses of both books stem from their authors' divergent political and personal perspectives, they help to underscore the need for additional serious and truly objective scholarship to penetrate the enigma that is Communist China.

Advice—and Dissent

The Cold War: Retrospect and Prospect,
by Frederick L. Schuman.
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1962.

Reviewed by John Whitman

A MARRIAGE COUNSELOR once advised a husband who found himself in constant conflict with his wife. He stressed to the man how his own crudities and aggressiveness drove his wife into the very behavior which made him despair. The husband was willing to see his own faults and ready enough to look at his wife in a new light. The marriage counselor pressed on, expatiating on the woman's virtues and attractions which a little encouragement would bring to flower; yet the more he expanded on this image, the less and less the man could see any relation to the suspicious, mean, and faithless woman he had known intimately. Finally, when the counselor's praises become utterly fantastic, the man burst out, "But you don't know my wife!"

Just so with Professor Schuman as a counselor on the cold war. He doesn't know the Soviet Union.

The three lectures published here were originally delivered at Louisiana State University in March 1961. The first sets forth some principles of Russian political behavior derived from history; the second explains modern Soviet society; the third builds upon the optimism developed in its predecessors to argue that it lies within the power of the West to end the cold war. The style is pleasant and persuasive, but the argument is not.

Professor Schuman begins with a survey of Russian history which is a perplexing mixture of accepted generalizations and what in the Soviet Union is called *"lakirovanie"*—embellishment. Russia, isolated from European influence by the Mongol yoke and then subjected to successive invasions, responded with autocracy, expansionism, and a determination to catch up. So far so good. But then we learn that Russians don't usually start war. Professor Schuman is forced to choose examples very carefully in demonstrating this proposition. He must pass over the historical experiences of Turks, Swedes, and Poles, for example, not to mention those of the present generation of Finns. He admits that the Russian mobilization of 1914 had something to do with the outbreak of World War I, but takes comfort in the fact that the Tsar nevertheless "left it to Germany to declare war." But his most absurd example is that of World War II; he finds it particularly virtuous of Stalin not to have attacked Hitler when the Wehrmacht was occupied in the Balkans. In fact, as the catastrophes of 1941 were soon to show, Soviet unpreparedness left Stalin no alternative but to will himself into disbelieving the reports of an impending German attack.

There follows a passage which tries to suggest that the author's only aim in making this point is to allay exaggerated American fears about a surprise attack from the USSR. But his purpose is in fact more far-reaching, for he goes on to point out that not only do Russians

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not start wars, but they only expand their empire in the aftermath of unsuccessful attacks upon themselves. "I speak now not of Asia," says Professor Schuman in parentheses, and by the time we recover our breath after this bland exclusion of half of Russian history, we find that the argument has been completed. Whatever expansionism there is in Soviet policy is, in the first place, historically the fault of the West and, in the second place, harmlessly latent unless the USSR is subjected to military attack. Lenin was devoted to the most benign form of peaceful coexistence, and the pattern of the early 1920's would have continued forever had not Hitler upset it. The sucking of Eastern Europe into the Soviet empire becomes not just understandable but wholly excusable and entirely the fault of the West.

IN THE SECOND lecture we learn that world revolution and the domestic police state are the fault of the West, too. Until the Allied intervention, which plays an even larger part in Professor Schuman's analysis than it does in contemporary Soviet propaganda, the Bolsheviks wanted nothing better than fruitful trade and the development of democracy. Instead, Western hostility and attack produced the familiar responses, which this time took the form of a worldwide revolutionary organism and, at home, of a totalitarian system surpassing all the old autocracies.

But the same factors also stimulated anew the old obsession to catch up in power, and now that the Soviets have caught up, Professor Schuman argues, autocracy is ready to give way. The police have been downgraded (true), the party has been democratized (largely false) and Khrushchev has enthroned the rule of law (in the light of recent additions of capital crimes to the Soviet code, Professor Schuman might now wish to revise this judgment). There follows a collection of economic and social observations—designed to show that life in the USSR is hard, but improving—which are full of little errors, evasions, and irrelevancies that remind us again that the marriage counselor doesn't know the wife. Retail prices, admittedly high, are wrongly said to be uniform throughout the country. The important thing about housing and medical and hospital care is that they are free or very cheap—no need to go into adequacy, let alone quality. The reduction of direct taxes is at least "something new under the sun" (it is, and it is bad, since more revenue must be collected via regressive indirect taxes). Social classes exist, but because social mobility is high, they are non-antagonistic.

Professor Schuman's real point in this chapter, however, is to show that the USSR and the United States are becoming more and more alike. Both share the common problems of Big Business, Big Agriculture, and Big Labor. Each has its traffic jams; both have "comparable problems of the relationship of both management and labor to the public, whose voice of course in Russia is that of the Communist Party." One wonders in passing whose is the voice of labor and of management in Russia. One wonders too at the marvelous assumption that, all history to the contrary notwithstanding, a shared experience of Bigness makes for partnership rather than rivalry.

AFTER ALL THIS cheerfulness, Professor Schuman grows worried in lecture three. The world seems to him to keep just missing chances for the global peace which was established by Lenin in the 1920's and which "would have continued indefinitely, even down to the present day," but for fascism. There was a chance in 1955, but Eisenhower's heart attack allowed control to pass to Secretary Dulles, and the moment was lost. There was another chance in May 1960, following the ill-fated U-2 incident, but the West threw it away again. Someone has insisted on using force against Communist force in South Vietnam. President Kennedy has exploited the "synthetic" Berlin crisis to increase military expenditures. Meanwhile the militarists have entrenched themselves deeper in Washington (in the USSR, we are reassured, they are fully controlled by the party).

Much of Professor Schuman's thought seems to be shaped by a desire to combat the more fanatic forms of anti-communism produced by the protracted tensions of the cold war. He is quite right to oppose these extreme views, to suggest rigidities in Western policy, and to remind us that Soviet policy is not wholly diabolic. But even though one can agree that many who stand at the opposite pole from Professor Schuman are a greater barrier than he to enlightened action, we remain in need of even-handed analyses of the conflict between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. The peaceful transformation of the cold war, which will come about for quite different reasons than these lectures adduce, would be advanced by such analyses. But it is not advanced by counselors who mistake hopes for facts and substitute facile advice for sober thinking.

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The "Anti-Party Group"

A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis of the Anti-Party Group,
by Roger Pethybridge.
New York, Praeger, 1962.

Reviewed by Robert C. Tucker

ONE OF THE IMPORTANT and promising recent developments in Soviet studies in the West is the emergence of what is often called "Kremlinology" as a more or less established field with something of a methodology and a growing literature of its own. Unlike the more traditional kind of sovietological work, which investigates primarily the Soviet power structure and the ways in which the regime controls and rules the population, this branch of study investigates politics within the Soviet ruling elite. Since this is full of conflict, the study of it has been largely concerned with such phenomena as factionalism, power maneuvering, leadership struggles and policy disputes.

All these phenomena are reflected in the affair of the "anti-party group," which forms the subject of the book under review. "Anti-party group" is of course the Soviet official designation for what was in fact merely an anti-Khrushchev group—a cabal of high Soviet politicians, led by Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich, who, constituting a majority of the Presidium in June 1957, unsuccessfully attempted to oust Khrushchev from power. Roger Pethybridge, a young British scholar, has undertaken in this study to reconstruct the sequence of events at that time, together with the prelude and aftermath, on the basis of information that has come out in both Soviet and non-Soviet sources. Some information revealed at the Soviet 22nd Party Congress in October 1961, at which much was said concerning the anti-Khrushchev group, has also been included. The result is a rather detailed narrative account and interpretation of a key episode in Soviet intra-elite politics of the post-Stalin period.

As such it forms a partial answer to those who have questioned the possibility of fruitful inquiry into Soviet intra-elite politics on the ground that there is a paucity of evidence as to what is happening, or has happened, behind the scenes. It is true, of course, that the processes of these politics are usually surrounded with a curtain of secrecy; nevertheless we find that from time to time, particularly at moments of acute internal political crisis, the curtain is briefly lifted on a scene of inner conflict and also on many of the events that have led up to it. The crisis of June 1957 was one such moment, and this has dictated the strategy of Mr. Pethybridge's book. The author takes the abundant disclosures concerning the affair of the anti-Khrushchev group as a" searchlight which penetrates the gloom of Soviet politics before and after June 1957 and incidentally casts some light on related topics."

According to the analysis that emerges, the crisis of June 1957 had no one single cause. It was, rather, the outcome of a complex process of leadership conflict combining several different factors. One was disagreement over the guidelines of internal and external policy. After Stalin's death, says Mr. Pethybridge, the Soviet leadership was split over four main policy issues: agriculture, the question of consumer goods *versus* heavy industry, foreign policy, and the reorganization of industry. To this list one would have to add, I should think, such an important and contentious issue as destalinization or criticism of Stalin. The failure to include it as a key element in the conflict mars the author's discussion of the role that policy disputes played in the whole affair.

However, the four policy issues just mentioned undoubtedly played an important part at one time or another. In this connection, the author argues that those

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who combined in June 1957 against Khrushchev were not a solid bloc with a single coherent policy line but an *ad hoc* coalition of men who had come to oppose Khrushchev's positions on one or more of these four policy issues at different times and in differing degree. Nor were they all orthodox or conservative in policy orientation. Rather, there were "two distinct wings" in the group, one "orthodox," headed by Molotov, and the other "revisionist," headed by Malenkov. The latter, says Mr. Pethybridge, was "possibly more revisionist than Khrushchev himself. Hence Khrushchev's careful attempt to hide the fact."

A SECOND MAIN line of explanation of the June 1957 crisis is derived from the political sociology of the Soviet system. Restating the now familiar theory of competing "interest groups," Mr. Pethybridge hypothesizes that the Soviet leaders involved in the conflict were representatives not merely of opposing policy views but also of clashing "major interests," most notably the party apparatus on the one hand and the government bureaucracy and economic leadership on the other. Seen in these terms, what happened in June 1957 was that "the government, together with the economic interest group, made a last desperate stand against Khrushchev and the party apparatus." Mr. Pethybridge takes cognizance of certain difficulties of this line of interpretation. Thus, he admits that both Mikoyan and Shepilov, two principals in the affair, did not line up as their interest-group affiliations would have dictated: Mikoyan, closely linked with the economic elite, sided with Khrushchev and the party apparatus, whereas Shepilov, whose career had been bound up mainly with the latter, joined with the opposition. Whether this type of difficulty is adequately met by describing Mikoyan as having been a "traitor to his group" and "one whose opinions have always been notoriously unpredictable and independent" is not clear. It may be that it indicates, rather, a defect in the explanatory method, at least in the somewhat simplified form in which it is employed here.

Mr. Pethybridge classifies the military leadership as a "minor interest group" and suggests that it is of "secondary importance." He states, somewhat perplexingly, that it played, through Marshal Zhukov, a "minor but crucial role" in the June crisis. Zhukov's support of Khrushchev at that time is explained on the hypothesis that he approved, for military reasons, Khrushchev's policy of regionalizing the administration of industry and construction. However, the author presents the role of Marshal Zhukov in June 1957 as not being of decisive importance, and he is unable to offer any very cogent explanation of Zhukov's fall in November of that year.

An alternative view would be that Zhukov *did* play a decisive part in saving Khrushchev from being ousted in June, that he was motivated in doing so primarily by his hatred of the leading oppositionists for their role in the Stalinist blood purges, particularly of the Red Army high command, and that his fall from power shortly afterwards was a consequence of the very success of his intervention. It may be argued, in other words, that Marshal Zhukov doomed himself politically by the fact that he saved Khrushchev; for he thereby established himself as a kind of "kingmaker" of Soviet politics, and this was something that none of the party politicians, including Khrushchev, could accept with good grace. In this view, the fall of Marshal Zhukov in November was not so much a new and separate development as a somewhat delayed sequel to the June crisis. It is to be noted, however, that on this hypothesis the fall of Zhukov would *not* be properly interpreted as a sign of the eclipse of the Soviet military leadership as an interest group active and influential in intra-elite politics. Recent indications of the powerful influence wielded by the military leaders in Soviet decision-making reinforce such a view. All this leads the reviewer to question the author's thesis that the military interest group is only of "secondary importance."

ALTHOUGH MR. PETHYBRIDGE does not agree with those Western observers who have speculated that Khrushchev himself took the initiative in provoking or instigating the June crisis, and indeed gives convincing evidence against such an interpretation, he does view Khrushchev's personal power drive as a third main "dynamic" in Soviet politics after Stalin, and thus as one of the principal underlying causes of the crisis. And in assessing the outcome of the affair, he writes that "the Soviet Union, which had gone through an interregnum lasting four years, witnessed the reemergence in 1957 of a single powerful leader." He adds that "collective leadership' was a forgotten phrase by 1958."

While no one is likely to deny the great importance of Khrushchev's power drive in post-Stalin Soviet politics, the sentences just quoted seem to leave an erroneous impression. So far as the phrase "collective leadership" is concerned, it has been heavily emphasized in the new Party Rules and Party Program and generally in the party press in recent years. But what is more important, the power position of Khrushchev, although

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greatly strengthened at the time of his stunning 1957 victory, has apparently never, then or since, been that of an unchallenged and unopposed leader standing above the pressures and vicissitudes of intra-elite politics.

There is no evidence that June 1957 marked the rise of Khrushchev to the role of a personal dictator or *vozhd* (leader) standing in a command position over the higher Soviet political elite and able to prevent opposition from raising its head within the upper ranks of the party. On the contrary, considerable evidence has accumulated (at the time of the U-2 affair, for example, as well as during and after the 22nd Party Congress) that Khrushchev and his group have had to fight to preserve the dominance that was won in the 1957 crisis, and that Khrushchev himself, while he unquestionably exerts a big influence, cannot singlehandedly dictate the policy line of the Soviet regime in either internal or external affairs.

Fortunately, Mr. Pethybridge himself recognizes this at the very conclusion of his study. Commenting upon the fact that a major new attack was launched against the anti-Khrushchev group at the 22nd Party Congress in the autumn of 1961, he infers that "although Khrushchev's victory in June 1957 undoubtedly marked a turning point in the balance of political forces in Russia, it did not lead to the kind of unqualified single dictatorship which prevailed in the past." Certain speeches at the Congress, he goes on, even suggested that Mr. Khrushchev "could not by any means yet take his own mastery of the Soviet Union for granted." In the opinion of this reviewer, this accurately epitomizes the situation as of then—and also as of now.

Guerrillas and Communists

Modern Guerrilla Warfare,
Franklin M. Osanka, Ed.
New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962.

Reviewed by Raymond Garthoff

THE WAVE OF POPULAR concern and interest in Communist revolutionary guerrilla warfare has subsided somewhat from its high watermark reached in 1961. To be sure, the fierce guerrilla war in Vietnam is not perceptibly nearer its end, and the situation in Laos remains shaky. But, on the other hand, the Congo is today relatively more stable than it was in 1961, the Algerian war is over, and the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba, though transitory, has overshadowed the original guerrilla campaign which brought Castro to power.

To hark back to the situation of two years ago, Khrushchev in January 1961 defined more clearly than before Moscow's view of "national liberation wars" and pledged Soviet assistance to such "just" and "sacred" wars. At that time, many expected the Soviet leader's bark to be followed by more bite. But by 1963 we find Khrushchev engaged in bitter public polemics with the Chinese over his policy of giving highest priority to "peaceful coexistence." The Soviet leadership has shown a willingness to take occasional risks in order to enhance its own position of world power, but it has shown little inclination to support overt revolutionary guerrilla movements which, even when successful, have had a rather poor record of subsequent responsiveness to Moscow's bidding.

Despite this, Communist views of guerrilla warfare, and more basically of the role of revolutionary armed struggle in advancing the transition of world society to communism, continue to be of very great importance. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the book under review, as a study of the more fundamental aspects of the subject, or even as a survey of the source materials, is of little assistance. The relationships between war, revolution, guerrilla or irregular warfare, and other forms of political violence in Communist theory and practice are largely untouched.

Modern Guerrilla Warfare consists of thirty-seven previously published articles, loosely grouped into nine

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"parts," with additional bibliographical notes and very brief connecting remarks. Many of the articles are worth reading for their contributions on the tactics and operations of modern guerrillas, and it is useful to have them conveniently in one cover. But even apart from the absence of a broad overview of the place of guerrilla war in Communist ideology and strategy, the organization of the book leaves much to be desired. Most coherent and useful are Parts 5-8, which trace individual guerrilla campaigns in the Philippines, Greece, Indochina, Malaya, Cuba, and Algeria (the last two grouped together as nationalist movements which have "emulated successful Communist techniques"). Also useful, if uneven and overlapping, are the seven concluding essays on *countering* Communist guerrilla warfare; several of these are, in fact, excellent analyses.

However, when we search for the basic underpinning of the role of guerrilla warfare in Soviet, Chinese, and general Communist strategy—which the reader is promised in the preface, subtitle, and jacket blurb—we search in vain. The mélange of subjects jumbled together under the headings "Soviet Russia" and, to a lesser extent, "Communist China," is disappointing. These parts should be the fulcrum of the work, but instead they are where it sags the most.

It is not appatent, for example, what purpose, if any, inspired the editor to lump together an article written by Lenin in 1906, which is *not* concerned with guerrilla warfare (even though mistitled "Partisan Warfare"), an early postwar German account of Soviet partisan-guerrilla activities in World War II, a Hungarian's account of German counterguerrilla tactics, and a propagandistic article on the World War II Galician-Ukrainian anti-Soviet partisans. The broadest article, and the only one to deal with Soviet policy either after or before World War II, is Walter D. Jacobs' essay on "Irregular Warfare and the Soviets." This, unfortunately, reflects the rest of the mélange and compounds the irrelevancies already noted by injecting references to Civil War partisan activities, the creation of the regular Red Army, and World War II Nazi policy. It would certainly have been better to delete the discussions of Soviet guerrilla (and German counterguerrilla) activities, or to group them in a section on special cases of guerrilla and counterguerrilla action employed as an auxiliary to major military operations by regular forces. (Incidentally, the bulk of the extensive scholarship available on the Soviet partisan campaigns in World War II is either ignored or buried in "Further References.")

The section on Communist China hangs together much better as a historical case study, but again—except for the excellent article by Katzenbach and Hanrahan on "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao-Tse-tung"—there is no theoretical or strategic framework. In neither the Russian and Chinese sections nor elsewhere is the key question of the *differences* between current Soviet and Chinese Communist views even posed, much less discussed.

THE QUESTION of what is the correct strategy of Communist revolutionary guerrilla warfare at the present historical juncture is in fact intertwined with other serious theoretical and practical issues which face and divide Communists today. One facet of this question is the "ripeness" of the economically underdeveloped areas for revolutionary action. After all, the Communists had high expectations for the period of the "collapse" of colonialism, yet that time has come, and largely gone, without *any* notable Communist gains (Cuba being a non-colonial exception). Another facet of the problem is the limits of deterrence of the "imperialists." A third is the question of the expediency of Moscow's broader effort to align itself with neutralist, pacifist, and anti-colonial "national-bourgeois" governments which are in no mood to let themselves be supplanted by local Communists. Differing Soviet and Chinese national interests are fused into the conflicting ideological attitudes of the two powers toward the underdeveloped areas, and this ideological clash is in turn reflected in tactical and organizational rivalry within other Communist parties over policy towards local revolutionary movements. These are all basic issues of considerable current importance, yet they find no expression in this book. The tactics of guerrilla (and counterguerrilla) warfare are certainly important, but the strategic role of such operations must be placed in broader perspective.

Perhaps this reviewer is inclined to expect more than he should of such a volume. It is, to repeat, useful to have a compilation of materials on the subject, and many of the case studies and some other articles offered in the book are worthwhile. But from the viewpoint of readers whose main interest lies in Communist strategy and affairs, it seems necessary to stress its limitations.

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NOTES and VIEWS

Who Controls Whom?

THE NEW PARTY-STATE Control Committee is one important feature of the recent multi-faceted administrative overhaul in the Soviet Union which has so far received little attention in the West. The scope of its responsibilities and the massive size of its membership, as well as the fact that it is headed by Central Committee Secretary A. N. Shelepin, who at 44 is already director emeritus of the Komsomol and the KGB and one of the brightest younger stars in the Soviet party firmament, are enough to suggest its great potential as the new overseer of Soviet officialdom. Since last fall, the new inspection agency has been the subject of a high-pressure publicity campaign. At the Central Committee plenum last November, Khrushchev sought to establish its authority by carefully linking it in the public mind with the old Commisariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection of the 1920's and by hailing its creation as a return to Leninism:

The Leninist principle of the organization of party-state checking was flagrantly violated by Stalin. During the period of the cult of personality, the remarkable system of checking which had arisen during the first years of Soviet power was in fact overturned and replaced by a bureaucratic apparatus which was isolated from the masses.[1]

The birth of the Party-State Control Committee was not completely unexpected, for it had been foreshadowed by an on-again, off-again public discussion of inspection problems dating back several years. The decision to create it may be viewed as the culmination of two developments: on the one hand, increasing dissatisfaction with existing state inspection practices and experimentation with new methods; on the other, the regime's growing efforts to enlist more active mass participation in some aspects of state administration.

In 1934, inspection functions were divided between the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee (for party matters) and the Soviet Control Commission, under the Council of People's Commissars (for state affairs). The latter was subsequently renamed the Ministry of State Control and until 1957 acted as a powerful central watchdog over state property and administration. Not only was it charged with controlling the use of state funds, but it also oversaw the fulfillment of all governmental decisions. Its powers were impressive, and its highly centralized and extensive apparatus was so organized as to mirror in microcosm the entire state administration.

In 1957 the Ministry of State Control—under Molotov's direction after his removal as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1956—was abolished amid criticism that it was too centralized and bureaucratic. Apparently its character was deemed incompatible with efforts to breath new flexibility into the state administration by encouraging a measure of cautious decentralization, and in its stead the regime substituted a Commission of Soviet Control with lesser stature, powers and staff. The Commission was directed to place greater reliance on "public checking."

The new organization proved less than successful. In the wake of charges of local malfeasance and complaints of laxity and ineffectiveness in state control, the Commission of Soviet Control gave way in July 1961 to a new State Control Commission designed to retighten central inspection authority over regional and local officials. Nevertheless, complaints of corruption, "localism" and other misdeeds (from the center's point of view) by lower-level officials continued to mount, along with demands in the press for more stringent controls. Here, as in its policies as a whole, the leadership found itself caught in a dilemma: to clamp on stricter controls would undercut its efforts to reduce centralized bureaucracy and red tape; but, on the other hand, given the "command" nature of the administrative system, which makes it difficult for local officials to coordinate their decisions with the interests of the center by some sort of self-regulating mechanism, to give these officials their heads might lead to actions contrary to the national interest as defined by Moscow. The issue

[1] *Pravda*, November 20, 1962.

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was clearly and candidly put by an article in *Kommunist* in October 1961:

The difficulty is that some local officials have interpreted the expansion of their rights as a lessening of supervision over them. We can hardly consider such an interpretation correct. With the broadening of the rights of raion, oblast, and republic agencies, we must also intensify supervision of them, because otherwise the broadening of rights in local areas can lead . . . to arbitrary rule.[2]

CONCURRENT WITH the growing concern for better enforcement of central plans has been the increasing emphasis placed—especially since the 21st Party Congress in 1959—on the use of voluntary, "non-staff" personnel in administrative roles and on the stimulation of "public checking" or "control from below." The regime's efforts to draw the masses into public service are part of its campaign against "bureaucratism" and at the same time a reflection of Khrushchev's brand of populism. They also appear related to an ideologically motivated preoccupation with preparing the population for the "withering away" of the state—a point to which more attention is given later.

The initial evidence would strongly suggest that the new Party-State Control Committee is designed to serve as a sort of "super-ministry" coordinating the efforts of the myriad public checking organizations. A large variety of such organizations has existed—at least on paper—for years; but they have not been particularly effective. By unifying all public checking of governmental activities under the direction of a single authoritative agency and focusing great publicity on its work, the regime evidently hopes at long last to make this form of surveillance an effective force in the life of the state.

The Party-State Control Committee represents, then, a dual attempt to implement not only stricter inspection and control, but also greater public participation in state administration. (It must be emphasized, however, that the committee is concerned only with *state* activities, surveillance of the party remaining the exclusive charge of the old Party Control Commission, which retains its separate identity). Thus, the new organ may be viewed as an integral part of the regime's pervasive effort, evident in most of the November "reforms," to shore up central controls while permitting some flexibilty and local initiative in state administrative operations.

In a sense, the move towards mass involvement in matters of economic administration might be considered a political-administrative substitute for a more radical decentralization of the economy along the lines suggested by the Kharkhov economist, Dr. Yevsei Liberman.[3] Efforts to place the economy on some sort of semi-automatic, self-adjusting basis may yet be forthcoming; but it is characteristic of Khrushchev's *modus operandi* to rely first on more exhortation, more party interference, more mass enthusiasm, and more public participation. Given his political orientation, it is also possible that Khrushchev regards an effective inspection agency as a precondition for more radical economic innovations permitting managers greater flexibility. Although it is difficult to visualize how greater managerial independence might be reconciled with centrally-manipulated "control from below," such a conception is nevertheless deeply ingrained in the ideological precept of democratic centralism.

In addition, the creation of the Party-State Control Committee reflects the leadership's growing concern over the deportment of managerial and middle-echelon administrative personnel, including party functionaries. The depth of this concern has been underlined by public disclosures of all sorts of "economic crimes" ranging from padding of reports to large-scale embezzlement on the part of important regional functionaries, as well as by an intensified official campaign against "speculators" and "parasites." We know from refugee reports that these phenomena have existed to some degree in the Soviet Union for a long time. *Blat*, it used to be said, was higher than Stalin; and nepotism and the *tolkachi* (business influence peddlers) are certainly not novelties of only the last few years. Even Stalin's harsh methods of fragmenting lower authority did not always prevent small coteries of local officials from forming mutual protection societies which wielded great political power within their geographical bailiwicks and garnered considerable profit for their members. How, then, is one to explain the greater publicity given to this problem in recent years?

FOR ONE THING, the incidence of economic crimes has most likely increased since the mid-1950's as an unwanted and unanticipated side-effect of the measures taken to curb the repressive apparatus of the Stalinist system. Reduction of the size and powers of the secret police and its informer network probably eased police supervision of managerial cadres and thus lessened the latter's chances and fear of being caught if they misbehaved. Such tendencies were also encouraged by the abandonment of criminal penalties for some forms of administrative misdoing and the reduction of penalties for others still treated as criminal offenses. Moreover, moves to breathe new flexibility into the administrative system and to reduce strangulating bureaucracy through decentralization had the effect of giving greater leeway to regional and local officials. At the same time, on the other hand, the Khrushchev leadership has been much more concerned with the public image of the party and with establishing its authority on the basis of public acceptance. It obviously recognizes that illegal self-enrichment by administrative officials tends to defeat this aim.

[2] I. Boliasny, "O sisteme partiinovo i gosudarstvennovo kontrolia," *Kommunist*, No. 15 (October) 1961, p. 90.

[3] See: Alec Nove, "The Liberman Proposals," *Survey*, No. 47 (April), 1963; and Marshall I. Goldman, "Economic Controversy in the Soviet Union," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1963.

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For these and perhaps other politically motivated reasons, there has been a noticeable retightening of controls and sanctions in the Soviet Union during the last few years.[4] The death penalty has been reimposed for various economic crimes, including even large-scale speculation, and a number of other economic offenses have been made punishable under the criminal codes. Antiparasite laws have been enacted and numerous devices instituted to apply social pressure to those who violate the norms of acceptable socialist behavior. Seen in this perspective, the Party-State Control Committee is undoubtedly meant to be yet another weapon to enforce compliance with the official standards.

The all-union Party-State Control Committee stands at the top of an organizational hierarchy with corresponding bodies at the republic and each successively lower level of territorial administration.[5] At the oblast level, there are two committees corresponding to the division of the party and state apparatuses into industrial and agricultural branches. The control committee at each level is responsible to the corresponding echelon of both the party and governmental apparatuses, *e.g.*, to the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers at the all-union level, and to the party committee of the territorial production administration and the local soviet at the lowest rung of the hierarchy. In addition, following the familiar principle of both horizontal and vertical subordination, each control committee is subject to its counterpart at the next higher territorial level.

The membership of the control committee at any level includes representatives of the trade union council for that particular territorial subdivision, of the Komsomol, and the press; party and managerial officials; and the customary smattering of workers and *kolkhozniki*.[6] The chairman of the committee is invariably either a secretary of the parallel party committee or, less often, a deputy chairman of the republic council of ministers or (at lower levels) of the soviet executive committee. Thus, the new inspection apparatus is not divorced from local officialdom. Although information is scanty, the all-union and republic committees appear to have full-time staffs including at least two deputy chairmen and other personnel organized into sections or departments for agriculture and industry, for handling complaints and letters, and perhaps others. The committees in larger cities and oblasts also have some full-time staff, but their organization is unclear.

At the grass-roots level, groups have been organized in enterprises, collective farms, housing administrations, and other institutions for the purpose of assisting the local control committees. The committees proper, at least at this level, also have some non-staff departments manned by volunteers. In this way, Khrushchev's command that "the broad working masses must be drawn into the work of checking organs" is being put into practice.

IN WEIGHING THE potential of the new control mechanism for developing into a lasting major institution, it is necessary first to consider the main problems it may encounter. At least initially, a major pitfall is the danger that it may be captured by the regular party apparatus and become merely the handmaiden of the entrenched official clique at each administrative echelon. As previously noted, the new inspection apparatus has not been made independent of the established party and governmental hierarchies (as had been suggested in much of the public discussion preceding its establishment and as had been true of the Party Control Committee and the old Ministry of State Control before the mid-1950's). That it was not established as a totally independent, centralized agency was probably a sop to the regular party apparatus (and in all likelihood it was for the same reason that the new institution was not given jurisdiction over party disciplinary matters). There is nevertheless a possibility that, in time, the bonds between the inspectors and the established party and state authorities may be loosened, especially should the present arrangement prove to inhibit the work of the control committees.

Another dubious question is whether "public inspection" and mass participation will prove any more effective a panacea for Soviet economic ills today than they have in the past. No doubt, if properly organized, public inspection will turn up a number of economic malefactors; and if it boosts morale by giving the masses a greater sense of personal involvement in the state and the economy, this will be all to the good. On the other hand, the problems of control in the Soviet economy arise not merely from the presence of incompetent or unscrupulous managerial personnel, but also from the "command" nature of the economic system and the frenetic pace with which production is pushed. The absence of slack in the economy and the setting of production targets at (or even above) maximum productive capacity—especially in agriculture—as well as the frequent inconsistency of orders handed down by the various central organs and the absence of rational criteria by which local officials can discriminate between

[4] See: Harold J. Berman, "The Dilemma of Soviet Law Reform," *Harvard Law Review*, No. 5 (March), 1963; Harry Willets, "The Wages of Economic Sin," *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.), 1962.

[5] *Pravda*, January 18, 1963, devotes an editorial to the statute of the Party-State Control Committee.

[6] In addition to the chairman and deputy chairman, the party-state control committee for the Moscow Oblast Industrial Party and Executive Committees, as of mid-February, had the following members: first secretary of the Moscow Oblast Industrial Komsomol Committee, a designer, director of the Krasnogorsk Mechanical Plant, manager of the Special Construction Trust No. 2, a mechanic, chairman of the party-state control committee of Kolomna City, chairman of the Zagorsk City Executive Committee, first secretary of the Orekhovo-Zuyevo Gorkom, deputy editor of the newspaper *Leninskoe znamia*, a weaver, and the secretary of the organizational bureau of the oblast industrial trade union council.

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these orders or make their own decisions, put the managerial cadres in ambiguous situations. David Granick, Joseph Berliner, Alex Nove and others have pointed out that to be successful, Soviet managers must almost inevitably indulge in some manipulation of official rules and procedures. Hence, intensified public checking, if effective, could even have the contrary effect of impairing the informal operating aspects of the economic system.

Undoubtedly many Soviet managers and local officials look askance at the renewed effort to broaden the inspection machinery. Constant prying and public checking are time-consuming. Moreover, in many cases, a politically motivated public inspector might not be qualified to make discriminating judgments about the operation of an enterprise. Thus, the fact that the new inspection agency was not created until more than two years after the initiation of public discussion about its desirability may well reflect foot-dragging by managerial and other economic personnel.

Finally, like most of the other instrumentalities that have been created to exert social pressure against Soviet citizens who violate the canons of socialist morality, the new control organization seems to be unbound by the type of legal safeguards that would be necessary to protect individual rights and prevent administrative arbitrariness. Unless the "New Soviet Man" has indeed come into being, the control committees will have to cope not only with justified accusations but also with fraudulent, malicious charges motivated by personal grievances or by ambition to succeed in the bureaucratic jungle by discrediting rivals and superiors. Unless the allegations of volunteer inspectors are scrupulously handled, it is likely that the reputations of innocent persons will be blackened. As a party secretary in the Krasnoyarsky krai pointed out last November, "the question is not how to create a circle of suspicion, overcautiousness, and mutual distrust; no, quite the reverse."[7]

The danger of arbitrariness is the greater because the mandate of the new inspection agency is so broad. Not only is it to root out "bureaucrats, parasites, bribe-takers, thieves, speculators and confidence men"; but it is even charged with preventing before the fact "mistakes and the possibility of any abuses" by helping "to indoctrinate cadres, to guard against shortcomings and failures in work." Its powers are correspondingly extensive. It is authorized to demand reports and documents from state organizations; to "stop illegal orders and acts . . . which damage the interests of the state; establish periods for the correction of persons who are guilty of unsatisfactory fulfillment of party and government decisions; . . . impose cash fines on officials who materially damage state, cooperative and public organizations; bring culprits to account and impose disciplinary penalties; demote culprits and remove them from their posts; and send materials on abuses and other criminal acts to organs of the prosecutor's office to bring wrongdoers to criminal responsibility." Although these sanctions appear generally the same as those exercised by the old Ministry of State Control, they are now tied in with public inspection on a massive scale. No wonder there have been expressions of concern that the inspection apparatus may operate in an arbitrary and capricious manner and that *Pravda* has warned that "control organs are obliged to use intelligently the rights which are given to them and not be overzealous in applying measures of punishment. . . ."[8]

[7] *Sovetskaia Rossiia*. November 25, 1962.
[8] *Pravda*, January 18, 1963.

CONTROL OR COLLUSION?

Caption below: "They've agreed on a draw." (Figures left and right are labeled "Director of the Store" and "Controller."

—From Krokodil (Moscow), May 10, 1963

Согласились на ничью.

Рисунок Е. ЩЕГЛОВА

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AS WE HAVE SEEN, the Party-State Control Committee and its subordinate organs were created to cope with important practical problems, and the future of the new machinery will depend primarily on how well it handles these tasks and avoids the pitfalls mentioned above. However, another factor likely to affect its development is the ability and dynamism of Shelepin, who will undoubtedly seek to use the agency as a vehicle to enhance his own power and prestige. (Parenthetically, a touchstone to the fortunes of the committee may be whether or not Shelepin's job catapults him into the exalted ranks of the party Presidium.) Finally, ideological considerations will also be an important factor inasmuch as the control agency, in its new form and operating methods, is supposed to implement one of Khrushchev's pet doctrinal concepts—the withering away of the state.

Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev has propounded the concept of the gradual and purposeful evolution of society towards a condition of statelessness (whatever that may be). He has shrewdly connected this goal with more immediate and pragmatic steps, an important one being the transfer of some state functions to "public organizations." He thus ideologically sanctions and stimulates more extensive tapping of unpaid part-time labor on civic projects, woos public support and involvement, and is able to point to tangible evidence of the state's withering away as proof of a narrowing gap between reality and the Communist utopia. Although it may be difficult to take seriously the ritual about the withering away of the state, the new inspection agency, from the Communist viewpoint, is an integral part of the broader development embracing comrades' courts, workers' militia, volunteer people's guards, and antiparasite laws—all conceived as stepping-stones to the Communist millenium.

The new control structure in part overlaps both the regular party apparatus and even more so the local soviets and their executive organs. Duplication is of course nothing new in Soviet administration, but it does give rise to friction and ballooning bureaucracy. In the case of the party, for example, the new inspection agency would appear to usurp the functions of the voluntary control commissions of primary party organizations, set up in enterprises in mid-1959. The regular party apparatus, however, does not appear to be threatened because it is more solidly entrenched and because the new control committees will presumably remain largely under its thumb. The same cannot be said for the soviets. Although predictions about developments in the Soviet Union are always tenuous, especially now when so much is in flux, the revised inspection system, if successful, may well set the stage for a substantial alteration of the soviets.

What are the grounds for such a prognostication? First, the Khrushchev regime has not been particularly successful in reactivating the soviets after their dragoonment by Stalin. Second, the functions of the standing committees of the soviets are precisely those of the new control committees. Third, the soviets have increasingly been stripped of their powers in the last several years. Last November, for example, all "local" industry of significance—representing about 11 percent of industrial production—was transferred from the jurisdiction of the local soviets to that of the regional economic councils. Paradoxically, one of the side effects of the greater stress on "regionalization" in administrative organization appears to have been even greater restrictions on the prerogatives of lower-level soviets. Fourth, on the party side of the equation, Khrushchev has several times indicated that he expects the governmental apparatus to wither away in advance of the party since the latter has "deeper roots." Finally, the soviets, as everyone knows, have never been very significant policy-making institutions. Thus, by elevating the new inspection apparatus in some manner at the expense of the soviets, the regime may hope to have found a convenient and inexpensive way of demonstrating progress towards the demise of the state and the arrival of communism.

Howard Swearer

(Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, Mr. Swearer contributed "Bolshevism and the Individual Leader" to the March-April, 1963, issue of this journal.)

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The Rajk Case: A Reappraisal

THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV controversy, which came into the open in March 1948 and developed into a full-fledged schism with the issuance of the Cominform's Bucharest Resolution three months later, was to produce a *cause célèbre* that will long be remembered. It was the trial of Laszlo Rajk and "his accomplices," most of them Hungarian Communists, on charges of plotting against Communist-ruled Hungary on Yugoslav orders, with the active support of the British and American intelligence services. The Rajk trial produced ostensibly "irrefutable proofs" that the Yugoslav Communist leaders were American agents and "war criminals," and that Rajk himself was a police spy, traitor, *déserteur* and international adventurer. He was hanged on October 15, 1949.

Although the broader purpose and meaning of the Rajk trial were clear from the outset,[1] many aspects of the case remained secret until recently. The official rehabilitation of Rajk and some of his fellow accused, carried out in 1956, gave a measure of moral satisfaction to the families of those unjustly condemned and to the survivors of the major purge that followed Rajk's arrest, but it did not clarify a number of key points. Why was Rajk made the main victim of the trial? Who decided his fate? How did the secret police obtain the confessions indispensable to the success of the trial? None of these questions was answered in 1956.

The charges brought against Rajk and the other accused (who included General György Pálffy and Tibor Szónyi, head of the personnel department of the Hungarian Communist Party) were at once monstrous and ridiculous, though their very monstrosity silenced many who would have liked to ridicule them openly. Some of them had a familiar ring, obviously taking their cue from the Moscow trials of 1936-38; others were apparently invented on the spot to suit the political expediency of the moment. Thus, stock anti-Trotskyist accusations, such as spying on behalf of a foreign power, plotting against the lives of party leaders (in this case, Rákosi, Gerö, Farkas), and conspiring to restore capitalism, were interwoven with and complemented by fanciful charges of Yugoslav Communist collaboration with the CIC and the *Deuxième Bureau* in organizing Trotskyist groups in Hungary in order to split the Hungarian Communist Party. The three alleged evil spirits behind the "plotters" and "spies" were Allen Dulles of the U. S. intelligence, Yugoslav Minister of Interior Aleksander Rankovich, and former Hungarian police official Sombor-Schweinitzer. The first two names had a political-demonological, the third a practical significance. Sombor-Schweinitzer was necessary as a link between past and present: most of the accused were said to have been his informers in the past, hence they could be blackmailed and recruited into the American and Yugoslav secret services.

Whereas the accused Communists in the Moscow "show trials" had been charged with *degenerating* into agents of foreign powers, the script of the Rajk trial produced even more appalling "revelations" purporting to prove that Rajk and his accomplices *had never been* Communists. They were said to have been diversionists and opportunists all their lives—consequently, natural allies of Tito's devilish "plot against Europe".[3] Rajk, a veteran of the International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War and Hungary's ruthless Communist Minister of Interior between 1946 and 1948, himself testified that he had been a police agent and informer since 1932. Tibor Szónyi, whom the Swiss police had known during the war as a dangerous Stalinist[4] (he had taken refuge from the Nazis in Switzerland), confessed that he was an American agent. György Pálffy-Oesterreicher, a hero of the Hungarian anti-Nazi Resistance during the war, told the court that his political ideal was Mussolini's fascism. None of the three was in any way guilty of the crimes to which he confessed. Ironically, the only Hungarian defendant to come out of the main trial with his life, the Social Democrat Pál Justus, was the sole accused with a genuine Trotskyist past.

[1] As F. Fetjo observes in his *Histoire des démocraties populaires* (Paris, Seuil, 1952, p. 254), "One could say that the Rajk trial was nothing but an *ersatz* trial of Belgrade which could not take place."

[2] Before World War II Sombor-Schweinitzer had headed the political department of the Hungarian police. He was deported by the Germans in 1944 for alleged anti-German activities.

[3] Derek Kartun, editor of the London *Daily Worker*, published a book on the Rajk case under the title *Tito's Plot Against Europe* (London, 1949).

[4] See F. Fejto, *La tragédie hongroise*, Paris, 1956, p. 75.

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ANOTHER FEATURE WHICH made the Rajk trial look like a refurbished, second-rate version of the Moscow trials was the very unanimity and uniformity of the confessions. All eight accused fully admitted their guilt and endured the procecutor's scorn with exemplary meekness, literally holding out the other cheek. Their confessions and statements before the court were all framed in a uniform, cut-and-dried style suggestive of a prosecutor, often repeating, word for word, ritual Cominform phrases and formulas. The confessions of the accused were thinly-veiled self-denunciations, and their last appeals open denunciations of Tito, Kardelj and Rankovich. The prosecution called in witnesses in large numbers, but not one appeared on the side of the defense. Amongst them were former functionaries of the Horthy regime, Communists who had fought together with Rajk in Spain or knew Szónyi from Switzerland, and a man named István Stolte, a colleague and comrade of Rajk many years before. Stolte's appearance in the dock surprised some people who thought he was living in Germany. They were right, but Stolte had been tricked into visiting Vienna, had been kidnapped there by the MVD and spirited to Hungary.[5]

Just last year the many still unanswered questions about the Rajk trial were reopened again by the announcement of a decision by the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) to rehabilitate "all victims of the autocracy connected with the cult of personality."[6] This was evidence of Kadar's wish to dissociate himself and his government from the crimes of the Rakosi regime and to close a shameful chapter in the history of the Hungarian party. For the gross violation of justice inherent in the Rajk Trial and in all the subsequent sub-trials held *in camera* (Kádár himself was sentenced in one of these trials) the 1962 MSZMP declaration blamed "the cult of personality" in general, and Rákosi, Gerö, Farkas and the leaders of the Hungarian Security Police (AVH) in particular. The members of the so-called Rákosi clique, it said. concocted fictitious charges against their fellow Communists solely in order to strengthen their personal power. "On the basis of the documents at its disposal," added the declaration, "the Central Committee came to the conclusion that the schemes behind the trials that took place in the period of the cult of personality . . . were made up by Rakosi himself." The document also condemned the judicial organs which complied with Rakosi's orders and cooperated in staging the trials.

This somewhat belated pronouncement by the MSZMP has two conspicuous shortcomings: it devotes only one discreet sentence to the anti-Titoist aspect of the trial, and this without actually naming Yugoslavia; and it preserves complete silence on the role played by Soviet security organs in the conception and preparation of the Rajk trial. Yet it is clear that, without Stalin's maniacal determination to destroy Tito's heresy and without the closest possible cooperation between the AVH and the MVD, the Rajk trial could not have taken place even if Rákosi had willed it. Rákosi and Gábor Péter of the AVH could hardly have preconceived Stalin's intentions; they merely helped realize those intentions by finding a scapegoat through whom Tito's perfidy could be demonstrated. As for Rajk, he was no Titoist, nor even an oppositionist; he was simply the most suitable person for Rakosi and the Soviet secret police to cast in the stellar role of Titoist agent.

THIS IS ONE of the conclusions that can be drawn from the excellent, 347-page study of the Rajk case by Vincent Savarius (Béla Szász), recently published in Hungarian by the Imre Nagy Institute in Brussels.[7] Savarius had been active in the illegal Communist movement in Hungary as early as 1931, and his friendship with Rajk went back to that same period, when both were students at Budapest University. This and the fact that Savarius lived abroad during the war were more than enough to make him "suspect"—that is, potentially useful for the scriptwriters of the Rajk case. He was arrested in May 1949, kept in prison for more than five years, finally rehabilitated, and since 1957 has been living in London. His book is a highly readable and remarkably objective record of his personal experiences, interspersed with interesting comments and observations about the fabrication of the Rajk case and the techniques of the Hungarian secret police.

Savarius maintains that before his frame-up Rajk had not been involved in any factional struggle against Rakosi, and he adduces evidence to show that Rajk, in fact, supported the anti-Yugoslav decision of the Cominform. If there was any tension between Rákosi and Rajk, it would have resulted from *tactical* rather than ideological differences. The Moscow-approved policy of the Hungarian party after World War II was the formation of a coalition with friendly non-Communist parties, stressing all the time the democratic and patriotic character of the Hungarian Communists. Class warfare was, for the time being, relegated to the background. But if Rakosi was a tactician, Rajk certainly was not: he was a fighter, almost a fanatic. He played a major role in the gradual elimination of the coalition and the suppression of the non-Communist parties in the immediate postwar period. If anything, Rajk was too zealous and too popular amongst militant Communists for Rakosi's liking. The anti-Semitism attributed to Rajk by some[8] could not have been a decisive factor in his selection by Rákosi to be the chief villain of the piece, for out of the six Hungarians accused in the Rajk trial, three were of Jewish origin, and both Szónyi and Szalai

[5] See Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961, p. 61.

6. "A Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart Kozpenti Bizottsaganak hatarozata a személyi kultusz éveiben a munkasmozgalmi emberek ellen inditott torvénysérto perek lezarasarol," *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), August-September 1962, p. 47.

[7] Vincent Savarius, *Minden kneyszer nelkul*. Brussels, 1963.

[8] Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, 1948, p. 190.

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were said to have Zionist connections. Rather, it appears to have been, above all, the fanatic, unconditional nature of Rajk's devotion to the Party—hence, his presumable willingness to sacrifice himself for it—that decided the architects of the trial to make him the main victim in preference to Imre Nagy or any other possible candidate. Other favorable factors, from the scriptwriters' viewpoint, were the "vulnerability" of his past[9] and the fact that he had been to many foreign countries, including France, Spain and Yugoslavia, and had met many foreign Communists. In many ways, he was the ideal scapegoat.

What we have, therefore is not so much a powerful, malevolent Rákosi scheming to destroy Rajk out of political enmity as a servile and resourceful Rákosi giving bright ideas to General Bielkin of the MVD, the stage director of this ambitious Soviet-Hungarian coproduction. Savarius believes that even Bielkin had to consult Moscow, the final decisions resting with Stalin.[10] Once Rajk had agreed under pressure to play his assigned part, the trial took place, and therewith both Stalin and Rákosi achieved their respective aims. On Stalin's side, the depth of Tito's "treason" stood revealed; on Rákosi's, a blow was dealt to the Western-oriented Hungarian Communists, and Communist Party members throughout Eastern Europe were intimidated into complete obedience.[11]

The Hungarian secret police handled the prisoners involved in the Rajk trial and its subsidiary cases with special brutality, torturing them in the most horrible ways, psychologically as well as physically. The investigators used both threats and false promises: some of the principal accused were offered "deals" (similar to that offered Radek before his Moscow trial) none of which was actually honored; others broke down under the pressure of dramatic appeals to their party loyalty. All these methods are known to have been employed in the preparatory stages of the Moscow trials. The AVH looked upon the prisoners, to quote Savarius, simply as "pre-fabricated elements of a building under construction."[12] The construction work had three stages: in the first, confessions were extorted in the hundreds, in the second, these confessions were fitted together and any gaps or contradictions filled in or eliminated; and finally the assembled "building" was painted and decorated—the trail could begin.

SAVARIUS-SZASZ had the courage and stubbornness not to admit to accusations which might have landed him in the prisoners' dock at the main trial—and also the good fortune of not being really necessary to the prosecution of the trial. He was separately tried *in camera* together with other superfluous "prefabricated elements." Only his name was mentioned in the Rajk trial: the prosecutor referred to him once as a British, and once as an American spy.

The irrational, often demonological, features of the Rajk case and the atrocious methods employed by the AVH in its preparation undermined the faith of even the staunchest Communist believers who were touched by it. Many who experienced AVH brutality lost faith in the party entirely, and even those victims who have since remained loyal Communists underwent a serious moral crisis. This crisis is vividly described by Gyula Oszkó, himself a police officer at the time of his arrest, who only recently published his reminiscences in Budapest.[13] Oszkó does not hide the total helplessness and despair that gripped him in jail and the bitterness he felt upon learning the outcome of the Rajk trial. He was convinced of Rajk's innocence (having known him from Spain) and could not accept the cynical claim that the frame-up would serve "the interest of the Party". The only thing that kept up his spirits during the five years he spent in jail was the hope that time would ultimately vindicate the truth that "a just cause cannot be served by unjust means."[14] We believe that the same truth impelled Vincent Savarius to write his book.

The international consequences of the Rajk case—Tito's continued defiance of Stalin and Yugoslavia's embarkation on its "own road to socialism"—are well known. Yet, the consequences of Rajk's execution within Hungary were equally important, for it was his ghost that roused Hungarian Communist writers to rebel against Rákosi, finally leading to the dictator's downfall. October 6, 1956, when the honorary reburial of Rajk and his comrades took place, was an advance rehearsal for the events of October 23: amongst the silent mourners at the graveside stood those who were to lead the huge student demonstration seventeen days later, raising the curtain on the Hungarian uprising.

In 1949, Laszlo Rajk had died ignominiously on the gallows because of Stalin's desire to crush Tito. But in October 1956 it was Stalin's colossus that toppled under the blows of history.

George Gomori

(Mr. Gömöri, who left his native Hungary after the October 1956 uprising, is at present Lecturer in Polish and Hungarian Literatures at the University of California, Berkeley.)

[9] Ferenc Vali explains the reasons for this "vulnerability" in his book (*op. cit.*, p. 34): "In World War II, when Rajk was arrested as a Communist conspirator by the pro-Nazi Hungarian movement, his life was saved by two powerful Arrow-Cross brothers. After the war he repaid this debt by removing the names of his brothers (then in Germany) from the list of war criminals."

[10] Savarius, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

[11] According to authoritative accounts, Rajk at first refused but finally was persuaded to yield by Janos Kadar, then Minister of Interior. See Savarius, *op. cit.*, p. 213, and G. Paloczi-Horvath, *The Undefeated*. London, 1959, pp. 259-62.

[12] Savarius, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

[13] *Kortars* (Budapest), February 1963.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

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Correspondence

EDITOR'S NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed according to instructions on the front inside cover.)

ON STALIN

TO THE EDITORS: The March-April issue of *Problems of Communism,* containing an article by Francis Randall on the early biographies of Stalin, fell into my hands shortly before my departure for the Soviet Union (the first trip in over 38 years), and in view of Dr. Randall's gracious yet reluctant comments on my *Stalin,* I would appreciate space for a few observations. Since Dr. Randall has undertaken to do a new biography of Stalin, to a study of whose career I have devoted nearly 35 years, allow me to enlighten him on some of the facts to which he adverts.

1. In discussing at length Essad Bey's book on Stalin, Dr. Randall refers to him as a "deliberately mysterious German Near Eastern writer using the Turkish name and title of Essad Bey." Essad Bey's real name is Nusselbaum, a Russian-Jewish refugee in the Caucasus whose true identity was well-known to his publishers. I was reliably informed that Essad Bey did not even know Georgian, and was certainly not a German. The real mystery to me is why Dr. Randall should have gone to such lengths to dissect Essad Bey's "biography" which no serious student of the Russian Revolution ever regarded as anything but a fictional melange on the order of Raguza's French biography which introduced Stalin as a Jew and of the notorious French fabrication under the name of Svanidze, *My Uncle Joe.*

2. Louis Fischer did not break "decisively with communism during the Great Purges", but considerably later, after the conclusion of the "Stalin-Hitler" (Molotov-Ribbentrop) Pact. Mr. Fischer is an American writer, a native of Philadelphia, although he may also be "of Russian origin," which is quite different from "a writer of Russian origin."

3. If I may be allowed a few words of comment about my *Stalin,* of special interest to students of his life, it contained the first and only complete bibliography on Stalin available by 1931, at a time when Stalin was the most enigmatic figure on the world stage. That is why my book (because of the source material) was welcomed by H. G. Wells in a note to me as "a godsend," why persons ranging from Albert Einstein to Col. House hailed it as a revelation of an area hitherto hidden from western eyes. Let Dr. Randall look up Dorothy Thompson's report on her visit to the Soviet Union and he will discover that she did not even learn Stalin's first name when she was in Moscow. If memory does not betray me, she called him Peter Stalin.

ISAAC DON LEVINE
Waldorf, Maryland

MR. RANDALL REPLIES: I am glad that Mr. Levine has penetrated the mystery of "Essad Bey," who *was* credited by his publisher with being a Georgian-speaking German officer in the Ottoman army; his book was worth discussing for its influence on Hitler. I stand corrected on the birthplace of Louis Fischer. However, I must cite the testimony of Mr. Fischer, a man whose word I do not doubt, in his autobiography, *Men and Politics.* There he movingly describes his "divorce" from Stalin's Russia during his stay in Moscow in 1937 as his friends were being purged. Fischer, long a defender of Communist Russia, never justified the purges, and prolonged silence from such a source spoke volumes. His silence jeopardized his chances of getting his Russian wife and Russian-born children out of the Soviet Union, as Soviet officials gave him to understand. Nevertheless, Mr. Fischer had the courage to dissent openly from Stalin's policies at the beginning of 1939, while the purges were still going on, before his family was safe, and many months before the Stalin-Hitler Pact. Mr. Levine's *Stalin* was indeed a book the world needed very badly. It was, as I said in my article, "the best of the early lives of Stalin."

ON RODOS

TO THE EDITORS: Mr. Conquest's suggestion concerning the identity of the mysterious Soviet secret police interrogator Rodos (see his letter in the March-April, 1963 issue)

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is ingenious and has certain attractive aspects. The following facts are relevant, and should be kept in mind in evaluating the suggestion:

(1) The name Rodos is not unknown in the Soviet secret police during the period under discussion. A Captain Boris Veniaminovich Rodos of the State Security service received the Order of the Red Banner under a decree of April 26, 1940 (*Izvestia,* April 27, 1940).

(2) As for Redens, he was awarded the ominous Order of Lenin under a decree of July 11, 1937 (*i.e.,* at the same time as his colleague, the ill-fated Zakovsky; *Sobranie zakonov* . . . SSSR, 1937, II, No. 27, Art. 200).

(3) Mrs. Murray's report of Redens' transfer, arrest, and execution (*I Spied For Stalin,* p. 191) appears to be based on personal knowledge of the facts, including the return to Moscow of Mme. Redens (sister of Stalin's wife) and her resumption of her maiden name, Allilueva.

(4) Although Orlov does not explicitly state that Redens was purged, the context strongly implies that he was. If Mrs. Murray is right in reporting that Redens was first sent to Kazakhstan as NKVD chief (a report which it should be possible to check) before being arrested and executed, Orlov's lack of knowledge of the circumstances of his purge would be easy to explain (Orlov himself was not in the Soviet Union at the time).

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MR. CONQUEST REPLIES: I had taken into account all of Mr. Slusser's points except one, and don't think they vitally affected my suggestion. His identification of a definite Rodos, on the other hand, does seem final. I am grateful to him: in this obscure area hypotheses are made to be withdrawn in the face of the—too-often elusive—facts!

ON SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

TO THE EDITORS: May I take this opportunity to congratulate you on the article "Russia and China: Perennial Conflict" by Mark Mancall (March-April 1963). The analysis, it seems to me, gets close to a major root of Sino-Soviet controversy.

It should be construed as in no sense a criticism of the article—but rather as an expression of approval—to suggest that it invites consideration of other possibly important roots and issues of conflict which ought not to be overlooked. Some are of course closely intertwined, with the inevitable consequence—all too familiar in history and the social sciences—that cause and effect are frequently difficult to distinguish.

Traditionally, in Chinese thought, there has been no concept of equality in international relations. For millenia, until the nineteenth century, Chinese leaders and scholars had been accustomed to perceive of China as the only real culture, the only civilization, and the only great power on earth. All other peoples and countries were considered to be of inferior status and properly tributary to the might and prestige of the Empire. Following the Opium War of 1839 it must have been a galling experience to see the situation reversed, to see China becoming more and more an economic and political tributary to the barbarian and essentially inferior West.

The Ch'ing dynasty found itself helpless against the onslaught of Western technology and Western economic and political penetration. It became increasingly clear to many Chinese that power and prestige in the world—if not basic survival—depended upon a rapidly developing technology and a new political, economic and even social order. But how was China to obtain the basic knowledge and wherewithal? The dilemma seemed inescapable: the more China borrowed from the West, the more dependent it seemed to grow.

For some Chinese the Marxist-Leninist system appeared to offer a way out—a bootstrap operation which could be performed almost independently, or at least without submission to outside dominance. Even during the 1920's and 1930's, as Mr. Mancall has ably pointed out, it became painfully evident, however, that Communist parties of differing environments and different cultures could maintain somewhat different goals and interests and could prefer different ways of doing things. With the achievement of power over the Mainland by the Chinese Communists, these early differences were aggravated.

Living on two differnt levels of political, economic, and broad revolutionary development, the Soviet Union and Communist China tended to see the world through somewhat different lenses. Their problems differed, and so did their priorities. Perceived from Moscow, the situation in China must frequently have looked discouraging, with the population exploding with each advance in sanitation and technology, and basic needs outstripping productivity almost *ad infinitum.*

China depended upon the Soviet Union for crucial technical assistance and economic credits, but in Peking it must have become increasingly clear that Moscow, ambitious to overtake and surpass the United States, had no intention—beyond certain relatively narrow limits—of underwriting China's economic and technological uplift.

It must have hurt Chinese pride to be compelled always to ask for more—and perhaps to be told what to do or how to do it. During the years of relative Chinese isolation from Moscow, Mao had found it feasible to pay lip service to Stalin's greatness and omniscience and still do what he, Mao, thought best. But Khrushchev may well have impressed Mao as an upstart, just at a time when China needed more, rather than less, Soviet assistance.

With the achievement of nuclear and missile capability by the Russians in 1957, it seems likely that further disagreement arose over how this new source of military

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power ought to be deployed and used—not so much directly, perhaps, but as a psychologically potent threat. To the Chinese it may have seemed that the Russians were failing to take sufficient advantage of their new capability, especially in support of Chinese interests in Asia.

Aggravating these various circumstances was the fact that the world Communist system offered inadequate processes and institutions for handling conflicts betwen national parties in an orderly, effective, and reciprocally admissible fashion. Like the inadequacy of Communist insituations for the orderly achievement of leadership succession *within* the various movements, this underdevelopment of institutions for channeling, containing, and resolving conflicts *among* parties and governments began to emerge as a serious flaw in the system. Gates were left open for serious contests and collisions between interests and between contenders for ultimate decision-making power within the Communist world and its outlying territories.

Within this wider context we might suspect powerful and disturbing historical and psychological compulsions, in Peking, toward the eventual reestablishment of the ancient Empire's prestige and even of its outermost boundaries—an image perhaps too grand for the somewhat more limited field of immediate reality.

Perhaps Mr. Mancall's article will stimulate further discussion of this difficult but extremely pertinent sphere of investigation.

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IN FUTURE ISSUES

A SYMPOSIUM on Khrushchev, the Soviet elite, and the problem of succession. Participants: Carl Linden, T. H. Rigby, Robert Conquest, and others.

A SYMPOSIUM on "Soviet Colonialism: Does It Exist?" Participants: Hugh Seton-Watson, Richard Pipes, Michael Rywkin, and others.

ALSO: Marshal Shulman on Russia and the ECO; Boris Goldenberg and Ernst Halperin on Castroism; Victor Alba on Communism and Agrarian Reforms in Latin America; and Peter Wiles on Economic Reorganizations in the USSR.

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